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ABSTRACT 
TITLE 
 
 
BEING-RESPONSIBLE IN PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC SUPERVISION: 
A HERMENEUTIC PHENOMENOLOGICAL STUDY 
 
 
RITA GLOVER 
 
Psychotherapeutic supervision exists to support, develop and monitor the practice of 
counsellors and psychotherapists. This endeavour creates an opportunity for counsellors and 
psychotherapists to learn and develop their craft and engage in on-going professional 
development. The establishment of a safe and trusting supervisory relationship enables 
supervisees to openly reflect on their casework and gain professional and personal insights. 
Psychotherapeutic supervisors are experienced practitioners, who are motivated to empower 
their supervisees, share their wisdom and safeguard clients. The question guiding this 
research was ‘What is the meaning of being a psychotherapeutic supervisor?’ In order to 
address this question a Heideggerian, hermeneutic phenomenological philosophical and 
methodological position was taken. Evocative experiences were captured from 22 interviews 
with 14 experienced psychotherapeutic supervisors who practised in Northern Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland.  The analysis of the stories borrowed from participants illuminated the 
Phenomenon of Responsibility.  This phenomenon manifested in unique yet common human 
experiences in terms of Responsibility as being-true and being-untrue ,Responsibility as 
leaping-in and leaping-ahead, and Responsibility as existing-resolutely. This study offers the 
finding that an enduring meaning of being a psychotherapeutic supervisor is being-
responsible. The view is offered that existential angst pervades psychotherapeutic supervisory 
relationships and is inter-twined with experiences of heightened responsibility. The 
participants’ stories have revealed that the experience of responsibility pervades the world of 
psychotherapeutic supervision. Being-responsible was an inescapable experience for these 
psychotherapeutic supervisors. It is contended that responsibility is a hidden yet influential 
aspect of being a psychotherapeutic supervisor which if unconcealed could be of benefit to 
the supervisory endeavour. It is argued that the phenomenon of responsibility can be rendered 
intelligible, in the world of psychotherapeutic supervision, by moving outside of the confines 
of epistemologies that focus on theories about responsibility or prescribed ethical guidelines 
and instead, by uncovering and dwelling in the day to day lived experience of being-
responsible when being in human to human relationships.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Psychotherapeutic Supervision- A Human to Human Encounter 
Psychotherapeutic supervision is a human to human encounter in which counsellors and 
psychotherapists regularly present and discuss their client casework. Supervision has evolved 
as a professional activity since its inception in the early 1900s (Fleming and Benedeck, 
1983). There are multiple methodological and theoretical perspectives about what supervision 
is and how to do it. While it is challenging to find a clear definition of supervision, there are 
some accepted common factors associated with this endeavour, which are encapsulated by 
Creaner (2014) in this way; 
It primarily exists for the welfare of the client, the professional development 
of the supervisee and gatekeeping for those who enter and continue to work 
in the profession….. It also seeks to provide for the welfare of the supervisee 
by giving support in professional identify formation and affording some 
containment for the stresses of the work (Creaner, 2014: 10).  
Psychotherapeutic supervision therefore exists to support and enhance the competence of 
counsellors and psychotherapists and to protect the public from risk or harm. This endeavour 
creates an opportunity for counsellors and psychotherapists to learn and consolidate their 
craft and engage in on-going professional development. Attendance at supervision is 
mandatory in Ireland and the United Kingdom for therapists who seek to be professionally 
recognised by accrediting organisations, such as the British Association for Counselling and 
Psychotherapy and the Irish Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy (BACP, 2013: 
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IACP, 2013).The establishment of a safe and trusting supervisory relationship enables 
supervisees to openly reflect on their casework and gain professional and personal insights 
(Scaife, 2009). Modes and methods of supervision tend to address the functional aspects and 
generic tasks of supervision (Hewson, 2001). However, philosophies of supervision carefully 
consider the meaning attached to being a supervisor (Carroll, 2001).  
Counselling and psychotherapy supervisors are experienced counsellors and psychotherapists 
who have achieved professional recognition. Professional supervisor accreditation is 
available to those who complete supervisor training programmes and demonstrate 
supervisory competence (BACP, 2013: IACP, 2013). Supervisors are often motivated to give 
something back to the profession by sharing their experience and their phronesis (practical 
wisdom) with novice and pre-accredited therapists while actively collaborating with 
experienced, accredited practitioners in the enhancement of therapeutic work.   Counselling 
and psychotherapy supervisors come from a wide range of theoretical backgrounds including 
but not exclusively psychoanalytic, cognitive-behavioural and humanistic psychotherapeutic 
traditions. Some supervisors take a specific psychotherapy bound approach to supervision, 
while others would class themselves as integrative supervisors who combine two or more of 
the above paradigms (Gilbert and Schmukler, 2001).  
Throughout this thesis, the term psychotherapeutic supervisor will be used to encapsulate 
those who provide supervision of counsellors, psychotherapists and psychoanalysts as each of 
these attend supervision to reflect on their ‘psychotherapeutic’ work with clients. This term is 
used to create a demarcation from other forms of supervision in the helping professions, such 
as, the supervision of psychologists, psychiatrists, mental health professionals, nurses or 
those who provide line-management supervision. The terms practitioner, counsellor, 
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psychotherapist and psychoanalyst will be used interchangeably in this study in order to 
reflect the backgrounds of the participants or supervisees and to set the context for the 
narrative accounts of their lived experiences. 
1.2. Aspirations of the Study 
This research study aspires to answer the question: What is the meaning of being a 
psychotherapeutic supervisor? This inquiry is primarily interested in uncovering, describing, 
interpreting and rendering more intelligible aspects of the human experience of being a 
psychotherapeutic supervisor. The focus of this research study has been driven by the fact 
that there is a dearth of quantitative, qualitative or mixed research inquiries focussed on the 
actual, day to day lived experience of being in this specific life- world (Heidegger 
1927/1962). There are many credible studies which examine the efficacy of supervisory 
interventions and theoretical positions. Many fruitful studies have been produced which help 
us to understand what supervision is and how to functionally enhance it. However, this study 
seeks to move beyond knowledge based structures of supervision in order to uncover what it 
is really like existing as a psychotherapeutic supervisor (Van Manen, 1990). A pondering, 
curious research position is adopted, in the hope that concealed or taken-for-granted aspects 
of human experiencing may emerge and be understood (Vandermause, 2011).  
In order to surface actual lived experiences and hidden meanings, a Heideggerian, 
hermeneutic phenomenological philosophical and methodological framework is employed. 
This places ontology before epistemology and paves the way for a depth of discovery about 
actual human supervisory experiences (Schmidt, 2006). It is hoped that this study, will bring 
to the attention of the counselling and psychotherapy field, an under researched, yet crucial 
aspect of psychotherapy supervision, in a rapidly changing therapeutic world.  It is 
4 
 
anticipated that this research study will contribute to the body of knowledge on 
psychotherapeutic supervision, by bringing forth quality, meaningful data, leading to fresh 
understandings and potentially a paradigm shift about how we understand and make sense of 
the day to day lived experiences of contemporary psychotherapeutic supervisors.   
1.3. Guiding the Reader    
The following chapter Pre-understandings of Psychotherapeutic Supervision follows the 
hermeneutic phenomenological tradition of recognising that researchers are influenced by 
‘fore-structures of understanding’ (Moran and Mooney, 2007). It introduces several 
fundamental aspects of Heideggerian philosophy and demonstrates the relevance of making 
researcher’s pre-understandings explicit in hermeneutic phenomenological research inquiry. 
Personal and professional reflexivity is engaged in, in order to crystallise this researchers’ 
‘fore-having, fore-sights and fore-conception’ (Heidegger, 1927/1962).  In chapter 3, I 
provide readers with an in-depth critical discussion on a variety of perspectives which 
influence the philosophy, principles and practices of psychotherapeutic supervision. I 
consider modes and methods of psychotherapeutic supervision and contrast psychoanalytic, 
cognitive-behavioural and humanistic theories and discuss how these bind and impact on the 
supervisory process. In the Reviewing Research chapter the reader is guided through a 
critique of quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods research studies previously 
undertaken with supervisors and their supervisees. What is currently known and what is 
unsaid about being a psychotherapeutic supervisor is highlighted. In chapter 5, there is an in-
depth discussion of Heideggerian hermeneutic phenomenology, the philosophical and 
methodological position which influences this research. Alongside expanding Heideggerian 
philosophical discussion, I map out the phases of this research study and introduce the reader 
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to the participant group. The Responsibility as Being-True and Being-Untrue chapter, 
borrows participants’ experiences, plucking from these evocative stories which are analysed 
through a hermeneutic phenomenological lens. Truth-seeking as a preoccupation in 
psychotherapeutic supervision is explored. Thereafter in chapter 7, I gather together stories in 
which a mood of anxiety pervaded the supervisory encounter. The reader is invited to think 
about how participants coped with heightened responsibility with respect to Heidegger’s 
postulations on the phenomenon of care which manifests in leaping-in and leaping-ahead. In 
Chapter 8, Responsibility as Existing-Resolutely, participants evocatively talk about 
experiences of being-with supervisees who have transgressed and breached the bounds of 
safe or ethical practice. The weight of responsibility that is palpable in this chapter is 
considered and interpreted with respect to Heidegger’s phenomenon of resoluteness.  In the 
final chapter of this thesis I seek to render responsibility more intelligible in the world of 
psychotherapeutic supervision. In turning over methodological, theoretical and philosophical 
positions on responsibility, I respectfully make suggestions and recommendations which 
could potentially be of benefit to psychotherapeutic supervisors, supervisees and clients.  
Finally, in this chapter, I consider the potential contribution of this thesis to the world of 
psychotherapeutic supervision and beyond, while being mindful of what has yet to be 
uncovered about the meaning of being a psychotherapeutic supervisor.  
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2. PRE-UNDERSTANDINGS OF PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC SUPERVISION 
2.1. Introduction 
Hermeneutic phenomenologists and philosophers recognise that researchers have ‘a fore-
structure of understanding’ (Heidegger, 1927/1962:151) with respect to the phenomena being 
examined and consider that professional and personal pre-understandings may not be fully 
accessible to or are concealed from them. As such hermeneutic phenomenological 
researchers are encouraged to strive to unconceal their hidden pre-understandings or 
prejudices about the phenomena (Van Manen, 1990). This chapter represents an attempt to 
illuminate my pre-understandings, as a hermeneutic phenomenological researcher, of the 
phenomenon of psychotherapeutic supervision. It begins by laying out perspectives, on the 
influence of having prior knowledge and assumptions, from hermeneutical phenomenology 
and philosophy, by drawing on the writings of Heidegger (1927/1962) and considers the 
influence of pre-understandings through the more recent postulations of Van Manen (1990) 
amongst others. The chapter provides an overview of reflexive, personal journaling and 
uncovers several of my dominant pre-understandings which have been illuminated through 
having undertaken a pre-understanding interview with one of my PhD Supervisors. My 
dominant pre-understandings are interweaved with a critical discussion of several 
Heideggerian (1927/1962) philosophical notions. 
2.2. The Fore-Structure of Understanding 
According to Van Manen (1990) the starting point for a phenomenological study is to choose 
an aspect of lived human experience, in which the researcher is keenly interested and then to 
seek to illuminate a ‘true’ phenomenon in such human experience. This starting point 
recognises that the researcher brings something of herself to the phenomenological research 
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project. She initially brings an area of particular interest to herself which may have been 
stimulated and motivated by expert knowledge or everyday experiences. The researcher, 
therefore, comes to the phenomenological inquiry with pre-existing knowledge and pre-
understandings. 
The problem with phenomenological inquiry is not always that we know too 
little about the phenomenon we wish to investigate, but that we know too 
much. Or, more accurately, the problem is that our “common sense” pre-
understandings, our suppositions, assumptions and the existing bodies of 
scientific knowledge, pre-dispose us to interpret the nature of the 
phenomenon before we have even come to grips with the significance of the 
phenomenological question (Van Manen, 1990:46.) 
 
The inherent danger in knowing too much about the phenomenon is that the researcher’s pre-
understandings may lead to premature or inaccurate interpretation of the data and prevent her 
from illuminating the ‘true’ phenomenon in others’ lived experiences. The challenge then, for 
the phenomenological researcher is to strive to make her implicit assumptions, beliefs, 
prejudices, knowledge and everyday experience, more explicit (Van Manen, 1990). 
 
Philosophers and phenomenologists have different perspectives about the influence and 
management of pre-understandings. The transcendental phenomenological strategy of 
inquiry, as proposed by Edmund Husserl places emphasis on describing human lived 
experience, as purely as possible (Husserl, 1970a). In order to achieve this, the researcher is 
required to focus purely on the phenomenon and ‘bracket off’ all expert and personal 
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knowledge about the phenomenon, under investigation (Husserl, 1970a). However, some 
phenomenological researchers (Willig, 2008) and philosophers are not convinced that it is 
entirely possible to purely describe participants’ experience of phenomena. They postulate 
that description and interpretation cannot be separated (Willig, 2008) and that the influence 
of the researcher’s own expert knowledge and everyday experience needs to be recognised 
(Todres and Wheeler, 2001). 
 
Hermeneutic phenomenologists, therefore, acknowledge that researchers make preliminary 
assumptions and conceptualisations about the phenomena being examined. As opposed to 
transcendental phenomenology, this approach to phenomenology does not strive to ‘bracket 
off’ assumptions or prior knowledge but encourages the researcher to strive to raise 
awareness of their pre-understandings, to consider the influence of these on the 
phenomenological inquiry and potentially to use these in order to enhance understanding 
about the phenomena (Schmidt, 2006).  
 
Martin Heidegger, philosopher and proponent of hermeneutic phenomenology, offers a 
strong treatise with respect to having a ‘fore-structure of understanding’ and an ‘as-structure 
of interpretation’ (Heidegger, 1927/1962:151) which moves well beyond Husserlian (1970a) 
notions of trying to ‘bracket off’ consciously available, expert and everyday knowledge. 
A fundamental aspect of Heideggerian philosophy is centered on the question of the meaning 
of being. Heidegger’s primary presupposition is that the meaning of being, is concealed and 
that hermeneutic phenomenology can unconceal or make understandable the meaning of 
lived experience (Moran and Mooney, 2007). From a Heideggerian perspective the meaning 
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of being can only be made intelligible through the ‘fore-structure of understanding’, which 
inextricably links understanding, interpretation and intelligibility (Moran and Mooney, 
2007:597). 
 
Meaning is the “upon which” of a projection in terms of which something 
becomes intelligible as something; it gets its structure from ‘a fore-having, a 
foresight, and a fore-conception’ (Heidegger, 1927/1962:151). 
 
In order to make sense of the world, Dasein ‘equips’ itself with a ‘fore-structure of 
understanding’ which is to have ‘a prior view of the past’ (Heidegger, 1927/1962:150). 
(‘Dasein’ means ‘being-there’ (Van Deurzen and Young, 2009)). The term is used by 
Heidegger to enhance understanding of ontology, of the nature of human existence in a 
specific time and place (Heidegger, 1927/1964:34). This helps Dasein to appreciate and make 
intelligible things in the world (Inwood, 1997:100). Accordingly Heidegger defines the first 
element,’ fore-having’, as ‘ something we have in advance’ (Heidegger, 1927/1962:150), pre-
existing knowledge, and understanding of the phenomenon under investigation and the 
context in which it resides. ‘Fore-sight …is something we see in advance’ (Heidegger, 
1927/1962:150), it is a form of circumspection. It refers to the researcher’s area of interest, an 
aspect of lived experience or a specific element of a phenomenon which she has set her 
‘sights’ on examining and interpreting (Inwood, 1999:107). The third element ‘fore-
conception …is something we grasp in advance’ (Heidegger, 1927/1962:150). This is the 
initial conceptualisation that a researcher uses to interpret the phenomena.   
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From this viewpoint, the researcher can only interpret things through the concepts that are 
already available to her. This ‘fore-grasping’ or premature conceptualisation may well be 
distorted, leading to inaccurate interpretations (Inwood, 1999:107). However, a ‘fore-
structure of understanding’ is not fixed. It can be revised during the research process when 
understanding is gained through describing and interpreting ‘in terms of the things’ 
themselves (Heidegger, 1927/1962:153). 
 
From a hermeneutic phenomenological perspective, the researcher has ‘a fore-structure of 
understanding’ , and in concurrence with Van Manen’s (1990) perspectives, has ‘pre-
understandings’ and prejudices that are not immediately accessible to her (Moran & Mooney, 
2007). Therefore, it is necessary to engage in a process of reflexivity (Koch, 1996) to strive to 
separate out:  
 
‘….productive prejudices that enable understanding from the prejudices that 
hinder it and lead to misunderstandings…This separation must take place in 
the process of understanding itself (Moran and Mooney, 2007:329). 
 
So, hermeneutically speaking, making sense of the world and understanding the phenomena 
therein involves a cyclical process of understanding, which involves describing and 
interpreting the phenomena while striving to identify the influence of positive and negative 
personal and expert prejudices and assumptions. This constitutes the meaning-making 
process which renders lived experience or phenomena more intelligible (Moran and Mooney, 
2007).  
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2.3. Making the Implicit Explicit  
The hermeneutic phenomenological approach to research inquiry ensures that the researcher 
strives to gain insight into her ‘fore-structure of understanding’ (Heidegger, 1927/1962) so 
that the research participants’ lived experiences and interpretations of the phenomena under 
investigation, are not lost or misunderstood (Todres and Wheeler, 2001). As such, the 
hermeneutic phenomenological researcher is encouraged to engage in a process of reflexivity 
(Koch, 1996).  
 
By way of trying to get some insight and understanding into my own personal and 
professional pre-understandings, I engaged in several reflexive processes. Firstly, through 
journaling and free-flow writing, I reflected on my own experience of being a supervisee, of 
being a psychotherapeutic supervisor and supervision consultant. Thereafter I considered and 
reflected on the main theoretical paradigms that have influenced me as a psychotherapeutic 
supervisor. However, I wanted to gain a deeper level of awareness of my pre-understandings 
of psychotherapeutic supervision, to try to capture personal and professional influences that 
were not immediately or consciously accessible to me.  
 
So I invited one of my PhD supervisors to carry out a pre-understandings interview with me. 
This interview was undertaken in the style of a hermeneutic phenomenological research 
interview and produced a number of interesting revelations, not previously captured in my 
personal and professional reflective journaling. Collectively, these processes have helped to 
crystallise my ‘fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conception’ (Heidegger, 1927/1962) and have 
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assisted in making several of my implicit personal and professional pre-understandings more 
explicit (Van Manen, 1990). 
2.4. Personal and Professional Reflexivity 
2.4.1. Being a Supervisee 
The journaling and free-flow writing process started with recording reflections on my lived 
experience of being a supervisee. The following section is a summary of the journaling 
process and my interpretations of my personal and professional experiences. Having worked 
in the psychotherapeutic world for over twenty years, generally speaking, my supervisory 
experiences have been extremely positive and these have, undoubtedly, assisted my 
professional and personal development. The type of supervision that I received had three 
broad functions, supportive, developmental and monitoring of practice, in order to ensure the 
protection of the public. This approach to supervision had emerged and been refined from 
Kaduskin’s (1976) conceptualisations of supervision for social workers. During those years, I 
enjoyed and actively participated in the experience of being supervised, in both individual 
and group supervision.  
 
Several pre-understandings emerged for me about psychotherapeutic supervision from these 
early experiences. Firstly, I made the assumption that supervisors were superior beings due to 
having extensive knowledge and practice experience. Secondly, I assumed that supervisors 
were trustworthy because they were able to elicit professional and personal disclosures from 
supervisees. Thirdly, I believed that supervisors were powerful as they could influence, 
curtail or even stop the practice of supervisees. However, the overriding pre-understanding of 
psychotherapeutic supervision, that I continue to carry, from the perspective of being a 
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supervisee is that it is a positive and empowering professional and personal experience to be 
supervised. On becoming a psychotherapeutic supervisor, some fifteen years ago, I carried 
with me this ‘fore-structure of understanding’ (Heidegger, 1927/1962). I naively thought that 
supervisees willingly attended supervision and that generally they had positive experiences 
therein.  
2.4.2. Becoming a Psychotherapeutic Supervisor 
There were a number of dominant theoretical paradigms which influenced my development 
as a psychotherapeutic supervisor. In the organisation in which I undertook supervisor 
training there was a strong allegiance to Client or Person- Centred theory (Rogers, 2003) and 
to Psychodynamic perspectives. The principles and practices of Person-Centred theory 
(Rogers, 2003) were the bedrock. In this approach a strong emphasis is placed on building 
therapeutic relationships and this notion was carried over into building trusting supervisory 
alliances in which the supervisee could feel heard, understood, accepted and valued. When 
these positive conditions prevail, there is the potential for individual growth and development 
(Rogers, 2003). The influence of Person-Centred theory (Rogers, 2003) and Psychodynamic 
theory was evidenced through a model of supervision which dominated psychotherapeutic 
supervisor training and practice in this organisation for over a decade. It is widely known as 
the Double-Matrix or the Seven Eyed Supervisor Model (Hawkins and Shohet, 2006). 
 
This model involves a process of supervision which pays close attention to two matrices or 
relationships, the client/supervisee matrix and the supervisee/supervisor matrix. In order to 
maintain a focus on these dual matrices, Hawkins and Shohet (2006) devised seven 
categories or levels of supervision.  
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In essence, the first two categories focus on the manner in which the supervisee describes the 
client’s presenting issues and reflects on the skills and strategies employed. The third 
category focuses on the relationship between the client and the supervisee at both conscious 
and unconscious levels. The focus of the fourth category moves to the supervisee and their 
conscious and unconscious experience of the client in a bid to assist the supervisee to connect 
more effectively with the client. By category five, the focus is on the second matrix, that of 
the relationship between the supervisee and supervisor. This category provides an 
opportunity to attend to the supervisee/supervisor relationship but moves on to grapple with 
unconscious dynamics and parallel processes (Mattinson, 1977). At category six, the 
supervisor tries to give voice to the conscious and unconscious material that has emerged in 
the supervisee/ supervisor matrix. In the final category, the supervisor focuses on the public 
context in which the clinical work occurs, giving consideration to organisational contexts, 
codes and ethics of professional bodies and to the social and cultural environment. 
 
Emerging from my professional training, a number of entrenched pre-understandings are 
evident. Firstly, I believe that forming and maintaining trusting relationships with supervisees 
is a crucial and essential aspect of the psychotherapeutic supervisory process. Therefore, it is 
the responsibility of the psychotherapeutic supervisor to establish such relationships. 
Secondly, I assume that supervisees have the potential to grow and develop both personally 
and professionally. Thirdly I strongly adhere to the notion that psychotherapeutic supervision 
is insight-orientated and this involves working with conscious and unconscious aspects of 
supervisees and of me. Finally, in my experience psychotherapeutic supervision is a highly 
skilled endeavour which is professionally and personally demanding. 
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2.4.3. Being a Psychotherapeutic Supervisor 
In the intervening years, I have practiced as a psychotherapeutic supervisor in the not-for- 
profit sector, in training and educational environments and in private practice. Working in 
each of these domains created unique experiences of being a supervisor and has thoroughly 
challenged my positive prejudices (Moran and Mooney, 2007) about the experience of being 
supervised and the experience of being a supervisor. In the not-for-profit sector, experienced 
and in-experienced supervisees were allocated to me. They had little or no choice about who 
would supervise them. Generally speaking, I was able to address this issue with supervisees 
and build positive supervisory alliances. However on a number of occasions this was not 
possible but we had to soldier on because, from the organisational perspective, negative 
assumptions were made about supervisees who could not integrate into the system. However, 
I was dissatisfied with such experiences of psychotherapeutic supervision, when supervisory 
alliances were somewhat forced and lacked relational depth. 
 
In the training and educational environments, providing supervision to trainee counsellors 
and psychotherapists has been most rewarding and also most worrying for me. It has been 
uplifting for me to observe and be party to the development of practitioners but it has also 
raised concerns about the maintenance of safe and ethical practice and the protection of the 
public. Reluctantly, I have also had to acknowledge that not all supervisees have the capacity 
to develop into competent practitioners. However, in the private supervisory domain, 
supervisees often select their supervisor based on reputation or theoretical matching. While 
my private supervisory work has also provided me with professionally and personally 
satisfying experiences, it can be a lonely road, with high levels of responsibility, especially 
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when my supervisees are grappling with clients’ significant life stories, such as child abuse or 
suicidal ideation. 
 
My ‘fore structure of understanding’ (Heidegger, 1927/1962) informs me that being a 
psychotherapeutic supervisor is an important and necessary endeavour. For me, it is a 
challenging, demanding and at times, an anxiety provoking experience. The anxiety is 
mitigated, for me, through being in positive supervisory alliances, witnessing effective 
therapeutic practice, being personally gratified and professionally affirmed. 
  
From my experiences of being a supervisee, my professional training and practical work as a 
psychotherapeutic supervisor, I realise that my perspective of psychotherapeutic supervision 
is, that it is an intricate process that at times seems to take on a life of its own, often leading to 
unexpected professional and personal insights and altered perceptions. As such, 
psychotherapeutic supervision is a unique phenomenological experience for me. 
 
2.5. Pre-understandings Interview  
Having engaged in a process of personal and professional reflexivity (Koch, 1996), as stated 
above, I also took part in a pre-understanding interview with one of my PhD research 
supervisors. During this interview my PhD research supervisor invited me to reflect on 
specific experiences of being supervised, of being a supervisor and of being a human being.  
By focusing on particular stories and probing aspects of my lived experience, my PhD 
supervisor assisted me to uncover three dominant pre-understandings which had not emerged 
in such depth through personal and professional reflection. In order to try to illuminate some 
17 
 
of my pre-understanding I sought to unconceal aspects of my lived experience through an in-
depth hermeneutic phenomenological analysis. Having read and re-read the transcript and 
numerous sessions of listening to the voice recording, I identified several dominant lived 
experience stories (Van Manen, 1990) which I believe have contributed to my pre-
understandings of psychotherapeutic supervision. These pre-understandings have 
undoubtedly influenced my ‘fore-structure of understanding’(Heidegger, 1927/1962) about 
the role and position of the supervisor in the supervisory process, the value placed on gaining 
understanding through being intuitive and wise, being responsible and responding to the call 
of conscience. These pre-understandings are described and interpreted through the lens of 
Heideggerian philosophy. 
2.5.1. Guru or Catalyst 
My initial encounter with psychotherapeutic supervision brought me up close to the 
phenomenon of supervisor as ‘Guru’. The supervisor was seen to be a superior being who 
was ‘a cut above the rest of us’. My first supervisor was part of an elite clique within the 
training organisation and I felt there was a kind of aura around him. It was initially an awe 
inspiring experience to be in the presence of someone who was highly valued as a therapist 
and supervisor. As a novice practitioner, I believed that I would gain a huge amount by 
having such a ‘fantastic guru’ as my supervisor. Yet this was a threatening phenomenon to 
encounter. I gradually developed a growing disillusionment with ‘Gurudom’ as I started to 
realise that being in the presence of a ‘Guru’ was a disempowering experience. It was an 
interpersonal experience wherein the supervisor, as ‘Guru’, held (or was given) all the 
knowledge and power to develop the supervisee and wherein I as supervisee struggled to find 
my therapeutic voice. 
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A subsequent experience of being a supervisee was much more empowering, as I was 
exposed to a supervisor who was the antithesis of the supervisor as ‘Guru’. 
 
I remember an English woman who I had who was fantastic. She had the 
ability to get you to think for yourself, to challenge you and yet to support 
you. And I know that my work improved significantly under her supervision. I 
suppose, that would have been a model that I would have wanted to replicate 
then as a supervisor, that you helped people to think for themselves, that you 
helped them to become autonomous (RG55). 
 
The position espoused here was supervisor as Catalyst for growth, development and change. 
This approach to psychotherapeutic supervision enabled me as a supervisee to begin to take 
ownership for my work with clients. While it was a more challenging way of being 
supervised, it ultimately helped me to find my own therapeutic voice. There was a sense of 
collaboration and respect in the supervisory alliance that allowed me to bring more of my real 
self to the supervisory encounter.  
From the perspective of Heideggerian philosophy, Dasein can exist in “authentic, inauthentic 
or undifferentiated” modes of being (Heidegger, 1927/1962). When Dasein exists 
authentically it is an autonomous entity in the world. It comports itself in such a way as to 
take ownership for its existence. Authentic Dasein has a unique relation to itself and in 
listening to its own inner voice it can experience self-fulfilment (Carman, 2007:285). 
According to Heidegger, Dasein also exists inauthentically. That is to say that its mode of 
being is strongly influenced by the perspective of others. Inauthentic Dasein does what 
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“They” suggest and in doing so experiences existential estrangement. As such, inauthentic 
Dasein is alienated from itself when its existence is pervaded by the third person perspective 
(Heidegger, 1927/1962). The third mode of being “undifferentiatedness” is a neutral form of 
everyday existence, which is neither specifically, authentic or inauthentic. In this mode of 
being Dasein’s self is a combination of first, second and third person perspectives which 
provide Dasein with the coping skills to manage social existence (Heidegger, 1927/1962). 
It could be argued that the modes of being of supervisor as ‘Guru’ and supervisor as Catalyst 
are both striving to show care and concern for the supervisee. From a Heideggerian 
philosophical perspective showing care and concern for ‘Others’ is a basic mode of being for 
Dasein. Heidegger terms this basic ‘care’ mode of Dasein as ‘solicitude’. ‘Solicitude’ can be 
authentic or inauthentic. Authentic solicitude creates independence. It encourages the ‘Other’ 
to become autonomous. Heidegger describes authentic solicitude as Dasein ‘leaping ahead’ 
of the ‘Other’ in order to ‘liberate’ him (Heidegger, 1927/1965:122). This type of ‘solicitude’ 
appears to be more closely aligned with the mode of being, of supervisor as Catalyst. This 
mode encourages the supervisee to become an autonomous entity, it fosters authentic 
existence. Alternatively, inauthentic solicitude ‘takes over’ to such a degree that the ‘Other’ 
becomes ‘dominated’. In this mode the supervisor ‘leaps in’ for the supervisee and, 
unwittingly, renders her ‘dependent’ (Heidegger, 1927/1965:122). From the Heideggerian 
philosophical perspective, it could be construed that the mode of being of supervisor as Guru, 
results in the supervisee existing inauthentically as a practitioner. 
These two very different experiences of being a supervisee appear to have left me with fairly 
firm pre-understandings (Van Manen, 1990) of how to be and how not to be a 
psychotherapeutic supervisor. I am left with a sense of there being a right way and a wrong 
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way to be a supervisor. So my ‘fore-structure of understanding’ (Heidegger, 1927/1962) 
informs me that it is inappropriate to bask in the glory of ‘Gurudom’ to have a superior mode 
of being-in-the-world of psychotherapeutic supervision. It informs me that being a good 
supervisor is to foster growth, development and autonomy in supervisees, in other words to 
be supervisor as Catalyst for change. 
2.5.2. Click or No Click 
From the analysis of my pre-understanding interview, I realise that as a supervisee and 
latterly as a psychotherapeutic supervisor, I place significant weight on gaining professional 
and personal insights about issues and dynamics in client casework. In my lived experience 
insight emerges through a dynamic dance between having self-awareness and listening to the 
intuitive self. This dynamic dance often results in spontaneous flashes of insight, experienced 
as a phenomenological ‘click ‘of understanding. 
There was an emphasis during my training, on developing the practitioner in terms of their 
theoretical knowledge, use of therapeutic skills and their self-awareness. However, in reality, 
priority was given to the third strand, the development of self-awareness. 
As a supervisee I would have been asked to do that, encouraged to do that, 
challenged to do that. The supervision would have been an on-going place 
where that would have happened (RG 84).  
This emphasis was focussed on being aware of what is happening to oneself, in the here and 
now experience. In being aware of one’s own immediate lived experience, it would then be 
possible to tune into personal feelings, psychological and physiological responses. Being able 
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to develop high levels of self-awareness was so highly valued in my training, that it was 
deemed to be the core characteristic of an effective counsellor.  
I have carried this ‘fore-having’(Heidegger, 1927/1962)  with me into my practice as a 
supervisor and I find myself actively encouraging supervisees to pause, listen, reflect and get 
in touch with their own unique, immediate lived experience. It is my ‘fore-conception’ 
(Heidegger, 1927/1962) that privileging self-awareness over theoretical knowledge and skills 
development enables supervisees to form a trusting relationship with their intuitive selves. 
My training and regular attendance at psychotherapeutic supervision introduced me to the 
experience of listening to the intuitive self. There was encouragement to listen to this inner 
guide by giving voice to implicit feelings, responses and bodily reactions and to consider how 
these could inform practice and lead to deeper levels of understanding about client casework. 
Over time, when it became evident that the cues from the intuitive self were generally 
reliable and beneficial in the therapeutic encounter, I came to trust and more actively embrace 
it.  
As a psychotherapeutic supervisor then, I carry a strong pre-understanding that being an 
intuitive type of person, innately, is highly beneficial in therapeutic and supervisory 
endeavours. 
 I don’t think that you can teach people to be intuitive and I think that is what 
worries me about supervision and supervision courses. You can learn the 
theory, you can learn the skills, technically you can be very sharp but I think 
you need something else, intuition (RG172).  
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I now realise that my ‘fore-structure of understanding’ (Heidegger, 1927/1962) influences 
the opinion that to be highly effective, therapists and supervisors need to be intuitive by 
nature. So as a psychotherapeutic supervisor, I actively strive to foster a dynamic 
intrapersonal relationship with the intuitive self and encourage supervisees to listen to and be 
actively informed by this guiding voice in their practice. 
I do respect the need for on-going professional development in terms of theoretical 
knowledge and psychotherapeutic interventions and firmly believe that there must be a 
balance between the use of the intuitive self and the intellectual self. However, as a 
psychotherapeutic supervisor, I am always concerned about the practitioner who lacks 
connection with the intuitive self. This is primarily because my experiences of supervising 
intuitive supervisees are that I am in the presence of practitioners who naturally respond to 
clients’ distress and pain with a depth of wisdom and understanding. 
One of the aims of psychotherapy is to help clients gain a deeper understanding of 
themselves. Therapeutically, gaining self-understanding is seen to be transformative, an 
‘empowering process.’ My pre-understandings advise me that this idiom also holds true for 
therapists. So a particular focus in psychotherapeutic supervision is facilitating practitioners 
to gain deeper understanding of the issues that emerge in their casework. 
It is to do with getting an insight or a deeper level of understanding about 
something. It is almost like it is phenomenological (RG85). 
So, through the ‘dynamics and processes’ of psychotherapeutic supervision, a ‘self-generated 
insight’ is gained for many practitioners. Indeed, I have an expectation that supervisees will 
get a ‘more fully involved insight’ because my assumption is that this is in the best interests of 
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the clients. Often in supervision sessions there is a ‘click’ of understanding for the supervisee 
about a client issue. These ‘click moments’ are like a ‘phenomenological experience’. Neither 
the supervisee nor I are entirely sure how they occur. They are experienced as a spontaneous 
‘flash’ of understanding.  
There are many, many phenomenological experiences and things like that in 
supervision. So like lots and lots of moments like that. Well it is 
unreasonable, but I would hope that my supervisees or within a supervision 
group, somebody would get a ‘click’. I would hope that something happens 
that goes beyond, tell me what skills you used or what theory you are using. I 
would hope that people get into that sort of zone (RG 142:174).  
Whether a supervisee has the willingness or capacity to get into this ‘phenomenological zone’ 
affects my opinion about them as practitioners. I seem to judge a practitioner’s competence 
and ability on their capacity to have ‘click moments’. When there are ‘no clicks’, I assume 
that while practitioners maybe technically competent, they lack the hallmark of or core 
characteristic of an effective therapist. 
Generally speaking Heidegger (1927/1962) is against the psychological view of self-
awareness. He disregards awareness and insight in the traditional or normal sense of these 
concepts. According to Guignon, Heidegger does not locate human existence in the mind, but 
in the ‘unfolding happening or event, of a life’. He suggests that a self can only exist through 
the ‘process of realisation’ (Guignon, 1993:224). Realisation from the Heideggerian 
perspective is an evolving phenomenological experience. He postulates that phenomenology 
seeks to uncover or get closer to things that are for the most part concealed (Smythe, 2011). 
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“Phenomenon”, the showing-itself-in-itself, signifies a distinctive way in 
which something can be encountered (Heidegger 1927/1962:31).  
From this perspective that which is hidden can be discovered through phenomenological 
inquiry. In order to get to the ‘things themselves’, it is necessary to pay attention to one’s 
average day to day lived experience (Heidegger, 1927/1962:153) and in this way the self can 
be realised. Heidegger deprives ‘pure intuition of its priority’ as he considers that both 
intuition and thinking to be derivates of understanding (Heidegger, 1927/1962:147). He does 
not apply any significance to ‘intuition or inspired inference’ which is in his view based on 
intangible cues (Inwood, 1999:105). He challenges lack of in-depth reflection on intuitive 
cues as he considers that this leads to immature and ‘haphazard’ unconcealments of 
phenomena (Heidegger, 1927/1962:37). Instead Heidegger proposes that phenomenological 
interpretation (hermeneutics) develops understanding of self and others and suggests that 
everyday existence is ‘pervaded’ by interpretation. He does not make a sharp distinction 
between interpretation and understanding but suggests that understanding is global while 
interpretation is about local understanding (Inwood, 1999:106). 
‘In interpretation understanding appropriates whatever is understood 
understandingly. Interpretation is existentially grounded in understanding 
(Heidegger, 1927/1962:148). 
From the perspective of hermeneutic phenomenology, Dasein interprets itself and gains self-
understanding by noticing what it does in its everyday existence (Heidegger, 1927/1962:140). 
Therefore interpretation renders things intelligible, enabling Dasein to make meaning or 
sense of its existential experience.  
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In the context of counselling supervision, the hermeneutic phenomenologist Smythe et al. 
(2009) suggests that understanding is enhanced when the supervisor accommodates both 
techne (know how) and phronesis (practical wisdom). Phenomenologically speaking, 
phronesis is an existential state. 
 Everything about phronesis comes from and goes back into the experience 
itself. ….phronesis opens one to the spirit of the moment. There is 
unpredictable spontaneity in the moment, described by hermeneutic 
philosophers as ‘the play’ (Smythe et al., 2009:5)  
According to Smythe et al. (2009) when the supervisory pair is ‘at play’ there are greater 
opportunities for deeper and unexpected understandings to emerge. When phronesis is 
‘brought into play’ all possibilities are entertained and the Heideggerian spirit of being ‘on 
the way’, as opposed to having predetermined the ‘answers’ pervades the encounter (Smythe 
et al., 2009:6). When phronesis is an integral part of the supervisory endeavour, a 
phenomenological sense of knowing emerges and the language required for techne (know 
how) is much less important (Smythe et al., 2009:5). While Heidegger makes limited direct 
reference to phronesis and its influence on interpretation and understanding, he places 
significant value on depth of reflection as this mitigates premature assertions (Heidegger, 
1927/1962). 
So, my fore-structure of understanding’ (Heidegger, 1927/1962) positions me to privilege a 
dynamic dance between self-awareness, intuition and depth of personal and professional 
understanding. My ‘fore-conception’ (Heidegger, 1927/1962) assumes, rightly or wrongly, 
that this interplay assists therapists and supervisors to get the phenomenological ‘click’ of 
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understanding and to make that which is implicit explicit, thus enabling the client to cope 
better with their life issues.  
The Heideggerian position of placing limited significance on the psychological view of self-
awareness and intuition challenges my ‘fore-structure of understanding’, making me pause 
for thought on the depth of reflection that I engage in with supervisees regarding intuitive 
responses. However, Smythe et al.’s  (2009) plea for the integration of phronesis (practical 
wisdom) into the supervisory encounter strongly resonates with my own lived experience of 
catching unexpected understandings through being ‘at play’ with supervisees. 
2.5.3. The Call of Conscience 
During the pre-understanding interview, I was asked to reflect on negative experiences of 
being a psychotherapeutic supervisor, to consider a specific time when supervision did not go 
well. This was an uncomfortable experience for me, as I strive hard to build and maintain 
positive, effective supervisory alliances. 
I reflected on the experience of supervising a therapist whose competence became a matter of 
concern for me. From the outset, 
‘I had some real reservations. I had real concerns about her ability and 
about her competence’ (RG241). 
Initially I decided to ‘hold fire’, to wait and see if she would settle down in the supervisory 
alliance. Unfortunately, my worries about her competence prevailed. It was an anxiety 
provoking experience supervising this therapist. I consulted my own supervisor who asked 
me baldly if I could ‘stand over her work and I said no!’  This supervision consultation 
jostled me into action and I made a decision that I could no longer supervise her clinical 
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practice. During the pre-understanding interview, I realised that ‘in all conscience, I could 
not continue to supervisor her’.  
As a psychotherapeutic supervisor, I am responsible for upholding standards in the profession 
and must be satisfied that supervisees are competent practitioners. I am required and 
committed to ensuring that ‘the clients’ best interests are paramount’ in the therapeutic 
endeavour. With this supervisee I could not satisfy myself on either count.   
‘I could not have lived with myself knowing that she was not doing a great 
service to the clients’ (RG263). 
Being able to live with myself became a matter of conscience. I felt compelled to respond to 
the call of conscience. However, this compulsion did not make it any easier to confront the 
issue. Deciding to end the supervisory alliance was extremely difficult. I wrestled with the 
voice of conscience, questioned my decision, searched for positive attributes in the 
supervisee and consulted further with my supervisor. However, the call to take responsibility, 
as voiced by my conscience, did not abate. In order to be able to live with myself, I accepted 
that I had to take a stand and to act responsibility on behalf of others. I knew that it was in the 
public interest and in the supervisees own interest to end the supervisory alliance. However, 
responding to the call of conscience did not feel virtuous. It was ‘awful and I felt sick’. The 
supervisee was ‘very annoyed and very upset’ and was persistent in trying to maintain the 
supervisory alliance. It was a struggle to hold my stance and stick to the decision. However 
the voice of conscience which was ringing in my head supported me to act responsibly. I 
knew that if I had done other than end the supervisory relationship that I could not have lived 
with myself ethically or morally.  
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Heidegger philosophises extensively on the ‘phenomenon of conscience’ (Heidegger, 
1927/1962). He offers an existential interpretation of conscience which critiques the common 
sense notions of conscience (Heidegger, 1927/1962:69). Traditional interpretations of 
conscience are usually associated with having done something wrong to persons or property, 
of having broken a law or a moral code. In the common sense interpretation of conscience, 
one is called to be responsible for something or make ‘oneself responsible for’ something or 
for putting others’ existence at risk (Heidegger, 1927/1962:282). Heidegger challenges 
fundamental conceptualisations of conscience which define ‘bad’ conscience that ‘reproves,’ 
and ‘good’ conscience which ‘warns’, ultimately dismissing the ‘negative character’ 
imposed on conscience (Heidegger, 1927/1962:290,294).  
In essence, Heidegger’s interpretation of the phenomenon of conscience is rooted in 
existential guilt.   
‘..interpretations of the conscience are at one in that they make the ‘voice’ of 
conscience speak somehow of ‘guilt’…We define the formally existential  idea 
of the ‘Guilty’ as ‘being-the-basis for a being which has been defined by a 
‘not’- that is to say, as ‘being-the-basis of a nullity’’ (Heidegger, 1927/1962: 
280,283).  
Existential guilt is defined as Dasein lacking something or having failed in some way, as 
opposed to actively doing something wrong, immoral or unethical.  For Heidegger guilt is a 
primordial mode of the existence of Dasein, in as much as Dasein ‘factically’ exists it ‘is’ 
also ‘guilty’ (Heidegger, 1927/1962:281). Therefore, ‘wanting to have a conscience’ is 
appealing as ‘being-guilty’ is fundamental to Dasein’s existence (Heidegger, 1927/1962:296).   
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As such, Dasein in its authentic mode of existence hears the call of conscience.  Authentic 
Dasein has the ability to take a first person standpoint in relation to its existence and in 
relation to others (Carman, 2007:285). In the authentic mode of existence Dasein cannot only 
hear but understands the voice of conscience (Heidegger, 1927/1962:296). The call of 
conscience is awakened by a mood, an anxious state of mind. From the Heideggerian 
perspective moods are pre-reflective. They are primordial in that they are always already 
there. They give us important messages about our way of being-in-the-world and the manner 
in which we are attuned to things in the world (Dreyfus and Wrathall, 2007:5).In the 
authentic mode of existence Dasein is an autonomous and resolute entity which embraces the 
‘anxiety of conscience’(Heidegger, 1927/1962:289). The ‘phenomenon of resoluteness’ 
(Heidegger, 1927/1962:298) manifests itself when authentic Dasein welcomes the call of 
conscience. Resolute Dasein is decisive and exists with determination in the way that it 
directly confronts specific situations that it encounters by being in the world (Heidegger, 
1927/1962:298).     
This reflection has helped me realise that my ‘fore-structure of understanding’ positions me 
to take a firm stance on ensuring safe and ethical practice, in order to protect clients. When 
faced with concerns about poor or limited competence, my concern manifests itself as 
anxiety. In such circumstances, the weight of responsibility for others’ practice will not be 
abated. I now realise that this is more than the professional responsibility inherent in the role 
of being a psychotherapeutic supervisor. It is fundamentally about being responsible and ‘in 
all conscience’, being able ‘to live with myself’ as a psychotherapeutic supervisor. 
 From a Heideggerian philosophical stance, it seems that I take a traditional or common sense 
view of conscience and actively embrace responsibility for others. Heidegger’s philosophy on 
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conscience and how the call is awakened by an anxious state of mind does resonate with me. 
My interpretation of Heidegger’s conceptualisation of the phenomenon of resoluteness, is 
such that, I consider that when I respond decisively to the call of conscience, I am able to live 
with myself, less guiltily and exist more authentically.  
2.6. Conclusion  
In this pre-understanding chapter, as a hermeneutic phenomenological researcher I have 
striven to make my implicit beliefs, expert knowledge and everyday experience of 
psychotherapeutic supervision, more explicit (Van Manen, 1990). Through a process of 
journaling, undertaking and analysing a pre-understanding interview I have endeavoured to 
capture aspects of my ‘fore-structure of understanding’ (Heidegger, 1927/1962), in order to 
try to understand those assumptions and prejudices that have not previously been 
immediately accessible to me (Moran and Mooney, 2007). Through these reflective 
processes, I realise that I have a number of entrenched pre-understandings about being a 
psychotherapeutic supervisor and the supervisory process. Among these pre-understandings 
are firm beliefs and assumptions about the quality of supervisory relationships, supervisees’ 
potential to develop both personally and professionally and how I privilege being a catalytic 
supervisor over being a guru. I place high value on a dynamic dance between self-awareness 
and intuition as a means of gaining flashes of deeper understanding and developing 
supervisee’s inner voices. My prejudices negatively affect my judgment of supervisees who 
struggle with personal and professional insight. 
My ‘fore structure of understanding’ (Heidegger, 1927/1962) informs me that being a 
psychotherapeutic supervisor is a demanding and anxiety provoking experience. When faced 
with concerns about safe and ethical practice, I take on responsibility for the protection of 
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others. I have come to realise that leaping-in and being-responsible, is my response to the call 
of conscience, so that I am able to live with myself, as a human being and as a 
psychotherapeutic supervisor. Aspects of Heideggerian philosophy such as living 
authentically and resolutely have resonated with me in my normal everyday experiences. I 
have been challenged by and struggled with Heidegger’s perspective on intuition and his 
conceptualisations of the call of conscience and on existential guilt. Yet I willingly 
acknowledge that being a psychotherapeutic supervisor is a unique phenomenological 
experience. 
In striving to crystallise my ‘fore- having, fore-sight and fore-conception’ (Heidegger, 
1927/1962) about psychotherapeutic supervision, I am acutely aware that I must carefully 
monitor my pre-understandings during the hermeneutic phenomenological research process 
in order to avoid pre-mature understandings or misunderstanding about participants  actual 
lived experiences.  
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3. PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC SUPERVISION -A VARIETY OF 
PERSPECTIVES 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter is designed to provide an in-depth account of differing perspectives about 
psychotherapeutic supervision, so that readers are better positioned to engage with research 
participants’ experiential stories as they evolve in latter chapters. In tandem, the function of 
this chapter is to provide a glimpse of the epistemological pre-understandings that potentially 
influence psychotherapeutic supervisors when being-with their supervisees.    
I begin by considering the emergence of supervision around the start of the 20
th
 century and 
discuss how this has evolved from being an educational and supportive process or activity for 
novice practitioners, to a position wherein it is mandatory for trainees, pre-accredited, 
accredited and highly experienced therapists to attend supervision if they wish to be 
recognised by a professional body. There are many highly influential modes, models, 
philosophies and psychotherapy bound approaches to psychotherapeutic supervision. There 
are multiple versions of psychotherapy and among the most influential of these are 
psychoanalytic, cognitive-behavioural and humanistic schools of thought. The participants in 
this research have been exposed to these dominant discourses, either, in the purist sense or 
integratively. Therefore, this chapter critically discusses these theoretical paradigms in order 
to appreciate the nuances of and highly variable approaches to psychotherapeutic supervision. 
From these multiple versions of psychotherapy a variety of perspectives on psychotherapy 
supervision have spawned leading to real challenges in finding a common description or 
definition of psychotherapeutic supervision. In reviewing these competing positions and 
33 
 
perspectives on psychotherapeutic supervision, careful consideration has been given to 
illuminating the attention or inattention that these approaches afford to supervisors’ day to 
day lived experiences and to the meaning of being a psychotherapeutic supervisor.  
In undertaking this review, a literature search was carried out using electronic data bases 
including CINAHL, PsycARTICLES, PsycINFO, and Google Scholar. In line with 
hermeneutic phenomenological inquiry, the literature review was undertaken after the data 
collection phase of the study in order to minimise my pre-understandings and prejudices 
about the phenomena under investigation. However, as an educator and practising 
psychotherapeutic supervisor, it must be acknowledged that I had a fore-structure of 
understanding prior to reviewing the literature and commencing data collection. It is hoped 
that the attention given to supervisory methodological frameworks and theory bound 
approaches to supervision will assist readers to navigate their way through the complexity of 
competing dominant discourses that postulate about what psychotherapeutic supervision is.  
3.2. The Evolution of Psychotherapeutic Supervision  
There have been references in the literature to supervision as an activity in the helping 
professions from the 1920s. With the growing interest in the practice of and training in 
Freudian psychoanalysis, approaches to supervision evolved over the subsequent forty years. 
Psychoanalytic supervision was then focussed on the supervision of trainee analysts, the key 
components of which were teaching, personal analysis and case discussion (Fleming and 
Benedeck, 1983). Trainee supervision was also advocated by the humanistic psychotherapist 
Carl Rogers (1951), who developed the Person- Centred approach in the 1950s when he 
began to mention the relevance of experienced counsellors engaging in a consultative process 
with more experienced colleagues (Page and Wosket 1994).  An influential form of 
34 
 
supervision gained prominence in the 1970s in the field of social work based on Kaduskin’s 
(1976) work and his conceptualisation that there were three main functions to supervision, 
broadly framed as educative, supportive and managerial. Kaduskin’s (1976) 
conceptualisations of supervision have been widely borrowed by counselling and 
psychotherapy supervisors. Additionally, Proctor’s (1988b) conceptualisation of the process 
of counselling supervision, described as formative, restorative and normative, has been 
highly influential in both the Irish and British contexts. Since then supervision for the 
practices of counselling and psychotherapy has developed quickly (Green et al., 2001). There 
has been general consensus, over recent decades, that supervision of counselling and 
psychotherapy is important to the growth and development of effective practitioners (Morgan 
and Sprenkle, 2007).  
This position was  endorsed in Britain by the, then British Association of Counselling (BAC), 
Code of Ethics and Practice (1984) and latterly BAC (1992) made attendance at supervision a 
requirement for all practitioners, regardless of whether they were trainees or experienced 
practitioners (Page and Wosket, 1994). In the Irish context, the Irish Association of 
Counselling and Psychotherapy (IACP) took a similar stance, highlighting in their Code of 
Ethics and Practice in1998 that it is an ethical requirement for counsellors and 
psychotherapists to attend regular supervision. There has, therefore, been a significant shift 
since the last century about the purpose, philosophy and functions of supervision. There has 
been an important evolution or move away from supervision primarily being a supportive, 
educative, reflective space for trainees to a position wherein attendance at supervision is 
mandatory for all practitioners. In order to be a recognised member of an accrediting body in 
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Britain and Ireland, and to have standing in the psychotherapeutic community therapists must 
annually attend a prescribed amount of supervision (BACP, 2013: IACP, 2013). 
While I agree that attendance at supervision is generally beneficial to the professional and 
personal development of practitioners, there are supervisors, counsellors and psychotherapists 
who strongly resist the imposition of specific guidelines for attendance at supervision as it is  
considered that these can impact on the dynamics and processes in the supervisory space 
(Mitchell, 2009). However, the implications of mandated supervision on therapeutic 
outcomes and the supervisory dyad are under-explored. In my view this shift from voluntary 
to mandatory attendance has had an impact on the experience of being a psychotherapeutic 
supervisor and a supervisee.  
This research study seeks to illuminate and more fully understand the meaning and 
experience of being a psychotherapeutic supervisor involved in the delivery of mandatory 
supervision. 
3.3. The Challenge of Defining Psychotherapeutic Supervision 
While there has been a growing general consensus about the importance of counsellors and 
psychotherapists regularly attending psychotherapeutic supervision, since its emergence in 
the last century (Fleming and Benedeck, 1983), over the last 30 years there have been 
differences of opinion in terms of defining the nature, objectives, parameters, tasks, roles, 
responsibilities and meaning of supervision (Carroll, 1988). There are those who view 
psychotherapeutic supervision as essentially an interpersonal interaction between a 
supervisory pair, the goal of which is to make the practitioner more effective in her/his 
interactions with clients (Hess, 1980). The emphasis, here, is on forming supervisory 
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relationships for the express purpose of developing therapeutic competence (Loganbill et al., 
1982).  Hewson (2001:65) postulates that supervision is an ‘art and a science’ based on being 
in a relationship in which the supervisor ‘creates safe space’ in which the supervisee can be 
supported and mentored. From this perspective, the art of supervision requires personal and 
artful qualities in the person of the supervisor such as empathy, sensitivity, awareness, 
understanding, approachability and wisdom. In contrast, the science of supervision requires 
structures and frameworks that can be measured for their effectiveness in empowering the 
practitioner, who can then enable clients (Hewson, 2001). 
Professional bodies, such as the British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy and 
the Irish Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy have traditionally taken the view 
that the function of supervision is the protection of the public through ensuring safe and 
ethical psychotherapeutic practice (BAC, 1992; BACP, 2013; IACP, 1998; IACP, 2013) and 
in this sense appears to prefer the notion of supervision being a science, with outputs and 
standards that can be scrutinised and verified.  
According to Gilbert and Evans (2000) there is broad agreement that supervision is an 
opportunity for practitioners to avail of on-going professional development by working with 
more experienced practitioners in a ‘learning process’  and through the implementation of 
this process clients are ‘safeguarded’ (Gilbert and Evans, 2000:1). So, in essence, supervision 
appears to be defined as educating and developing practitioners in their skills and knowledge 
bases, while supporting and enabling them in the context of safe, interpersonal supervisory 
relationships, so that their practice can be monitored in the interests of public protection.  
However, in striving to clearly define supervision, there is a danger that we lose the essence 
of it, by mainly focusing on the arts and science of this endeavour. It is difficult to find 
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specific definitions that address the hidden and less overt influences that impact on the 
process of supervision such as the training backgrounds of the supervisor and supervisee or 
how these impact on the meaning that each party attaches to supervising and being 
supervised.  
In quantifying psychotherapeutic supervision in terms of functions and measurable outcomes, 
there is the danger that the personhood of the human being that is the supervisor and the 
supervisee become concealed and that it is then difficult to recognise and capture the richness 
of experience in psychotherapeutic supervision or to uncover the phenomena that may occur 
therein. Carroll (2001) makes a helpful distinction between functional supervision and the 
philosophy of supervision in this way; 
‘In its ‘functional’ mode supervision is something done, applied techniques, 
strategies and methods used for some purpose. A ‘philosophy of supervision’ 
focuses on the ‘being of people’ and the meaning supervision has for us, is 
almost before anything is done.’  (Carroll, 2001:77) 
Carroll’s (2001) discussion on the philosophy of supervision, ‘the being of people’ and the 
‘meaning’  that supervision has for supervisors, takes us closer to the possibility of 
uncovering and understanding phenomenological experiences within specific 
psychotherapeutic supervisory situations. As such Carroll’s perspective on the philosophy of 
supervision is of particular interest to this study, as it is hoped that this research inquiry will 
provide participants with an opportunity to describe, interpret and more deeply understand 
the experience and meaning of ‘being’ a psychotherapeutic supervisor. 
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3.4. Modes and Methods of Psychotherapeutic Supervision 
Since its inception, multiple modes, methods and models of psychotherapy supervision have 
mushroomed. These frame the manner in which supervision is systemically delivered 
(Leddick, 1994) There are two main modes of supervision, referred to as ‘vertical’ and 
‘horizontal’ supervision. According to Hawkins and Shohet (2006:61) there are three strands 
to ‘vertical’ supervision, described as training, managerial and consultancy supervision. 
‘Vertical’ supervision occurs when a novice or less-experienced counsellor or 
psychotherapist attends a more experienced practitioner for the purposes of enhancing their 
clinical practice. Training supervision focuses on the developmental function of supervision 
in the context of training courses or placements and requires the supervisor to take 
responsibility for the quality of the supervisee's practice. Managerial supervision occurs when 
the supervisor is also the line-manager of the supervisees and has a quality control role 
whether they are trainee or experienced practitioners. Consultancy supervision is provided to 
experienced and accredited counsellors and psychotherapists, wherein there is a more 
collaborative aspect to the supervisory alliance and the supervisee holds some but not all of 
the responsibility for their practice (Omand, 2009). 
There are a number of formats or methods of delivery for vertical psychotherapeutic 
supervision. Supervisees and supervisors set up contracts for individual supervision, wherein 
the supervisor gives individual attention to one supervisee on a regular basis. Shared 
supervision involves two supervisees attending one supervisor and sharing the allocated time 
to discuss their own cases and to learn from each other’s case presentations (Compton, 2005). 
Group supervision involves a number of supervisees from differing clinical contexts coming 
together to critically explore their casework. The supervisor has a facilitative role and the 
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group members mainly supervise each other, while absorbing key learning points through 
case discussion. Team supervision, is similar to group supervision, except that the members 
are drawn from a related working environment (Hawkins and Shohet, 2006). There are 
further permutations, for example, supervisees may well attend both individual and group 
supervision or any combination of the above methods of supervision, in which case work is 
explored and evaluated (Compton, 2005). 
I offer the view that the meaning of being a supervisor, in these varying contexts, 
considerably changes. Being in a one to one relationship with a supervisee is quite different 
from being in a triadic relationship, as in shared supervision. The level of intimacy and 
connection, evident in individual supervision can be eroded and issues of competition and 
rivalry can emerge, eliciting good/bad parental responses. Being a group supervisor again has 
a different meaning for me. In this context, there can be a sense of being apart from the 
group, as group members grapple among themselves with clinical issues, only becoming part 
of the group if they meander off track or become stuck. Moving beyond my own perceptions, 
it is considered that this research has the potential to uncover the unique experiences of 
research participants who have to juggle different ways of being psychotherapeutic 
supervisors in diverse situations.   
The main benefits of vertical supervision are that supervisees can be mentored by 
experienced and competent practitioners who can pass on their practical wisdom or phronesis 
(Smythe et al., 2008); they can be enabled to become competent practitioners; and they can 
learn how to navigate their way through ethical minefields. It is widely acknowledged that 
there is a need to appropriately support trainee counsellors and psychotherapists in their 
professional development (Shearer, 2003). However, aspects of ‘vertical’ supervision, for 
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example the managerial and monitoring functions are contrary to the fundamental premises 
of several psychotherapy traditions, including the humanistic, behavioural, and cognitive 
schools. While these schools have different underlying philosophies, they place specific 
emphasis on equitable, collaborative, mutually responsible and respectful relationships 
(Rogers, 1951; O’Sullivan, 1996; Beck, 1991). There is an unanswered dichotomy in that this 
mode of supervision is widely utilised within these psychotherapeutic traditions, yet it 
positions supervisors as gurus in explicitly suggesting that supervisors are theoretically, 
practically and personally superior to other practitioners.  
Alternatively, ‘horizontal ’supervision occurs in the form of peer supervision.  This is carried 
out between two practitioners with similar levels of experience and is a widely accepted 
mode of practice in the private sector (Hawkins and Shohet, 2006: 61). Beneficially, within 
peer supervision each practitioner has an opportunity to present their casework, to discuss the 
progress and hindrances that they are encountering and to receive feedback or alternative 
perspectives on case-management.  
Peer supervision is regarded as a supportive and collaborate venture in which the potentially 
disempowering aspects of vertical supervision are minimised (Feltham and Dryden, 1994). 
Each supervisee is autonomous and holds ultimate responsibility for the quality and 
effectiveness of their practice. Counsellors and psychotherapists often seek peer supervision 
with individuals who have been trained in a similar theoretical approach. Peer supervision 
has been criticised as a convenient and inexpensive form of supervision, in which there is the 
potential for collusion between the supervisory pair with respect to the quality or 
effectiveness of therapeutic practices or the management of ethical, moral or legal issues. 
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According to Feltham and Dryden (1994) there are obvious disadvantages to peer 
supervision.   
 No one has any final authority or clear mandate, for example to report any 
unprofessional behaviour 
  Participants may avoid confronting each other when it is necessary to do so 
 Participants may either collude with each other or lack the structure and skills to 
offer emotional containment to each other (Feltham and Dryden, 1994: 49) 
The sustainability of horizontal supervision depends on both parties being able to avoid 
disruption of the supervisory alliance (Hawkins and Shohet, 2006).  Peer supervisees need to 
be vigilant about the potential traps and pitfalls of this type of alliance and discuss or 
formulate an agreement as to how they will address concerns that may emerge about each 
other’s practice, if they are to ensure that the services that they provide to the public are safe 
and ethical.  Modes of supervision create practices and structures for the manner in which 
supervision is carried out.  They focus on the functional facets of supervision. The ‘vertical’ 
mode places a higher level of responsibility for safe and ethical practice on the 
psychotherapeutic supervisor. While the ‘horizontal’ mode places this responsibility squarely 
on the shoulders of the supervisee.  
This study is based on the argument that an over-reliance on specific or combined modes of 
supervision creates a climate in which the ‘how’ of supervision is privileged and that 
understanding  about ‘what’ the actual  experience of being a psychotherapeutic supervisor is, 
gets lost. This research inquiry, therefore, seeks to get underneath the functional aspects of 
supervision to more fully understand psychotherapeutic supervisors’ day to day lived 
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experiences of being-with novice, pre-accredited and experienced counsellors and 
psychotherapists. It is anticipated that listening to and interpreting lived experience 
descriptions of the actuality of being a psychotherapeutic supervisor will begin to address this 
under-researched domain.  
3.5. Conceptual Models of Supervision 
Models of supervision can be divided into two broad categories, namely conceptual and 
theory bound models (Morgan and Sprenkle, 2007). Conceptual models tend to focus on the 
interaction between supervisor and supervisee (Bernard and Goodyear, 2009). There appears 
to be two main types of conceptual model, known as developmental and social role models 
(Morgan and Sprenkle 2007). 
An example of an influential developmental conceptual model is Stoltenberg and Delworth’s, 
(1987) conceptualisation, which defines the supervisee’s stages of development from being, 
initially, self-centred and dependent on the supervisor, to slowing moving, if anxiously, 
towards being client-centred. At the third developmental level there is an increase in 
professional confidence and the supervisee is more able to adapt theories and strategies to 
meet the clients’ needs. At the fourth and final stage, the process of being a 
psychotherapeutic practitioner has become more integrated and the supervisee is recognised 
to have reached master level (Stoltenberg and Delworth, 1987:20). This type of model is 
useful for training organisations and accrediting bodies in categorising practitioners as 
trainees, pre-accredited and experienced/accredited practitioners. While development models 
provide support, direction and structure, they tend to simplify trainee development (Creaner, 
2014:42).  They tend to box supervisees and supervisors into predetermined roles. 
Supervisees are expected to learn, cognitively and practically at similar rates (Lockner and 
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Melchert, 1997). Psychotherapeutic supervisors are, initially expected to be nurturing and 
supportive, assisting supervisees in their professional development. Latterly they are required 
to determine supervisees’ capacity for complex thinking and masterful practice (Stoltenberg 
and Delworth, 1987). The focus in developmental models is on how to supervise novice, 
apprentice and masterful practitioners. As such, there is the potential for the day to day, lived 
experience of being a psychotherapeutic supervisor, when being- in these very different pre-
determined situations to be concealed.   
Social- role conceptual models are descriptive and tend to try to define and organise the 
activities that supervisors engage in (Morgan and Sprenkle, 2007:4). For instance, Holloway 
(1995) outlines the five main functions of supervision as monitoring and evaluating; advising 
and instructing:  modelling; consulting and supporting; and sharing. Similarly, Carroll (1996) 
identified seven generic tasks of supervision which involve establishing a learning 
relationship; teaching; evaluating; monitoring professional and ethical issues; counselling; 
consulting and monitoring administrative or work-related contexts of therapeutic practice.  
Whatever the number of identified generic tasks, it is postulated that in clearly defining the 
activities of supervision that a scientific framework is provided through which supervisors 
and supervisees can clarify the nuances and complexities that emerge in the supervisory 
relationship (Hewson, 2001).  
Hawkins and Shohet’s (2012 :86), conceptual model, as previously discussed, suggests  a less 
task-orientate stance by taking a helicopter view, of the supervisory process by 
simultaneously focussing on the double matrix of the client/supervisee and the supervisee/ 
supervisor, while taking into account the potential influences from work and social contexts. 
Similarly, Page and Wosket (2001) offer a cyclical model of supervision which is also 
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process-orientated. This model creates a space for supervisees to reflect on the chaos in 
casework and to play with creative ways of working with clients. The bridge and focus phase 
of the cyclical module enables supervisees to consider that which they need to bring their 
attention to and assists them in relevant goal setting and action planning. The Contracting 
and reviewing phases are on-going features of this model, designed to ensure clarity for all 
parties, in the supervisory endeavour. 
Conceptual models are widely employed in supervisor training however, according to 
Bernard and Goodyear (2009) the efficacy of developmental and social-role conceptual 
models have not been researched sufficiently. While it is helpful to have structured and 
organised models of supervision for the training and development of psychotherapeutic 
supervisors, we have been warned that over reliance on modes, methods and models of 
supervision obscure the meaning of supervision (Davey 2002:231). In endeavouring to be 
proficient in the application of conceptual models, there is the danger that the 
psychotherapeutic supervisor’s actual experience of being-with the supervisee could get lost.  
I would argue that it is as important to understand what it is to be a psychotherapeutic 
supervisor as it is to intellectually and practically know, how to do it.  
3.6. Theoretical Bound Models of Psychotherapeutic Supervision 
Alongside conceptual models of supervision, Morgan and Sprenkle (2007) suggest that 
theory bound models have a major influence on approaches to the practice of supervision. 
Theory bound models draw on specific counselling and psychotherapy approaches and seek 
to apply these to the supervisory endeavour. According to Creaner (2014), 
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One advantage of considering supervision within a therapy frame is that 
there is a body of theory and research to draw upon (Creaner, 2014:41).  
The suggestion here is that theory bound models of supervision are perhaps more 
epistemologically sound than the potentially compartmentalising features of methodical 
frameworks for undertaking this endeavour.  In order to understand theory bound models of 
supervision, it is however, essential, to have an in-depth understanding of the philosophies, 
principles and practices that fundamentally inform their dominant and contradictory 
discourses about the nature of psychotherapeutic supervision.   
Counselling and psychotherapy is characterised by many diverse versions drawing on a broad 
range of differing and oppositional philosophical, theoretical and practical stances. According 
to Feltham, there are some 400 schools of counselling and psychotherapy which advocate 
differing and competing approaches to therapy which propose and implement diverse 
methods of training and supervision of practitioners (Feltham, 1999). However, these 
multiple schools of therapy have tended to evolve and mushroom from several dominant 
paradigms and are generally influenced by psychoanalytic, behavioural, cognitive and 
humanistic approaches to therapy (Corey, 2001).  
These approaches are widely utilised with individual clients, couples and groupings who 
present with transient and entrenched issues as single modalities. Alternatively two or more 
of these are combined and are practiced by integrative psychotherapists (Gilbert and 
Schmukler, 2001). Given the multiple perceptions about the nature of therapy, there are 
varying perspectives on what constitutes counselling or psychotherapy, what the common 
factors are and how these practices assist clients to overcome personal and relationship 
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distress. Some authors use the terms counselling and psychotherapy interchangeably while 
others argue that there are significant differences between these talking therapies (O’Farrell, 
1993). In the context of this research project it is considered that psychotherapy tends to 
involve longer term work with clients who have entrenched emotional and psychological 
issues, while counselling tends to benefit clients who have transitional issues and attend for 
time-limited therapy. There are many common factors between these therapeutic stances that 
appear to lead to effective therapeutic outcomes.  
These include the capacity of therapists to form and maintain safe, trusting and confidential 
relationship with clients. Core characteristics of therapists include warmth, genuineness; the 
capacity to be non-judgemental and non-reactive (Mearns and Thorne, 2007). Commonly 
effective therapists are persons of integrity and maturity who comfortably encourage client 
autonomy and foster personal responsibility for growth and change in helpees (Van Deurzen, 
1988).   
According to the United Kingdom Council for Psychotherapy (2013); 
Psychotherapy is one of the talking therapies. It can help people gain insight 
into their difficulties or distress, establish a greater understanding of their 
motivation, enable them to find more appropriate ways of coping and bring 
about changes in their behaviour (UKCP 2013).  
While the United Kingdom Council for Psychotherapy takes a risk in proffering this 
definition, it does appear to reflect the common view that counselling and psychotherapy is 
an insight orientated activity, which is designed to reduce emotional and psychological 
disturbance by supporting and enabling clients to engage in a process of personal change in 
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order to manage their lives more effectively.  However, the main schools of counselling and 
psychotherapy conceptualise and approach these endeavours in highly variable ways.   
According to Storm et al., (2001) the theory based approach significantly inspires the 
principles of supervision practice. This has resulted in multiple models of supervision 
including but not exclusively psychoanalytically rooted supervision (Wharton, 2003); 
behavioural and cognitive structured supervisory positions (Ricketts and Donoghue, 2000); 
humanistic consultative perspectives (Page and Wosket, 1994); narrative approaches 
(Speedy, 2001); and integrative relational approaches to psychotherapy supervision (Gilbert 
and Evans, 2000). Additionally, across many psychotherapeutic modalities  the influence of 
Roger’s, Person-Centred theory, which places high value on developing and maintaining 
empathic and non-judgemental relationships, can be witnessed in the manner in which 
supervisors invest time and energy in creating safe and trusting relationships with their 
supervisees (Rogers, 1951).  
However, the basis upon which supervision generally occurs is rooted in the diverse and 
differing training, therapeutic experience and supervision of the supervisors who undertake 
this endeavour. In doing so, supervision practice which is influenced by theoretical models 
take, not only, the principles and practices of psychotherapeutic approaches into 
consideration but also seek to propagate the philosophies of such theories in supervisory 
practice.  
Interestingly, and in contrast to Creaner (2014), Storm et al., (2001) bring to our attention the 
fact that there is a lack of robust research evidence to demonstrate the effectiveness of any 
one theoretically influenced model of supervision over other approaches.  Yet, purists from 
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within these psychotherapeutic paradigms seek to privilege their own philosophical and 
epistemological perspectives on clinical practice and supervision, often dismissing, criticising 
and rejecting alternative or differing positions.  
It is my view that this variety of influential perspectives on supervision leads to markedly 
different experiences of being a psychotherapeutic supervisor. Having been a supervision 
consultant for many years, I have observed and noted that the day to day experience of being 
a supervisor appears to have very different meanings for psychoanalytic, humanistic, 
behavioural, cognitive and integratively trained supervisors. In order to provide readers with 
a depth of understanding about the specific epistemological contexts which significantly 
impact on psychotherapeutic supervisors’ existence, the philosophical underpinning and 
practical applications of these divergent paradigms are extrapolated, here. 
3.7. Psychoanalysis-Precepts and Practices 
Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) as the founder of psychoanalytic psychotherapy has had a major 
influence of the development of the talking therapies (Jacobs, 2007). There are many off-
shoots of psychoanalysis including the Kleinian, Jungian, Eriksonian and Lacian schools of 
thought. However, given the deterministic view of human nature purported by Freud, 
alternative forms of therapy have been developed which sit in direct contrast to his 
propositions and principles about personality development and human nature (Corey, 2001). 
Psychoanalysis is based on the assumptions that people’s behaviour is governed by 
unconscious drives and motivations which have an impact on human behaviour. Unconscious 
drives are fuelled by psychic energy or instincts. These include survival, development, 
pleasure and death instincts. It is Freud’s contention that people have limited control over 
their unconscious drives and resulting symptoms until aspects of the unconscious are brought 
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into consciousness through the process of prolonged psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytic theory 
asserts that the unconscious, while not directly accessible, manifests itself in behaviours and 
through dreams, slips of the tongue, free association, transference and countertransference 
and by the identification and examination of projections of unwanted aspects of self on to 
others (Freud, 1949).  
In psychoanalytic theory the structure of personality, while a single entity, has three 
interrelated aspects, the Id (biological aspect), the Ego (psychological aspect) and the 
Superego (social aspect). These ego-states compete for dominance over each other (Jacobs, 
2007). The Id is governed by the pleasure principle. The Ego is governed by the reality 
principle and the Superego is governed by the principle of striving to be perfect.  As a result 
of the competition and struggle between these ego states human beings experience anxiety 
which can be a positive and motivating force or which can be irrational and debilitating 
(Nelson-Jones, 1992).  
When anxiety manifests in debilitating symptoms, people employ defence mechanisms, such 
as repression, denial, projection, rationalisation, regression, introjection or compensation, to 
name but a few,  in order to try to control anxiety and cope with real or perceived threats. 
Defence mechanisms have an impact on daily functioning and behaviour. As such key aims 
of psychoanalysis are to strengthen the ego and interpret the meaning that patients attach to 
their symptoms, so that choices and behaviours become more reality based (Freud, 1949). 
Freud placed significant emphasis on personality formation during the initial six years of life 
postulating that this is the stage of life on which a person’s future personality is founded. 
According to the orthodox psychoanalytic perspective, during this period of life there are 
three major personal and social personality development tasks to be achieved which are 
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broadly framed as love and trust, coping with negative emotions and embracing sexuality in 
an optimistic manner (Jacobs, 2007). It is postulated that the quality of parenting and life 
experiences in these early years will affect whether or not a person manages these 
psychosocial tasks (Bowlby, 2005). Freud also purported that psychosexual development 
begins in infancy and that there are five psychosexual stages, the oral (first year of life), anal 
(ages 1-3), phallic (ages 3-6), latency (ages 6-12) and genital stages (ages 12 and beyond) 
(Freud, 1949). Erikson latterly extended the management of these tasks beyond childhood 
and suggested that psychosocial and psychosexual tasks can be worked and reworked across 
the life span (Erikson, 1963). While the orthodox psychoanalytic view has been tempered 
over the years, psychoanalytic and psycho-dynamically orientated therapists utilise these 
psychosocial and psychosexual frameworks to assist clients to gain understanding about 
recurring difficult and painful patterns in their lives (Jacobs, 2007). For example, clients 
present with symptoms such as recurrent anxiety, social phobias, persistent fear of intimacy, 
inability to form trusting or lasting relationships, ingrained low self- esteem or personal and 
sexual self-loathing.  
The central aim of Freudian psychoanalysis is to render the unconscious conscious (Scaife, 
2009). This goal is aided by interpreting symptoms, analysing dominant ego-states, defence 
mechanisms, transferences (unconscious emotional material communicated between the 
patient and the analyst) or counter-transferences (unconscious emotional reaction of the 
analyst to the patient) and how patients have or have not worked through psychosocial and 
psychosexual stages of development (Freud, 1949; Wharton, 2003:87).  
Critics of psychoanalysis question the existence of the unconscious and the attending drives 
and motivations (Thornton, 1999). They point out the danger that in viewing clients’ 
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symptoms purely through a psychoanalytic philosophical lens that obvious or consciously 
known factors that are negatively impacting on clients’ well-being could be neglected 
(Omand, 2009). Critics argue that there are more effective and efficient ways of managing 
client care (Alperin et al., 1997) and assisting clients or patients to address entrenched 
emotional and psychological distress. Psychoanalytic opponents raise ethical questions about 
keeping clients in long-term and costly psychotherapy when they may gain insight and relief 
through more pragmatic therapeutic approaches. 
Psychoanalysts counter these argues by proffering the view that insight-orientated work 
cannot and should not be forced or rushed and that clients move beyond first order change at 
emotional, intellectual and behavioural levels, overcome entrenched negative patterns in 
individual and relational functioning while achieving sustained second order change through 
psychoanalysis (Jacobs, 2007). These perspectives filter into the supervision of 
psychoanalysts and psychodynamic therapists.  
3.7.1 Psychoanalytic Perspectives on Supervision 
Psychoanalysts make the claim that they introduced the idea of supervision into 
psychological and psychotherapeutic practices. In the early 1920s it was considered that it 
was necessary for novice psychoanalysts to undergo analysis themselves as part of the 
training process (Balint, 1948). It was considered that training analysis provided evolving 
analysts with an opportunity to explore any difficulties they had in working with patients by 
reflecting on transferences and countertransferences that occurred during the analysis of 
patients and that it also helped them to identify their own blind spots (Omand, 2009).  
However, during the mid-1920’s Freud was beginning to consider that developing an 
understanding of psychoanalytic concepts and attending training analysis were insufficient in 
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the full formation of analysts. This resulted in Freud advocating mandatory attendance at 
supervision during psychoanalytic training. Over the following decades, complicated versions 
and revisions of psychoanalytic supervision emerged (Ekstein, 1969). There was much debate 
about whether or not analysts should provide supervision to  students or whether this should 
be provided by a different entity, a ‘control analyst’  so that a clear demarcation could be 
made between personal analysis and maintaining a focus on the analysis that the trainee was 
providing to patients (Mattoon, 1995).  
The tripartite model of education, personal or training analysis and supervision have become 
cornerstones in psychoanalytic training and this has carried over into the supervision of 
psychodynamically trained counsellors and psychotherapists (Scaife, 2009). However, 
Wharton (2003) argues that contemporarily, personal analysis is the cornerstone stone of the 
development of analysts. 
While there are many shades of psychoanalysis, (Freudian, Jungian, Kleinian, Eriksonian or 
Lacian) and its successor psychodynamic psychotherapy, it is generally agreed that 
supervision, in this domain, involves educating the supervisee in terms of theory, principles 
and practices as well as interpreting unconscious material and parallel processes (Scaife, 
2009). Significant focus is placed on identifying and managing transferences and 
countertransferences, while reflecting on the impact these may be having on the therapeutic 
process (Wharton, 2003). Searles (1955) placed emphasis on the importance of paying close 
attention to the supervisor’s emotional experiences in the supervisory relationship.  He 
postulated that the supervisor’s emotional responses or reactions were a manifestation of the 
parallel but unconscious dynamics or processes being played out between the patient and the 
supervisee. Working with transferences/ countertransferences and interpreting parallel 
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processes are mainstays in psychoanalytically orientated supervisory practice with both 
novice and experienced analysts (Omand, 2009).  
According to Wharton (2003) supervision is an educative, creative, reflective, unpressurised 
‘space to play’ for trainee analysts. It is a space in which supervisors can pass on 
psychoanalytic knowledge and experience.  
I see the supervisor as modelling a way of listening and thinking which is 
informed by the analytic attitude, an enquiring, non-judgemental 
reflectiveness which presupposes the ability to be in a state of not knowing, 
or not imposing a shape prematurely, of waiting for the unconscious contents 
to take their own shape. Underlying the waiting is trust that our words and 
actions have meaning and that their meaning might emerge in time (Wharton, 
2003:86).  
In psychoanalytic terms, supervision creates a space in which the supervisee is exposed to 
psychoanalytic practice at play. In modelling the capacity to patiently sit with the unknown, 
the supervisor is teaching the supervisee that the emergence of unconscious material can be a 
slow process which cannot be forced. So, the novice analyst initially introjects that which the 
supervisor models and plays this out in psychotherapy practice (Scaife, 2009). Overtime, 
through practical experience and self-reflection, the analyst becomes more self-reliant and 
develops her/his own internal supervisor. With experienced analysts, it is advocated that the 
psychoanalytic supervisor, supervise the supervisee’s internal supervisor (Casement, 1985). 
It is openly acknowledged that psychoanalytically orientated perspectives on supervision are 
strongly influenced by analytical thinking (Ekstein, 1969). When supervision is 
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operationalised, purely based on this philosophical stance, as a psychotherapy supervisor, I 
am concerned that over-reliance on the existence of transferences and countertransferences 
could block supervisory exploration of normal, common, understandable every day reactions 
and interactions between two people (the patient and the analyst) who are involved in the 
challenging human endeavour of psychotherapy.  Furthermore, placing parallel processing at 
the heart of the supervisory process (Searles, 1955)  has the potential to set up expectations 
that perceived parallels are purely responsible for the dynamics that emerge in supervisory 
relationships or are accountable for the inevitable tensions, discomforts and disrupts that 
happen between the supervisory pair (Frawley-O’Dea and Sarnat, 2001).  
While psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic perspectives on supervision have made a 
significant contribution to the talking therapies, it is evident that these endeavours are 
significantly informed by philosophical postulations and theory (Ekstein, 1969), the 
principles of which are privileged over the subjective experience of patients, clients, 
supervisees and supervisors. It is argued here that psychoanalytic supervisors are constrained 
by psychoanalytic dogma which impacts on their way of being as supervisors. The heavy 
emphasis on the power of unconscious drives and the process of waiting for unconscious 
contents to emerge, in my view, intellectually deflects and gets in the way of illuminating the 
meaning of being (Heidegger, 1927/1962) for patients, clients, supervisees and supervisors, 
in the here and now, in the time being. Making meaning, psychoanalytically, is associated 
with interpreting the meaning that patients’ attach to their symptoms (Balint, 1948). In 
focussing on the interpretation of symptoms, it could be construed that Dasein (the situated 
meaning of being) (Flood, 2010) remains unearthed. Searles (1955) postulations on parallel 
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processing, suggest that the supervisor is experiencing an experience outside of her/his own 
experience (a manifestation of something that is occurring in the analytic space). 
While this is a widely reported phenomenon by supervisors, there is the danger that 
understanding of one’s own authentic experience of being-with supervisees gets concealed or 
is accounted for by a dominant psychoanalytic discourse. This research study, therefore, 
which favours ontology over epistemology, seeks to reflectively listen to stories about 
specific and unique supervisory moments. It strives to uncover and more fully understand the 
unique meaning of being a supervisor when this experience is freed from the binds of 
theoretical dogmas and dominant discourses. 
3.8. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapeutic Positions 
3.8.1. Behaviour Therapy  
Historically, behaviour therapy has tended to take a common sense view to the management 
and resolution of personal problems such as anxiety and phobias. Across centuries, this 
common sense approach has evolved into a coherent behavioural theory, underpinned by a 
set of clearly defined principles, experimental interventions and action- orientated techniques 
which are designed to pragmatically help clients to get control of and manage dysfunctional 
reactions and behaviours (O’Sullivan, 1996).   
Contemporary approaches to behaviour therapy spawned in the western world during the 
1950s. The basic assumptions and underlying principles of behaviour therapy sat in sharp 
contrast to the dominant discourses which abounded in psychotherapy, at that time. It was a 
major force in challenging psychoanalytic perspectives and the emphasis it places on the 
influence of the unconscious on human behaviour. The emergence of and early developments 
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in behaviour therapy were greeted with scepticism and opposition by the psychoanalytic 
community.  In juxtaposition, early forms of behaviour therapy advocated a scientific 
approach which focussed on the assessment of concrete and observable aspects of human 
behaviour which could be changed or modified through guided behavioural tasks and 
experiments (Corey, 2001).  
The early principles underpinning behaviour therapy were strongly influenced by the Russian 
physiologist Pavlov (1927) whose research and experiments with animals lead to the 
development of his theoretical model of classical conditioning. Classical conditioning 
postulates that an unconditional stimulus (e.g. food) automatically creates an unconditioned 
response (salivation). When a manufactured or conditioned stimulus (e.g. a specific noise) is 
repeatedly added when the unconditional stimulus (food) is presented, then eventually the 
sound of the noise will be sufficient to create the unconditioned response (salivation) even in 
the absence of the unconditional stimulus (food) (Pavlov, 1927).  During the 1950s Wolpe 
began to experiment with the application of classical conditioning with human subjects in a 
clinical setting and this led to the development of systematic desensitisation, a technique 
which has become a staple in the behavioural therapist’s tool box (Wolpe, 1990). Lazarus 
(1971) who was also influenced by Pavlov’s work (1927) successfully began to apply 
classical conditioning to the treatment and management of panic disorders and phobias, 
which was highly influential in the popularisation of behavioural therapy in the mid-twentieth 
century (O’Sullivan, 1996).     
Furthermore behavioural therapy was influenced by Thorndike’s (1911) experiments with 
animals that led to the formulation of ideas on operant conditioning. Operant conditioning 
asserts that human behaviour is mainly governed by its consequences.  When an action or 
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behaviour has a positive consequence or reward, then the behaviour is likely to be reinforced 
through behavioural repetition. Positive reinforcers often include things like financial or 
monetary gain, praise and validation or satisfying a basic human need like hunger. If, on the 
other hand, specific actions or behaviours have an unpleasant, painful or negative 
consequence then it is anticipated that such behaviour will become extinct (Thorndike, 1911). 
Negative reinforcers are, for example, over-indulging in the consumption of alcohol and 
becoming physical sick resulting in a period of abstinence from alcohol.  During the 1950s 
Skinner proposed a radical approach to behavioural psychotherapy which was focussed on 
creating measurable and observable change in human behaviour. This approach was based on 
his research and study of the application of operant conditioning to patients presenting with 
mental health issues. It was Skinner’s hypothesis that changes in human behaviour only occur 
when positive or negative reinforcers are present. Skinner’s approach to therapy, which was 
designed to help patients to cope with and manage the behavioural manifestations of fears, 
phobias and compulsions, was integrated into main stream clinical practice in the 1960s 
(Skinner, 1971).  In essence radical behavioural theory and practice postulates that peoples’ 
behaviour makes sense and that; 
An individual’s behaviour is a reflection of his or her overall state of well-
being. Human functioning can be enhanced by influencing behaviour. Self-
control and mastery of the environment allow people to achieve their goals 
(O’Sullivan, 1996:284).  
Radical behaviourists then adhere to the notions underpinning learning theory which state 
that the behaviour of human beings is governed by what they have learned through classical 
and operant conditioning. As such radical behaviourists have traditionally rejected the 
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influence of cognitions and subjective experience on positive or maladaptive human 
functioning. This psychotherapeutic position is firmly rooted in objectivity. It is primarily 
interested in observing human behaviours and the context in which these occur. From this 
scientific position, it is asserted that interventions can be employed which lead to measurable 
behavioural change and the reduction of anxious, phobic or obsessive-compulsive related 
dysfunctions (O’Sullivan, 1996).   
Behaviour therapy focusses on the client’s current problem(s) and assumes that these are 
related to the present environment. Initially, the therapist will undertake a behavioural 
analysis of the problem(s) and their consequences on human functioning. In collaboration 
with the client, the therapist will establish several specific, measurable and attainable goals 
which are directly related to reducing and managing the presenting issues (s). As behavioural 
therapy is an action orientated approach, the goals of therapy are translated into a tailor-made 
treatment plan and graduated tasks (Lazarus, 1993). During each therapy session, the 
therapist and the client work collaboratively in agreeing take-home tasks for the following 
week. Clients undertake these tasks or employ techniques and strategies in their own 
environment. There is an expectation that clients will take responsibility for undertaking the 
tasks and for helping themselves to overcome their difficulties (Spiegler and Guevrement, 
1998). At subsequent sessions, clients report back on their progress with agreed tasks and any 
hindrances or blocks they may have encountered. Behavioural tasks are repeated and/or 
modified until clients have achieved their goals and dysfunctional behaviours are being 
controlled, managed or resolved. Behaviour therapy tends to be briefer than other forms of 
therapy as it has a psycho-educational component which assists clients to learn new skills, 
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unlearn unhelpful or dysfunctional behaviour and emphasises self-help techniques (Crowe 
and Ridley, 2000).  
Lazarus (1993) advocated that therapists should be ‘authentic chameleons’. He argues that 
clients’ behavioural problems should be approached in a creative, flexible manner and that 
practitioners should have at their disposal a comprehensive range of techniques that can be 
tailored directly towards specific client presentations. As such, behavioural therapists draw 
on a range of interpersonal approaches towards clients and identify techniques which are 
employed in the best interests of clients. For instance, they are active in providing relaxation 
training to clients who present with fears, phobias and obsessive-compulsive conditions. 
Historically, behaviour therapists have been influenced by the exposure principle which 
advocates that people should be gradually and in a measured way, exposed to the source or 
object of their fear. When the exposure principle is applied appropriately, the client will be 
able to gain confidence in confronting the feared situation (O’Sullivan, 1996).  Through a 
process of systematic desensitisation clients learn that they can become desensitised to 
increasingly anxiety provoking situations by undertaking specific, small steps or actions 
which directly counter anxiety or compulsiveness (Wolpe, 1990). Behavioural change is 
elicited and reinforced with active techniques such as, role-play, assertiveness training, note-
taking/ recording and self-help strategies designed to support relapse prevention. Radical 
behavioural therapy has had some, if limited sustained success, with individual clients 
presenting with phobic and compulsive-obsessive disorders.  
It is recognised that behavioural techniques such as systematic desensitisation can be very 
challenging for clients and as such many are unable to action the take-home tasks or they 
drop out before achieving their goals (Marks and O’Sullivan, 1988). Behavioural couple 
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therapy has generated positive outcomes when clients’ presenting issues are transitory and 
lack a depth of entrenchment.  However a radical behavioural approach has had less success, 
in terms of long-term change with dysfunctional or abusive behaviours and entrenched 
psychosexual dysfunctions (Crowe and Ridley 2000).  During the 1970s Lazarus (1971) 
among others began to illuminate and challenge the limitations of Skinner’s radical approach 
to behaviour therapy. Concurrently, Bandura’s (1977) social learning theory was beginning to 
influence the manner in which behavioural therapists formulated client’s problems.   
Alongside a shift away from radical behaviour therapy (Lazarus, 1971), the basic premises 
and validity of behaviour therapy have also been widely challenged by other 
psychotherapeutic stances. This therapeutic approach has been condemned by humanistic 
psychotherapists as being mechanistic and placing an over-emphasis on fixing the problem. 
There is a view that behavioural therapy is overly directive and controlling, resulting in the 
manipulation of clients (Corey, 2001). Central techniques such as exposure have been 
deemed to create high levels of discomfort for clients leading to non-compliance and drop out 
(O’Sullivan, 1996).  It has been further suggested by experiential psychotherapists that 
behavioural therapy has a limited interest in building therapeutic alliances with clients or 
understanding their subjective experience or feelings. Behavioural therapists refute these 
claims and state that there is a humanistic and interpersonal aspect to contemporary 
behavioural therapy practice (Lazarus, 1993). They claim that their work is subject to more 
evaluation by practitioners and empirical research than other approaches and that the 
outcomes of these inform and change practice (Spiegler and Guevremont, 1998). While they 
acknowledge that there is a directive aspect to this approach, they argue that there is the 
potential for manipulation and control of clients in all therapeutic modalities (Kazdin, 1994).  
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Psychoanalytic psychotherapists question an absence of emphasis on the client’s subjective 
experience in behavioural therapy and suggest that clients need to have an opportunity to gain 
personal insight through psychotherapy (Jacobs, 2007). They contend that behavioural 
therapy treats the overt cues or symptoms and does not deal with or heal the underlying 
causes of problems. As a result of this clients may well experience first order change but 
eventually, according to the psychoanalytic tradition symptoms will re-emerge or new 
symptoms will surface as manifestations of unresolved past issues (Kohut, 1984). 
Behaviourists challenge these criticisms and take the position that insight is not essential to 
resolving personal difficulties.  Furthermore, they assert that there is a lack of empirical 
evidence to suggest that insight-orientated therapeutic practice has better long term, sustained 
outcomes for clients (Spiegler and Guevremont, 1998). 
3.8.2. Cognitive Therapy 
While radical behavioural therapy was developing and gaining prominence in the 1950s and 
1960s, Beck (1964) was simultaneously formulating his cognitive module which proposed 
that; 
Distorted or dysfunctional thinking (which influences the patient’s mood and 
behavior) is common in all psychological disturbances. Realistic evaluation 
and modification of thinking produce an improvement in mood and behavior. 
Enduring improvement results from modification of the patient’s underlying 
dysfunctional beliefs (Beck, 1995:1). 
The assumptions underpinning Beck’s (1976) cognitive model evolved into a form of brief, 
time-limited therapy which primarily focusses on patients /client’s current thinking processes 
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and the impact these have on feelings and behaviours. As such contemporary cognitive 
therapy is primarily concerned with helping people to resolve present-orientated problems by 
changing maladaptive or distorted thinking (Beck, 1995).   
Cognitive therapy is based on the principle that it essential to form and maintain a strong 
therapeutic alliances with clients and draws on precepts from person-centred therapy such as 
empathy, warmth and unconditional positive regard in order to achieve this (Rogers, 1980; 
Beck, 1995). The approach is deemed to be most effective when both therapist and client 
collaborate and participate in the therapeutic process. This is assisted by a strong emphasis on 
psycho-education, with therapists openly sharing rationales for specific treatment approaches 
and cognitive techniques. The central psycho-educational aspect focuses on training clients to 
identify maladaptive thought processes and dysfunctional core beliefs or schemas (Padesky 
and Greenberger, 1995).  This approach postulates that core beliefs, which manifest in 
absolutist thinking, such as I am stupid lead to intermediate beliefs which influence the rules, 
attitudes and assumptions which direct people’s lives. Intermediate beliefs are best captured 
in spontaneous or automatic thoughts. Automatic thoughts are usually accompanied by an 
emotional and behavioural response, for example, a person who has a core belief that he/she 
is stupid, may think I can’t do that when faced with a new challenge, so he/she is likely to 
feel despondent and may well retreat and engage in avoidance type behaviours. So, cognitive 
therapy starts with the identification of automatic thoughts as these can be most easily 
accessed.  
Once clients have learned to identify these, they are then trained to evaluate the validity or 
otherwise of these and are taught a range of techniques such as socratic questioning and 
thought stopping so that they can respond to situations and events in a more realistic, less 
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distorted fashion (Beck, 1976). Formulation of the client’s problem is an on-going and 
evolving process in which the cognitive therapist considers pre-disposing, precipitating and 
maintaining factors associated with the clients’ presenting issue. When blocks or resistance 
emerge during the therapeutic process clients are taught to understand and modify 
dysfunctional intermediate and core beliefs due to the significant impact these have on 
cognitions, feelings and behaviours (Padesky and Greenberg, 1995).  
As cognitive therapy is goal orientated, sessions tend to be structured, with a clear focus on 
resolving presenting problems. Once the client’s problems have been conceptualised, the 
psycho-educational process begins. Clients are assisted to gain understanding about the 
nature of their problem or disorder and simultaneously they are educated in the principles of 
the cognitive model that will assist them to overcome their difficulty (Beck, 1995). So, clients 
are introduced to the central idea that people’s feelings and thoughts are strongly influenced 
by their perception of events. They are encouraged to consider that it is not the actual event 
that causes emotional and behavioural responses but the manner in which people interpret 
and think about these (Beck, 1964).  
Thereafter cognitive therapy sessions have a defined format. Generally speaking, sessions 
begin with clients giving an update about how they have been since the last session and the 
therapist will do a mood check using a mood rating scale. An agenda for the session is then 
agreed and previous homework is discussed in terms of progress and hindrances. The 
therapist works in an empathic manner with clients, exploring intermediate or core beliefs 
which may be negatively impacting on progress and demonstrates understanding about the 
challenges of modifying dysfunctional cognitions (Dattilio and Bevilacqua, 2000). Thereafter 
new homework is set based on assisting clients to meet their goals. Homework tasks often 
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include cognitive activities such as guided imagery; applying the principles of mind over 
mood; identifying and reframing distorted or unrealistic thoughts, through rational reflection. 
Paper exercises assist with understanding and reinforcing these principles (Padesky and 
Greenberg, 1995).  Furthermore, behavioural tasks are also agreed, such as graduated social 
experiments in which the client is ask to step outside of their comfort zone and monitor their 
thoughts and emotional responses to the new situation.  Sessions end with a summary of the 
key aspects of the session and the cognitive reinforcement of homework tasks (Beck, 1995).   
The goal of cognitive therapy is to collaborate in the management or resolution of problems 
and eventually to enable the client to become his/her own therapist. The psycho-educational 
approach inherent in the cognitive-model assists these processes. As clients begin to deal 
with their problems they are taught cognitive and behavioural relapse prevention techniques. 
This fosters a sense of self-reliance in clients. Contact with the therapist is then reduced by 
tapering off sessions from weekly, to fortnightly, to monthly meetings. Clients are then 
invited to take responsibility for scheduling booster sessions in three, six and twelve months. 
This weaning off approach is designed to reduce the potential for dependence on the therapist 
and to enable the client to autonomously deal with future challenging life events (Beck, 
1976). 
As with behaviour therapy, there have been many criticisms levelled at cognitive therapy. 
Indeed, Beck (1991) acknowledged that the principles and practices of his cognitive model 
challenged and were challenged by psychoanalysis and behaviourism which were the 
dominant therapeutic forces, when he was developing his approach. While, latterly 
behavioural and cognitive therapies became comfortable bed-fellows, the limitations of 
Beck’s approach to treating patients continue to abound. A common criticism is that this 
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approach lacks theoretical depth, is unsophisticated and naively places too much importance 
on reframing negative thinking (Corey, 2001).  As such critics, trained in humanistic and 
experiential schools, suggest that the application of the cognitive model is insufficient to 
address entrenched or deep seated issues and is more applicable to transient presenting 
problems because humanistic psychotherapists propose that clients’ interests are best served 
by exploring their feelings (Rogers, 1961) and their subjective experiences of being human 
(Van Deurzen-Smith, 1988). Experiential therapists question the strong emphasis on the 
psycho-educational aspects of the cognitive model. They contend that teaching people to, for 
example, reframe distorted thinking, without engaging in a depth of self-reflection and self-
awareness, may lead to short term gain, however such gains will not be sustained (Patterson 
and Watkins, 1996). Therefore, the cognitive approach is structured in such a way that clients 
are invited to return for booster sessions (Beck, 1995) to mitigate the time-limited gains and 
the fundamental short comings in its philosophy. As cognitive therapy is present-orientated 
and goal focussed, it comes in for particular criticism from the psychoanalytic community. 
Cognitive therapists are interested in client’s core and intermediate beliefs and they actively 
work with the information that is consciously available to clients (Beck, 1976). Alternatively, 
psychoanalysts consider that the causes of psychological disturbance are manifestations of 
unconscious material and in order to overcome psychological and emotional distress 
unconscious factors must be subjected to interpretation by the analyst (Freud, 1949). 
Therefore, in failing to consider and therapeutically work with unconscious drives, cognitive 
therapists are merely treating symptoms and not the underlying causes.  
The psychoanalytic position has been strongly rebutted by  Ellis (1999) among others, when 
he argued that focussing on illuminating unconscious material can do more harm than good 
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to people and that it can make them worse rather than pragmatically helping them to get 
better. 
3.8.3. Integration of Cognitive and Behavioural Therapies 
In a move away from a pure reliance on classical and operant conditioning (Lazarus, 1971) 
and in line with Bandura’s (1977) postulations  on the relevance of social learning theory, a 
general acceptance was developing that it was necessary to give weight to the influence of  
clients’ cognitions, beliefs and attitudes  and how these impacted on positive and maladaptive 
behaviours. This move paved the way for the emergence and integration of multiple forms of 
cognitive-behavioural therapy (Corey, 2001).  At this time there are in excess of 20 
recognised variations of cognitive-behaviour therapy, for example rational emotive behaviour 
therapy, multimodal therapy, mindfulness-based cognitive therapy or acceptance and 
commitment therapy (Smith et al., 2012). 
Rational emotive behavioural therapy (initially formulated under the auspices of rational 
emotive therapy) was one of the first forms of cognitive behavioural therapy (Dryden, 2009). 
While Ellis openly acknowledges that rational-emotive behavioural therapy borrows a 
breadth of cognitive and behavioural techniques, as developed by others, he offers his own 
unique philosophy on psychological health, well-being and disturbance (Ellis, 1994).  
According to Ellis and MacLaren (2005); 
Rational emotive behavior therapy is based on the assumption that cognition, 
emotion and behaviour are not disparate human functions but are instead 
intrinsically integrated and holistic. When we feel, we think and act; when we 
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act, we feel and think; and when we think, we feel and act (Ellis and 
MacLaren, 2005:3).  
Rational emotive behaviour therapy, then moves beyond the fragmentation of human 
functioning and in a dynamic way intertwines thoughts, emotions and behaviours. This think-
feel-act triad (Ellis and Dryden, 1997) suggests that a response in anyone of these domains, 
elicits responses in the other two domains, in as much as, if a person has a negative thought, 
this will be accompanied by a negative feeling and less than positive behaviours.   
Central to this approach is the postulation that rigid and extreme beliefs are at the heart of 
psychological disturbance. Ellis (1994) proffers that rigid beliefs are translated into absolutist 
thinking, which in turn makes irrational and debilitating demands on self and others. In 
contrast, flexible beliefs are central to the promotion and sustenance of psychological health 
and well-being. When clients present with emotional and psychological distress the rational-
emotive behavioural therapist enables them to identify their basic assumptions about life and 
invites them to consider revising rigid or extreme beliefs that are having a negative impact on 
their thinking, feelings and actions (Smith et al., 2012).   
Psycho-education which is widely associated with behavioural and cognitive therapies is also 
prevalent in rational emotive behavioural therapy. Therefore clients are taught about the 
underlying philosophy and principles of the approach. Clients are informed that this form of 
psychotherapy draws on the thinking of the roman philosopher Epictetus when he stated 
‘Men are not disturbed by things but by the views they take of them’ (Epictetus, 1899) and 
clients learn that rational emotive behavioural therapists modify this statement to emphasise 
the influence of entrenched beliefs, and suggest that ‘People are disturbed not by things, but 
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by their rigid and extreme views of things’ (Dryden, 2009:115).  What this means is that 
people, for the most part, cause their own psychological disturbance by holding on to rigid or 
extreme beliefs (Ellis, 1994). In order to unhook from damaging beliefs and to identify and 
develop non-extreme beliefs clients are also taught the ABC (DE) model. Ellis’ argument is 
that it is peoples’ attitudes and beliefs about a life event (as opposed to the event itself) that 
causes negative emotional responses (Ellis 1994). This model graphically outlines how an 
activating experience (A) is viewed through the lens of irrational beliefs (B) about that 
experience which in turn causes upsetting emotional consequences (C). However, clients are 
then taught to dispute (D) irrational ideas by rationally questioning whether or not there is 
evidence for such rigid or extreme beliefs which results in new or different emotional 
responses and consequences (E) (Ellis and MacLaren, 2005).      
As indicated there are multiple forms of cognitive-behavioural therapy. While Ellis places 
emphasis on diminishing rigid and extreme beliefs, other forms of cognitive-behavioural 
therapy offer their own perspective on that which enables psychological health and well-
being. So for instance, mindfulness-based cognitive therapy encourages clients to be fully 
present in the moment and to strive to live in the here and now (Collard and Walsh, 2008). 
While acceptance and commitment therapy is designed to improve psychological flexibility 
by utilising cognitive and behavioural techniques and by assisting clients to accept and 
embrace painful and positive life experiences in a mindful manner ( Hayes and Smith, 2005).  
These multiple forms or variations of cognitive-behavioural therapy, have been widely used 
with individual clients; couples experiencing relationship and psychosexual difficulties; and 
with families in distress and crisis. Furthermore, it has been accepted into mainstream family 
therapy in the last 30 years (Dattilio, 2010). As the efficacy of cognitive behavioural therapy 
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has been heavily research since the 1950s, it has steadily gained recognition as a valid and 
reliable approach for alleviating emotional and psychological distress. Indeed, it is one of the 
most highly promoted therapeutic approaches by the National Institute for Health and 
Clinical Excellence in the United Kingdom (Smith et al., 2012).  
However, the popularity of cognitive behavioural therapy has been a mixed blessing as 
practitioners are being put under increasing pressure by government and institutions to help 
clients resolve their difficulties within very short timeframes, 2-4 sessions in some cases 
(Hallet, 2012). In government and institutions privileging cognitive-behavioural therapy over 
other forms of psychotherapy, a renewed swell of criticism has emerged against this 
approach. This could be construed as sibling rivalry as the psychoanalytic, humanistic and 
systemic communities may well consider that their professional and philosophical stances on 
attending to psychological disturbances are being marginalised, are under-valued and under-
utilised. However, alongside their well-rehearsed criticisms of cognitive-behavioural therapy 
there is a genuine concern that over-reliance on one, integrative therapeutic approach is doing 
a disservice to patients and clients who cannot or do not respond well to psycho-education, 
prescribed techniques and challenging homework tasks (Smith et al., 2012). This one size fits 
all approach, which has been demonised for treating symptoms as opposed to causes, means 
that clients who are grappling with long-term deep seated problems are less likely to receive 
on-going, in-depth emotional and psychological support as they struggle towards recovery.  
The emphasis on psycho-education and experimentation prevalent in cognitive-behavioural 
therapy, maintain a focus on how clients can be agents in their own recovery by embracing 
strategies and changing maladaptive behaviours. As such, this psychotherapeutic position 
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privileges epistemology over ontology, which potentially conceals the actual experience of 
being emotionally and psychologically compromised.     
3.8.4. Cognitive-Behavioural Conceptualisations of Supervision  
The structure and processes associated with cognitive-behavioural supervision are less clearly 
defined than psychoanalytic supervision as there are numerous shades of this therapeutic 
approach (Rosenbaum and Ronen, 1988). Within psychotherapeutic supervision which is 
primarily influenced by the cognitive strand, there is a psycho-educational tendency and 
focus on developing and educating supervisees. As such novice and experienced therapists 
are encouraged to study the principles and practices of cognitive therapy and demonstrate 
their knowledge of this paradigm through in-supervision discussion.  
Supervisees are encouraged to understand and accept the philosophy of cognitive therapy and 
actively apply the underlying tenets in their own lives and to the resolution of personal and 
professional problems (Liese and Beck 1997). When misconceptions arise about cognitive 
theory and practice, supervisors challenge these and assist supervisees to gain a depth of 
knowledge about the layers of complexity of this approach. Similarly cognitively inclined 
supervisors employ active techniques such as role-play, guided imagery, direct instruction 
and observation to enhance psychotherapeutic skills and session management (Liese and 
Beck, 1997).  
Cognitive therapy supervision sessions are structured on similar lines to therapy sessions. 
There is an emphasis on forming a solid supervisory relationship; working collaboratively in 
setting an agenda for the session; identifying the supervisee’s goals for supervision; working 
with blocks or hindrances; uncovering hot thoughts and core schema; and agreeing 
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homework tasks (Watkins, 1997). The goal of cognitive therapy supervision is to enable the 
supervisee to become a competent, capable and independent therapist (Omand, 2009). 
However, unlike the therapy process, which weans clients off therapy, in order to avoid 
dependence and to foster self-reliance, the prevailing view among cognitive therapy 
supervisors is that supervisees of all levels of training and experience should continue to 
attend both individual and group supervision throughout their professional lives (Liese and 
Beck, 1997).   
While Rosenbaum and Ronen (1988) assert that cognitive-behavioural supervision lacks a 
defined methodological approach, they go on to state that there are common themes evident 
in the supervision of the varying forms of this theoretical position. From their research 
Rosenbaum and Ronen (1988) suggest that cognitive-behavioural supervision is a meaning 
making process. Meaning making in this context is concerned with creating a supportive 
space to understand the meaning that clients make of their problems and also, to explore the 
meanings that supervisees and supervisors make of clients issues. Meaning making in this 
context is not to be confused with meaning making in the ontological sense, of understanding 
the meaning of being (Heidegger, 1927/1962). Here, it is concerned with understanding and 
interpreting clients’ rigid or extreme beliefs and the influence that these have on presenting 
problems.  
Psycho-education was also a common theme in cognitive-behavioural therapy supervision. In 
this context psycho-education is in the thinking, feeling and action domains (Woods and 
Ellis, 1997). Evidence (or lack of evidence) for cognitive, emotional and behavioural 
responses towards clients are explored, in a bid to assist therapists to find systematic ways to 
resolve blocks and hindrances that prevent goals being achieved. Alongside this supervisees 
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are directed to undertake experiments and behavioural homework tasks. In line with Lazarus’ 
(1993) view that therapists should be ‘authentic chameleons’, cognitive-behavioural 
supervisors encourage creativeness and resourcefulness in their supervisees. Rosenbaum and 
Ronen (1988) also pointed out that while cognitive-behavioural supervision is rooted in the 
principle of collaboration this is difficult to maintain as supervisors are required to evaluate 
supervisees’ levels of knowledge and practical competence and as such have significant 
influence in determining whether or not therapists are fit to practice. This is markedly in 
contrast with the philosophy of cognitive-behavioural approaches in which clients are 
encouraged to evaluate negative thoughts, feelings and actions and are empowered to take 
control of perceptions which create psychological and emotional disturbance (Ellis and 
MacLaren, 2005).  
Allowing for the differences between the various strands of cognitive-behavioural therapy, 
supervision in this integrative modality is generally speaking structured and goal orientated 
(Rosenbaum and Ronen, 1988). It is less free floating than humanistic or psychoanalytic 
approaches to supervision and it is coloured by supervisors’ explicit and implicit theories 
which are rooted in the many versions of cognitive-behavioural therapy that they practice 
(Omand, 2009). While I, as a therapist and supervisor, value the fundamental principles of 
cognitive-behavioural therapy and how these are inculcated into psychotherapeutic 
supervision, I am inquisitive to discover how this pragmatic and logical approach to 
supervision impacts on actually being a supervisor. From the behavioural perspective, 
classical and operant conditionings are designed to change and adapt peoples’ behaviours and 
are reward and consequence driven (Pavlov, 1927; Thorndike, 1911). The forming and 
moulding of behavioural therapists is, then potentially, a very powerful and responsible 
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position for psychotherapeutic supervisors to be in. In focussing on modifying behaviour, I 
wonder if the supervisor is able to exist authentically, in the Heideggerian sense, or are they 
so governed by the ‘they’, of epistemological discourse that the true self gets lost (Heidegger 
1927/1962). 
With respect to the cognitive strand of cognitive-behavioural therapy, psycho-education holds 
a privileged position within the supervisory process (Dryden, 2009). Supervisees are trained 
to embrace the philosophy, theories, models and principles of cognitive therapy and are 
overtly challenged if they misconstrue these perceived truths (Rosenbaum and Ronen, 1988). 
It is argued here that while the benefits and outcomes of this approach are well documented 
and researched (Smith et al., 2012) that privileging epistemology over uncovering actual 
lived experience can conceal the authentic existence of the supervisor. While the authentic 
existence of cognitively orientated supervisors is masked, I wonder if it is possible to elicit 
the unique meaning of being a psychotherapeutic supervisor.  
This research project does not seek to dismiss the validity of cognitive-behavioural therapy 
supervision but hopes to widen the space in which it exists and in so doing enable 
psychotherapeutic supervisors to illuminate and more fully understand the meaning of their 
existence and how this in turn can impact on who they are; what they think, feel and do, 
when being in the world of cognitive-behavioural supervision. 
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3.9. Competing Perspectives in Humanistic Psychotherapy   
Humanistic psychotherapy has evolved from philosophical phenomenological and existential 
thinking. The underlying principles of this approach sit in sharp contrast to the 
psychoanalytic perspective (Rogers, 1980) with its determinist view of human nature and its 
emphasis on the influence of the unconscious on people’s choices and behaviours (Freud, 
1949). Furthermore it offers an alternative therapeutic response to behaviour therapy, which 
has been criticised for its lack of attention to feelings, personal growth, and the development 
of insight and has been challenged for merely treating symptoms as opposed to the sources of 
emotional, behavioural and psychological disturbances (Corey, 2001).  As with all of the 
main traditions of counselling and psychotherapy, there are multiple schools of thought 
within the broad church of humanistic therapy. Prevalent and influential (although not 
exclusively) among these are existential therapy (Frankl, 1965; May, 1983; Yalom, 1980), 
the person-centred approach (Rogers, 1951), gestalt therapy (Perls, 1951) and transactional 
analysis (Berne, 1961).   
The following sections elaborate on the principles and practices of  existential therapy and 
the person-centred therapy and the supervision of these perspectives, as these enduring 
approaches from the humanistic tradition are heavily influenced by phenomenology and 
hermeneutic phenomenology  which is the philosophical and methodological framework 
underpinning this research project. 
3.9.1. Existential Therapy 
The existential approach to therapy is primarily a philosophical one. Existential therapy is not 
based on a theory but has evolved from centuries of existential thinking and philosophising 
about the meaning of human existence (Frank and Frank, 1993). The most influential 
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contemporary existential thinkers include Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Sartre 
(Blackham, 1991). In the 1960s, Husserl, a transcendental phenomenologist took up the 
existential baton (Husserl, 1962). However, it is considered that Martin Heidegger, who was 
also a hermeneutic phenomenologist, made the most significant contribution to existential 
inquiry, in the last century and that he has been particularly instrumental in the emergence of 
existential therapy (Corey, 2001).  
Phenomenology is a philosophical tradition which is concerned with illuminating and 
understanding the experience of being human (Langdridge, 2007). Husserl proposed a 
scientific approach to examining and understanding everyday lived experience (Husserl, 
1970a). The assumptions that underpin his philosophy are that all human experience comes 
from consciousness and individual awareness. As a transcendental phenomenologist, Husserl 
postulated that there are universal human experiences.  
In order to illuminate the essence of such experiences, he contends that they must be 
described as purely as possible. His central treatise was that investigators or researchers must 
bracket off prior expert and personal knowledge in order to be able to describe and 
understand the essence of consciousness without prejudice, analysis or interpretation 
(Husserl, 1970a). When this is achieved, it is argued in descriptive phenomenology that 
unified meanings in human experiencing will be illuminated (Giorgio, 1992). While 
transcendental phenomenology is interested in individual human existence, it is primarily 
concerned with describing the universal essence of human experiencing (Flood, 2010).  
As a pupil of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger started out as a pure phenomenologist 
however overtime he parted company with Husserl’s philosophical stance when he proposed 
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that merely describing phenomena was insufficient when trying to illuminate experiences of 
being human. It is considered that Heidegger’s most significant contribution to existential 
philosophy is his ontological project. Ontology is the study of human existence and is 
concerned with what it means to be; what it means to exist (Heidegger, 1927/ 1962). 
Heideggerian hermeneutic phenomenological philosophers are less concerned about the 
structures of consciousness than Husserlians and are keenly interested in unconcealing actual 
lived experience (Schmidt, 2006).  Hermeneutic phenomenology, which embraces the art of 
interpretation, seeks to more fully understand the unique and individual experience of being 
human, in specific situations and at specific points in time. In contrast to Husserlian 
philosophy, Heidegger purports that the task of phenomenology is to describe and interpret 
everyday human activity, in undertaking ontological inquiry and in examining the meaning of 
being, a more in-depth understanding of human existence will be unconcealed (Cerbonne, 
2006).  
Hermeneutic phenomenology has had a direct influence in both medical and psychological 
worlds. In the mid-1940s Heidegger had a psychological breakdown and entered into therapy 
in 1946 with Gebsattel who was known to be an existential psychiatrist. During the course of 
therapy, Gebsattel and Heidegger discussed and clarified the relevance and application of 
hermeneutic phenomenology to the treatment of disorders in both the mind and the body; in 
Heideggerian terms to the therapeutic treatment of Dasein, ( being-there or human existence ) 
(Heidegger, 1927/1962). Von Gebsattel went on to publish a series of articles between 1948-
1964 on the meaning of medical practice and calling the practitioner to engage as a person 
with the patient as they experience their existence (Von Gebsattel, 1964).  
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Heidegger was approached by Boss, an existential psychoanalyst who wanted to open up a 
discourse about the possible role of phenomenological philosophy with respect to 
psychological problems (Boss, 1994). Extensive communication from the late 1940s to the 
mid-1960s between Boss and Heidegger resulted in the Zollikon seminar series (Heidegger, 
1965). During these seminars Heidegger presented his ideas on Daseinanalysis which seeks 
an in-depth understanding of the meaning of human existence. Daseinanalysis seeks to 
liberate that which is hidden in peoples’ experiences of being-in-the world. Daseinanalysis 
advocates moving beyond scientific knowledge in order to illuminate and understand patients 
day to day lived experiences of their physical and mental conditions (Heidegger, 1965).  
In these seminars Heidegger challenged and dismissed the popular notion of empathy as a 
fabricated way of being in relationship with clients or patients and in turn psychoanalysts 
criticised Daseinanalysis as lacking scientific rigour, objectivity and as lacking conceptual 
depth (Heidegger, 1965). Undaunted, in these seminars, he continued to offer an application 
of the ontological project to the worlds of medicine and psychology and advocated that;  
It is being-with that means a way of existing with you in the manner of being 
in the world, especially a being-with one another in our relatedness to the 
things encountering us (Heidegger, 1965:112).  
During the Zollikon seminars and in conversation with Boss, Heidegger contended that it was 
inappropriate to separate the mind and body, the psyche and the soma when treating physical 
or mental illnesses. Collaboratively, Boss and Heidegger contented that in order to truly heal 
patients, medical and psychological practitioners must relate to the patients entire existence; 
must encounter Dasein, the totality of human existence (Boss, 1994). We can see the legacy 
78 
 
and influence of hermeneutic phenomenological philosophy in existential therapy today, as 
existential therapy is anti-conceptual and is primarily interested in helping clients become 
more aware of  and manage the positive and negative aspects of human experiencing (Frankl, 
1965).  
There are a number of strands of existential therapy and no-one is credited with being the 
father or founder of this approach. However, several prominent existentialists such as Frankl 
have been credited with developing existential concepts from the 1940s and latterly Yalom 
and van Deurzen-Smith have further developed the central human concerns that underpin 
existential psychotherapy (Corey, 2001). Frankl developed Logotherapy which encouraged 
clients to reflect more deeply on fundamental aspects of human existence including freedom, 
responsibility, meaning and the search for values (Frankl, 1965). 
Frankl suggested that meaningless existence or the existential vacuum was the main 
psychological sickness affecting mankind and he considered that psychotherapists are well 
placed to invite clients to find meaning and a sense of purpose in their lives through work, 
love and even through suffering (Frankl, 1965). Yalom was heavily influenced by Frankl’s 
philosophy and went on to argue that existential therapists can best assist clients by inviting 
them to reflect on significant life themes such as death, freedom, isolation and meaningless 
(Yalom, 1980). Yalom states that existential therapy is primarily concerned with illuminating 
and understanding the depth of human experiencing (Yalom, 1989).  
According to van Deurzen-Smith existential therapy can help people to find more creative 
ways to live meaningful lives. She argues that unlike other theoretical approaches existential 
therapy is not governed by theory designed to label peoples’ conditions or by principles 
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purporting to cure them of emotional and psychological disturbance. Neither is existential 
therapy focussed on relieving clients of anxiety which, existentially, is deemed to be a 
condition of living but it is designed to assist people to search for value and purpose in their 
existence (van Deurzen-Smith, 1997).   Furthermore, van Deurzen- Smith contends that 
existential therapy is concerned with helping people to more fully understand their place in 
an ever changing world and assists them to search for the truth about their experience of 
being human and to understand the unique meaning of their ever evolving existence (van 
Deurzen-Smith, 1988).  
The philosophy underpinning existential therapy considers that people have the capacity to be 
self-aware and that they can develop awareness and understanding that human life is finite 
and that there is limited time to live a purposeful, fulfilling life. Central to this approach is the 
construction that people have freedom of choice and therefore they have a hand in shaping 
their own future lives. Alongside having the freedom to make life choices, comes the 
responsibility for the trajectory of one’s life. Existentially freedom and responsibility are bed-
fellows (Frankl, 1965). In developing awareness people can choose to free themselves from 
the legacy of their past experiences, can choose to make informed decisions and take 
responsibility for the choices they currently make while being responsible for the 
consequences of their actions (Corey 2001).  The avoidance of responsibility is experienced 
as existential guilt. Accordingly it takes courage to be (May, 1983) simultaneously free and 
responsible. Yet, in order to make changes to meaningless aspects of life, people must be able 
to embrace these dichotomous positions.  
80 
 
A central aspect of this approach is to help people to realise that while they are alive, they 
will experience a constant process of change and transformation which only ends when life 
itself ends.   
The person is in a constant process of becoming. I create myself as I exist and 
have to reinvent myself daily. There is no essential self as I define my 
personality and abilities in action. This impermanence and uncertainty give 
rise to a deep sense of anxiety (Angst) in response to one’s insignificance and 
simultaneous responsibility to have to create something in place of that 
emptiness (van Deurzen-Smith, 1996:169). 
This approach helps human beings to deal with the anxiety, the existential angst that results 
from acknowledging the temporary and insecure nature of daily life, through examining the 
choices and actions they can take towards creating their own destiny. In facing this void, 
existential therapists invite people to take personal responsibility for making meaning in their 
ever changing lives (Corey, 2001). According to van Deurzen-Smith existential therapy calls 
people to consider the quality of their ever changing human existence by paying attention to 
the physical, social, psychological and spiritual levels of human experiencing (van Deurzen-
Smith, 1988).  
While in the physical dimension, people can take responsibility for how they relate to the 
health and well-being of their bodies, to the inevitability of mortality, to the natural and 
material worlds. In the physical level of existence many people seek a sense of security and 
may for periods of their lives experience a sense of permanence, yet the ever changing nature 
of life means that being secure, in this domain is a short lived experience (van Deurzen-
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Smith, 1988).  The social domain is focussed on how we exist and interact with other people 
in the world. Within the global world there are situational worlds such as intimate 
relationships, families, social classes and cultures. Many people exist with a sense of 
belonging in these micro and macro communities while others exist in isolation (May, 1983). 
The social dimension is riddled with such polarities and people find themselves existing 
somewhere along continuums of love and hate, togetherness and aloneness, co-operate and 
sabotage, leader and follower. Peoples’ attitudes to these polarities inform where they find 
themselves existing across these polarities. As life and its circumstances are impermanent 
these modes of existence also change (van Deurzen-Smith, 1996). 
The psychological level of existence is fundamentally an inner existence. Existential therapy 
does not propose a theory of personality but is concerned with how people relate to 
themselves and the inner personal world that they create (Corey, 2001). In the psychological 
dimension people are searching to make sense about who they are, to find their identity and 
to have a meaningful sense of self. Changing and challenging life experiences influence 
personal perspectives on self.  In the face of significant life events some people respond pro-
actively endeavouring to maintain a robust sense of self-identity, while others give up and are 
psychologically overwhelmed.  
The spiritual level of existence is fundamentally about seeking meaning in life in that which 
is outside of the physical, social and psychological levels of being. People search for meaning 
in religion, humanism, ideologies as well as in philosophy. The spiritual level can create a 
sense of purpose, can give added value and meaning to life. While existing in the spiritual 
domain some people believe that they can through religious observance transcend death and 
attain everlasting life of the soul and spirit, while others seek to overcome the finitude of their 
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mortality by leaving a valuable legacy to humankind and to their situational worlds (van 
Deurzen-Smith, 1996).  
Existential therapy postulates that anxiety manifests in all of these dimensions as people 
encounter and acknowledge the insecurity and fragility of life.  Across these four levels of 
existence there is the potential to exist in hope or disintegrate in despair. In order to manage 
existential angst and to avoid sliding into emotional and psychological disturbance, 
existential philosophy suggests people have a responsibility to create and recreate something 
which is personally meaningful in each of these domains.  It suggests that meaningful 
existence is attained by embracing both the negative and positive aspects of human 
experiencing (Frank and Frank, 1993). In Heideggerian terms, people are called to exist 
authentically which in this context means living resolutely towards death. For it is only in 
living towards death that people can be truly alive (Heidegger, 1927/1962). This is a very 
challenging perspective for many people because to embrace this philosophy means learning 
how to live with existential angst and to accept one’s personal responsibility for being fully 
alive (van Deurzen-Smith, 1996). 
3.9.2 An Evolving Picture of Existential Supervision 
The literature on the supervision of existential therapy has been sparse until recent times (Du 
Plock, 2009). There have been passing references to considering existential issues within the 
context of an integrative supervisory framework (Kearns, 2005) and within relationship 
models of supervision (Scaife, 2009). However, the gap in literature on existential 
supervision has been recently addressed by van Deurzen and Young (2009) with an edited 
text that is claimed by contributors and editors, to be the first book dedicated to existential 
therapy supervision.  Van Deurzen and Young (2009) offer an evolving and exploratory 
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picture of existential supervision. They state that at this stage of its evolution, existential 
supervision primarily creates a space for the supervisory pair to engage in creative 
exploration, experimentation and mean-making. Van Deurzen and Young (2009) go on to 
proffer the view, that existential supervision is a collaborative space in which supervisor and 
supervisee can dialogue about the awareness and assumptions that clients and the supervisory 
pair have about the existential themes of life, such as death, freedom, isolation and 
meaninglessness (Yalom, 1980).      
As with many approaches to supervision, the philosophy underpinning this therapeutic 
approach binds the supervision process.  The core aspect of existential supervision focusses 
on establishing a quality supervisory relationship (Carroll, 2010). The supervisor reflects on 
her/his manner of being-with the supervisee and in turn explores the connectedness of the 
supervisee when being-with the client in the therapeutic world. Being-connected-with and 
being-present-with the Other-in-the-world of supervision is an important consideration in 
existential supervision. In relating in this way, the client’s experience of being; the 
supervisee’s experience of being-with the client; and the supervisor’s experience of being-
with the supervisee are discovered. In uncovering these multiple layers of experience, it is 
suggested that supervisees are better placed to assist clients to make-meaning of and find 
purpose in their lives (Du Plock, 2009).   
The unhurried nature of existential supervision demonstrates to supervisees that it is possible 
and desirable to be-with clients in their existential angst and suffering. Such modelling is 
freeing for supervisees as it removes the burden of responsibility from them for fixing clients 
problems in living. Existential supervision assists supervisees to learn to tolerate the 
experience of ‘not knowing’ (Spinelli, 1997) what choices clients will make or how they will 
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cope (or not) with the freedom and responsibility for existing meaningfully (Van Deurzen 
and Young, 2009).  
Existential supervision, like the philosophy is rests upon is anti-conceptual and as such 
critiques supervisory modes or models and is slow to embrace competency based approaches 
toward supervision (Farber, 2011). In this approach, a sound supervisory relationship, 
coupled with the capacity to be-with the supervisee is more important than having clearly 
defined and systematic structures guiding the supervisory process (Du Plock, 2009).  Carroll 
(2010) synthesises existential supervision in this way; 
Evocative supervision, patient philosophical reflection, meditation on work, 
critical contemplation, collaborative exploration, reflective consciousness, 
reflective discussion, dialogue and imaginative variation (Carroll, 2010:154).  
Here, Carroll (2010) is describing an approach to supervision which is essentially 
philosophical and a-theoretical. Pondering patiently; posing pertinent questions; opening up; 
turning over; listening and lingering; thinking and re-thinking; sitting-with; existing in the 
unknown; illuminating and uncovering;  are the innate characteristics of  the philosophical 
existential supervisory position.  
The evocative, idealistic nature of existential therapy and supervision is deemed to be its 
strength and its weakness (Carroll, 2010). It has been argued that a key strength of existential 
therapy is that it enables therapists to more fully empathise with powerful negative emotions 
such as hopeless, despair, emptiness, meaninglessness and anxiety (Cooper, 2003). It enables 
clients, practitioners and supervisors to sit-with the unknown aspects of human existence and 
wait for clients’ awareness to emerge (van Deurzen, 1998). However, this perspective has 
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been critiqued from a rational-emotive perspective, which raises strong concerns that 
prolonged emphasis on negative and debilitating thoughts and emotions can make clients 
even more unwell (Ellis, 1994).  
The pessimistic premise behind existential therapy has, also, been questioned. 
Fundamentally, existentialists suggest that life is tough and that human existence is a 
continual, persistent struggle, with exceptional glimpses of happiness (van Deurzen, 1998). 
This image of the person is not shared in the field of humanistic psychotherapy as, for 
example, person-centred practitioners take a more optimistic view of human potential, 
considering that human beings have the capacity to take responsibility for the quality of their 
lives, self-actualise and over time reach their full potential (Cooper, 2003). The pessimist, 
existential proposition of human existence results in prolonged periods of therapeutic 
contemplation and self-reflection. In order to benefit from a circular process of existential 
reflection and gain self-awareness clients typically remain in therapy for two or more years 
(Spinelli, 1997).  
In doing so, it is claimed that in-depth existential therapy assists human development as it 
provides an unhurried space for clients to linger at the crossroads of life and make 
responsible choices about how they want to move forward in their day to day human 
existence (Cooper, 2003). However, during such an extended period of therapy, critics argue 
that clients need to be resilient enough to continue to struggle with being human; to be able to 
cope with their existential suffering and angst. So questions have been asked about the 
appropriateness of existential therapy for clients who are in crisis, who are suicidal and in 
need of more immediate therapeutic interventions (Scullion, 2008). As existential therapy 
does not concern itself with symptom removal (Du Plock, 2009), clients also need to have 
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supports in life that assist them to manage their own symptoms or circumstances that can 
accommodate them not being fully functioning in their day to day lives. Clients who 
undertake existential therapy are likely to be a privileged group as prolonged therapy is 
increasingly becoming unavailable in government run therapeutic services and in the not-for 
profit sector (Omand, 2009). Therefore clients attending for existential therapy need to have 
significant financial resources and supports to undertake such long-term, contemplative 
therapeutic work (Scullion, 2008).  
Notwithstanding the critiques of this philosophical approach, of all of the counselling and 
psychotherapy schools discussed in this chapter, the underpinning assumptions of existential 
therapy are of particular interest to this research inquiry as its philosophical stance resonates 
most closely with the primary aims of this study which are to understand the meaning of 
being a psychotherapeutic supervisor.  As has been demonstrated, existential therapy has 
been strongly influenced by Heidegger’s phenomenological philosophical position 
(Heidegger 1927/1962: 1965), which is the philosophical and methodological framework 
guiding this study. Heidegger’s philosophy places the ontic (personal experience) and 
ontology (existence itself) before epistemology (Cohn, 1997). It is primarily concerned with 
illuminating the meaning of being. Similarly, existential therapy and supervision focusses on 
gaining a depth of understanding about the uniqueness of human experiencing and strives to 
bring into awareness, the meanings which clients, supervisees and supervisors attach to their 
ever-changing existences (van Deurzen-Smith, 1996).  
While Heidegger questioned and disregarded the notion of empathy (which existential 
therapists embrace) as a manufactured way of being- in- relationship, in line with existential 
therapists (Du Plock, 2009) he highly valued relatedness and holistic connection among 
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human beings (Heidegger, 1965). Indeed, it could be argued that existential therapists and 
supervisors have responded to Heidegger’s call in the Zollikon seminars (1965) for 
psychological (and medical) practitioners to relate in a holistic way to the entire existence 
(Dasein) of the client or patient. 
Similarly, this research study seeks to create a sense of relatedness and connectedness with 
research participants as they reflect upon specific situations that constitute their day to day 
lived experiences of being psychotherapeutic supervisors. It strives to apply the philosophical 
position of ‘not knowing’ what will emerge from participants’ experiential stories and to 
listen, linger and patiently ponder,  until the hidden, unspoken aspects of their experiences 
show themselves. 
3.9.3       The Person-Centred Approach 
Carl Rogers developed what he termed a newer psychotherapy during the 1940s and the 
1950s as an alternative way to work therapeutically with individuals, adults, couples, young 
people, children, families, groups and organisations. He is credited with the development of 
the third force in psychotherapy which sat in sharp contrast to the principles and practices of 
psychoanalysis and behavioural approaches which had dominated this field since the turn of 
the twentieth century (Mearns and Thorne, 2007). Within the humanistic psychotherapy 
tradition, the person-centred approach is deemed to be a humanistic-experiential approach 
(Nelson-Jones, 1992). 
Roger’s new psychotherapy evolved and was refined over several years of practice and group 
facilitation. It was initially presented as a client-centred approach however through reflective 
practice Roger’s considered that the broad label of ‘a person-centred approach’ more 
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accurately described the nuances of his way of being with clients (Kirschenbaum and 
Henderson, 1990).   Roger’s central proposition of the person-centred approach suggests that; 
‘It is that the individual has within himself or herself vast resources for self-
understanding, for altering his or her self-concept, attitudes and self-directed 
behaviour and that these resources can be tapped if only a definable climate 
of facilitative psychological attitudes can be provided’ (Kirschenbaum and 
Henderson, 1990: 135). 
Rogers clearly states that the person-centred approach is a philosophy, a specific way of 
being with clients that moves beyond mere theoretical notions and technical competence. His 
philosophical position presents an image of the person that is fundamentally good and 
trustworthy. This person-centred philosophy manifests itself when the therapist or group 
facilitator demonstrates attitudes and values that create a safe and trusting therapeutic space 
in which personal growth and development can occur. When this person-centred philosophy 
is actively lived with clients, Rogers argues, that there is sound evidence to suggest that 
clients engage in personal change and that social transformation occurs. Furthermore, 
Roger’s philosophy of person is based on the assumption that human beings have a self-
actualising tendency and have the capacity to attain their full potential and to become fully 
functioning persons (Rogers, 1961). 
Roger’s person-centred philosophy places a central emphasis on the importance of creating a 
growth promoting therapeutic relationship (Thorne, 1996). For over four decades he was 
resolute in his contention that; 
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If the therapist proves able to offer a relationship where congruence, 
acceptance and empathy are all present, then therapeutic movement will 
almost invariably occur (Thorne, 1996: 135). 
Roger’s philosophy, then, postulates that the quality of the therapeutic relationship has a 
direct impact on therapeutic outcomes and that if the three core conditions, congruence, 
acceptance and empathy are absent then there will be insufficient trust and safety within the 
therapeutic alliance to enable the client to personally develop, gain insight, effect change or 
reach their full potential. In essence these core conditions are seen to be a way of being with 
the client (Thorne, 1996).  
When the therapist is being congruent, she/he is transparent in interactions and responses to 
the client. There is a genuine level of openness which moves beyond the fronts and facades 
that human beings often employ in social discourse and interpersonal interactions. The 
feelings and responses, along the positive to negative spectrum that the therapist experiences 
at a gut level, with respect to the client’s presentation, accurately match that which is 
reflected back to the client (Kirschenbaum and Henderson, 1990).  
The second core condition or attitude is acceptance. In Roger’s writings this has variously 
been called unconditional positive regard, prizing, or caring. The therapeutic position is non-
judgemental. Clients are fully accepted as they are at that moment in time. There are no 
conditions of worth placed on clients to be or act in specific ways in order to be accepted by 
the therapist (Rogers, 1961). It is suggested that through this non-possessive caring clients 
begin to feel safe enough to take the risk of being more open and congruent in the therapeutic 
relationship. The third significant condition inherent in an effective therapeutic alliance is 
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empathic understanding. Empathy is a term used to describe the therapist’s capacity to 
accurately understand clients’ feelings and the personal meanings that they attach to their life 
experiences. It is not sufficient for the therapist to have empathy. According to Rogers, 
empathic understanding must be conveyed to clients through the circular process of actively 
listening to emotions and meanings and then reflecting or mirroring these back to clients with 
an accepting attitude (Rogers, 1961). It is argued that collectively, these three core conditions 
or attitudes create a growth promoting climate within the therapeutic relationship. Indeed 
Rogers claims that the efficacy of these conditions with respect to positively enabling clients’ 
personal growth; acceptance of self-responsibility; capacity to engage in affirmative change; 
and empowering them to move towards reaching their full human potential,  has been 
observed and ratified in research studies since the 1940s (Rogers, 1980). 
In contrast to other therapeutic approaches such as psychoanalysis or behaviourism, which 
tend to consider that human beings need assistance in managing their psychological well-
being and behaviour, the person-centred approach considers that the client is the expert with 
respect to their emotional and psychological problems and as such therapists avoid 
interpreting clients’ symptoms and take a non-expert, non-directive and non-judgemental 
stance in the therapeutic space (Mearns and Thorne, 2007). Rogers contends that human 
beings are, at their core trustworthy. This is a significant philosophical position and is based 
on the premise that human nature is basically good, it is not intrinsically bad or evil or even 
to be feared, as is suggested by theoretical perspectives such as psychoanalysis (Rogers, 
1961).  In the person-centred therapeutic environment, clients are encouraged to explore their 
feelings and the meaning behind these.  
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They are facilitated to explore and reflect upon their subjective experiences and through such 
self-expression, trustworthy human nature can be liberated (Kirschenbaum and Henderson, 
1990). It is Rogers’ view that when individuals or groups of individuals are treated and 
respected as autonomous human being, they have the capacity to act responsibly in the 
choices that they make, such as building positive relationships with others and can be 
responsible for the ways that they make and adapt their life goals (Rogers, 1961).    
Roger’s person-centered philosophy in essence is a non-directive form of therapy. It 
gradually evolved as an alternative way of working with people in psychological distress 
which was averse to diagnosing, objectifying and labelling people. Therefore Rogers stopped 
referring to those who presented for help as patients but considered them to be clients who 
had the capacity to be self-responsible (Thorne, 1996). This shift in perception towards 
people with emotional and psychological issues neatly illuminates the flavour of non-
directive therapy in which the therapist is someone who walks alongside the client in their 
journey of discovery. The person-centered therapist is often considered to be a facilitator 
(O’Leary, 1999), someone who empowers the client to recognise and more fully understand 
her own emotions and attitudes. The therapist is not deemed to be an expert or to be in 
anyway superior to the client. When therapists take on a position of superiority, the implicit 
message is that the client is unable to take responsibility for her own life goals. The Rogerian 
approach defies this stance and argues strongly that the client is disempowered when the 
therapist acts in a directive manner, taking responsibility away from the client.   
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 At the other end of the scale is the client-centered, experiential, person-
centred approach, consistently stressing the capacity and autonomy of the 
person, her right to choose the directions she will move in her behaviour, and 
her responsibility for herself in the therapeutic relationship, with the 
therapist’s person playing a real but primarily catalytic part in the 
relationship (Kirschenbaum and Henderson, 1990: 386). 
This non-directive person-centered approach places high value on the client’s right to self-
determination. The responsibility, then, of the therapist is to encourage the client to take a 
pro-active role during therapy sessions. Being a non-directive therapist is challenging 
because the client will, at times, make decisions and chose goals that the therapist may not 
agree with. However, the non-directive therapist is called to be responsible for their own 
reactions and responses and to avoid imposing these on clients (Rogers, 1961).  
These principles and practices associated with Rogers’ person-centred approach to therapy 
have enjoyed a sustained period of popularity since the 1940s and are the bedrock of 
contemporary training for humanistic and integrative counsellors and psychotherapists 
(Bernard and Goodyear, 2009). The emphasis on the importance of establishing a safe and 
trusting therapeutic relationship has been borrowed and embraced by other schools of 
psychotherapy including those who are fundamentally at odds with the philosophy and 
principles of the person-centred approach (Mearns and Thorne, 2007). Yet, the limitations of 
the Rogerian approach have been subjected to scrutiny within the humanistic tradition and by 
those who fundamentally oppose a phenomenological/ experiential approach to 
psychotherapy (Cooper 2003; Spiegler and Guevremont 1998).  
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Within the humanistic tradition there are fundamental differences between the existential and 
person-centred philosophical positions on which clinical practice rests (Langdridge, 2007). 
Rogers’ offers a positive and optimistic image of the person and postulates that individuals 
have the capacity to self-actualise and to reach their full potential (Rogers, 1951). In contrast 
van Deurzen (1998) offers a more pessimistic view of human existence suggesting that life is 
a continual struggle towards death in which people predominantly have to grapple with pain 
and existential anxiety. The existential view of human existence does not exclude the 
possibility of moments of happiness but views these as transitory. Existential therapists, 
therefore, consider that they are better equipped to be-with clients as they wrestle with 
powerful, disturbing emotions and negative life experiences than Rogerians, as they are less 
naïvely optimistic about the human condition and are more open to lingering with clients in 
their existential distress (Cooper, 2003).  
The critique and counter critique between the main psychotherapy schools have been well 
rehearsed earlier in this chapter with evidence of open dissention between the psychoanalytic, 
cognitive-behavioural and person-centred communities. In addition to previous critiques, it is, 
however, worth mentioning that psychoanalysts challenge the philosophy behind the person-
centred approach as unscientific and naïve, particularly when it offers an image of the person 
as fundamentally good and trustworthy (Rogers, 1951). In holding a purely positive 
perception of human beings there is a concern that the shadow side of human nature is 
therapeutically neglected (Jung, 1991). In offering all clients unconditional positive regard, 
irrespective of their behaviour, concern is voiced in cognitive-behavioural quarters, that those 
who perpetrate harm and human suffering, such as child abuse or domestic violence may 
think that the therapist is colluding with their actions when they demonstrate an accepting, 
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non-judgemental attitude towards the person who has committed such heinous acts (Cooper 
and Vetere, 2006).  
3.9.4 Person-centred Bound Supervision 
In contrast to existential supervision much has been published about the supervision of client- 
centered and latterly person-centred counsellors and psychotherapists, which reflects the 
evolving nature of Roger’s non-directive approach to psychotherapy (Kirschenbaum and 
Henderson, 1990).  Rogers demonstrated a keen interest in supervision since the 1940s from 
whence he encouraged client-centered therapists, in training, to tape record sessions and then 
review these with a supervisor. 
He considered this approach to supervision, to be a key resource for trainees’ to develop their 
psychotherapeutic techniques (Rogers, 1942).  The Rogerian approach to supervision is 
heavily influenced by the philosophy and principles underpinning client-centred therapy 
(Patterson, 1997).  Rogers advocated that creating a safe, enabling relationship with 
supervisees and genuinely demonstrating the core conditions of unconditional positive 
regard, congruence and empathy are as important in supervision as they are in psychotherapy 
(Scaife, 2009).  According to Bernard and Goodyear (2009) the person-centred supervisor 
must also have faith in the supervisee’s capacity to self-actualise personally and 
professionally. 
The successful person-centered supervisor must have a profound trust that 
the supervisee has within himself or herself the ability and motivation to grow 
and explore both the therapy situation and the self (Bernard and Goodyear, 
2009:83).  
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It is clear from this premise that Rogers did not establish a clear boundary between personal 
therapy and supervision for supervisees. His position was that supervisees need, at times, to 
engage in a depth of reflection about themselves with respect to their feelings about and 
responses to clients, resulting in personal therapy within the supervisory encounter (Wosket, 
2003). While on other occasions, the quality of the relationship with the client needs to be the 
focus of the work, which more clearly falls into the realm of supervision (Hackney and 
Goodyear, 1984).   
A pure psychotherapy bound approach to client-centered supervision has been advocated by 
Patterson (1983), who has been critical of developmental and theoretical models of 
supervision. He has argued that supervision is more fluid and effective when the supervisor 
and supervisee are both committed to the same philosophy or approach to psychotherapy 
(Patterson, 1983). He purports that the client-centered supervisor’s role is to help the 
supervisee to work within Rogers’ core conditions and to ensure that they do not stray 
beyond these. He considers that the supervisor has an overall responsibility for the well-being 
of the client and as such must ensure that the supervisee does not experiment with techniques 
or interventions that are outside of the principles and practices of client-centered therapy 
(Patterson, 1997).  The atmosphere in supervision is designed to mirror the safe space and 
trusting relationship that occurs in psychotherapy. The supervisory relationship creates a 
productive environment which facilities learning and growth (Rogers, 1942). While Patterson 
(1997) does not define a clear process for supervision, he proposes that the supervisee directs 
the supervision session by choosing the cases to be discussed. He plays down the monitoring 
and evaluative function of supervision (Kaduskin, 1976) by placing the emphasis on self-
evaluation by the supervisee. Patterson (1997) differs from Rogers in as much as he is clear 
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that personal therapy is not an integral part of supervision.  He suggests that supervisees 
should be directed on for personal therapy and in exceptional circumstances, if it is 
considered that clients are at risk of harm then the therapist’s practice should be ceased 
(Patterson, 1964).  
While Patterson postulates that his approach to supervision espouses Rogers’ philosophical 
stance and therapeutic principles, several anomalies arise (Patterson, 1983). His discourse is 
riddled with shoulds and oughts, for example the supervisee should be directed to personal 
therapy or the supervisee’s practice should be discontinued, in certain circumstances 
(Patterson, 1997). Rogers was actively non-directive and against imposing conditions of 
worth on clients and supervisees. His view was that if the correct core conditions prevail 
supervisees will become responsible enough to know that they need to attend for personal 
therapy or take a break from therapeutic practice (Rogers, 1942). Furthermore, Patterson’s 
perspective perpetuates the myth of mutuality and horizontality which is prevalent in 
humanistic psychotherapy (Kearns, 2005:8). This myth conceals the power dynamic that is 
inherent in a relationship wherein the supervisor takes responsibility for the effectiveness of 
therapeutic practice and the promotion of strict adherence to prescribed ways of working 
therapeutically with clients (Patterson, 1997). As with the metamorphosis of client-centered 
therapy into person-centred therapy, perspectives on supervision have also evolved. 
According to Scaife (2009) person-centred supervisors, strongly adhere to Rogers’ 
philosophical stance and set aside their own needs and perspectives with respect to casework 
and focus exclusively on the needs of the supervisee. She proposes that this position results in 
a deep connection between supervisor and supervisee in which understanding develops and 
change occurs. As such, the person-centred supervisor does not police the supervisees 
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practice but trusts that the therapeutic work is being done well (Scaife, 2009). This is a 
similar position to Patterson’s client-centered approach to supervision (Patterson, 1983).   
However, contemporary person-centered supervisors tend to be more selective in terms of 
their adherence to pure Rogerian perspectives.  For instance Tudor and Worrall (2004) 
reviewed the relevance of Rogers’ core conditions with respect to the practice of supervision. 
They contended that congruence in supervisees and supervisors is essential if they are to 
discuss casework in an honest and transparent manner. Also Tudor and Worrall considered 
that empathy on the part of the supervisor was necessary so that supervisees can feel 
supported in their therapeutic work, thus reducing the isolating aspects of being a therapist. 
However, these reviewers had a mixed view on the appropriateness of unconditional positive 
regard in supervision. On the one hand, they considered that the demonstration of an on-
going prizing and acceptance of supervisees was crucial so that supervisees could feel safe 
enough to disclose worrying or challenging aspects of their practice.  However, strict 
adherence to unconditional positive regard for supervisees leads to a deficit in critique and 
evaluation of their practice. This is a major criticism of person-centred supervision (Scaife, 
2009), as counselling and psychotherapy accrediting bodies expect psychotherapy 
supervisors to protect the public from harm and uphold standards in the profession through a 
process of on-going monitoring and evaluation (IACP, 2013: BACP, 2013).  The net result of 
this is that while person-centred supervisors prefer to maintain a, non-judgemental, 
supportive and empowering relationship with their supervisees, they are now called to be 
more active and explicit about their ethical, legal and moral responsibilities towards clients 
and supervisees (Lawton and Feltham, 2000).    
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The premise upon which person-centred psychotherapy supervision rests has commonalities 
and divergences with the philosophical and methodological stance which guides this research 
project. The Rogerian approach has been described as a phenomenological/ experiential or 
humanistic/ experiential approach, which privileges exploring and reflecting upon people’s 
lived experiences, over formulating their problems in living through psychological paradigms 
or dominant theoretical discourses (Nelson-Jones, 1992). In order to bring lived experience 
into awareness, a journey of discovery is facilitated which overtime, it is asserted, uncovers 
the meanings behind subjective experiences (Rogers, 1961). This philosophical position is of 
interest in this project which seeks to illuminate the meaning of being a psychotherapeutic 
supervisor. As a researcher, I am cognisant that if I can establish a good rapport and trusting 
relationship with research participants then there is a greater likelihood that they will feel safe 
enough to engage in a depth of exploration and description with me about their specific 
supervisory experiences.     
The underlying thinking behind this research project however diverges from Rogers’ 
philosophy in a number of ways. While person-centred philosophy has its roots firmly in 
phenomenology and privileging peoples lived experience, aspects of this approach are in 
contention with Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology philosophy. Hermeneutic 
phenomenologists consider that it is important to not only explore and describe lived 
experience but also to interpret it, in order to unconceal the truth and  meanings associated 
with being human (Willig, 2008).  It is considered that the horizon of understanding is 
expanded through communication, clarification and the art of interpretation (Gadamer, 1975). 
This is contrary to Rogers’ philosophy which waits for clients, supervisees and supervisors 
to, in their own time, gain insight, awareness and meaning, through a circular process of 
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listening and reflecting. Rogerians believe that within the context of an empathic relationship, 
others will be sufficiently liberated to engage in a process of self-exploration (Rogers, 1961). 
However, Heidegger, as has been articulated, dismisses empathic responding as a 
disingenuous way of being-with people (Heidegger, 1965). Hermeneutic phenomenologists 
assert that it is more realistic to acknowledge that it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate 
description and interpretation when reflecting upon lived experiences (Todres and Wheeler, 
2001).  
While client or person-centred philosophy and practice are considered to be anti-theoretical, 
it does appear to have gotten caught up in propagating its own ideas and principles through 
the supervisory process. In essence, it prescribes specific ways for supervisors to be with 
supervisees that are based on being fully committed to person-centred principles such as 
being optimistic about human nature and striving to demonstrate the core conditions 
(Patterson, 1983). However, hermeneutic phenomenology is interested in illuminating the 
totality of human experiencing whether it is the positive, acceptable side of being human or 
the negative, shadow side (Cerbonne, 2006). 
 From the perspective of this research project, I want to be able to capture a breadth of 
supervisory experiences on the positive to negative continuum. I don’t want to preclude 
illumination of what it is like to be a person-centred supervisor who is committed to this 
philosophical way of working. However, I want to create an opportunity for supervisors, 
including those who are person-centred in orientation, to tell stories about their actual day to 
day lived experiences. So, I am also interested in creating a truly open space to uncover, what 
it is like to wrestle with being-judgemental or non-accepting of supervisees; to grapple with 
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experiences of being-mistrusting; being-incongruent; being-watchful; being-critical; being-
powerful; being-directive or being-responsible when being-with supervisees.   
This research study, therefore, strives to move beyond transcendental or descriptive 
phenomenological philosophy (Husserl 1970a) which influences the Rogerian 
phenomenological/experiential approach. While acknowledging the value and positive 
influence of this approach in the world of psychotherapy supervision, this research seeks to 
unconceal and interpret the meaning of being a psychotherapeutic supervisor, in an unfettered 
way. 
3.10. Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a robust critical discussion of the methodological frameworks and 
theories that inform and influence psychotherapeutic supervisors thinking and common 
practices. It has mapped out the evolution of psychotherapeutic supervision since its 
inception at the beginning of the twentieth century and demonstrated how this has progressed 
from an educative, supportive and voluntary encounter between therapists and supervisors to 
a mandatory process for those who seek recognition and credibility within the fields of 
counselling and psychotherapy (IACP, 2013; BACP, 2013). Contemporarily, there is a 
diverse range of perspectives about what psychotherapeutic supervision is; what it is for; and 
what actually occurs in the supervisory space. There is much debate, in the literature about 
the art and science of supervision which has resulted in a mushrooming of modes, methods 
and models of psychotherapy supervision (Gilbert and Evans, 2000). Preliminary efforts have 
been made to separate out the functional and methodological aspects of supervision from 
supervisors’ individual philosophies about this endeavour and the meanings that they attach 
to it (Carroll, 2001).  
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This chapter has offered the view that psychotherapy bound approaches to supervision have 
had a significant impact on what actually occurs in supervisory practice. To this end the 
chapter compares and contrasts three of the main psychotherapeutic forces psychoanalytic, 
cognitive-behavioural and humanistic approaches and considers the supervisory stance that 
each of these prescribes. It is hoped that this in-depth, critical discussion of competing 
paradigms will contextualise, for readers, the field of psychotherapy supervision and alert 
them to the philosophies, principles and practices that the supervisors who have participated 
in this research study have been exposed to. It has been demonstrated here that psychotherapy 
preferences and epistemologies get played out and privileged (with the exception of the 
existential approach) over ontology, in the world of supervision. 
In agreement with Omand (2009) and Creaner (2014), the view has been offered that 
psychotherapy theories can provide a secure base from which supervisors can conduct their 
practice. However, from the perspective of this research, I am curious as to whether being 
tightly bound, to principles and practices associated with specific psychotherapeutic theories 
circumvents recognition of actual lived experiences while being a psychotherapeutic 
supervisor. 
Having engaged in a circular process of reading, thinking and  writing about methodological 
frameworks and  psychotherapy bound approaches to supervision, it has become clear that 
each of these make assertions about  the nature of this endeavour and postulate on what it is 
to be a psychotherapeutic supervisor. I would argue that many of these differing, diverse 
prescribed perspectives constrain supervisors from having ready opportunity to reflect on 
their actual day to day lived experiences. Furthermore, I would suggest that the 
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epistemological attention given to the entity of supervision, inadvertently conceals, what it 
actually is, what it actually means, to be a psychotherapy supervisor.  
In contrast, this hermeneutic phenomenological inquiry is interested in uncovering the 
breadth of lived experience. It is hoped that this research study will get underneath theoretical 
dogmas and dominant discourses, in order to create space for supervisors to reflect in an 
unfettered way on their hidden, forgotten or lost existence and their exclusive experiences of 
existing, in the world of psychotherapy supervision. 
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4. EXAMINING EXISTING RESEARCH  
4.1. Introduction 
This research study is guided by a hermeneutic phenomenological methodological and 
philosophical framework. In this type of research study, the participants lived experience is 
privileged before epistemological paradigms (Heidegger, 1927/1962). This philosophical 
position causes a dilemma for the hermeneutic phenomenological researcher in terms of 
reviewing research findings. Ideally, the hermeneutic phenomenological researcher 
approaches data collection and analysis with openness and curiosity; paying intimate 
attention to understanding, interpreting and illuminating the unique experiential descriptions 
offered by participants about the way that they experience the world, in this case, the specific 
world of supervision (Van Manen, 1990). While the hermeneutic phenomenological 
researcher acknowledges her/his own pre-understandings of the topic under investigation, a 
real attempt is made to stay as close as possible to the actual lived experience of participants, 
in order to unconceal the meaning they make of their life worlds (Heidegger, 1927/1962; 
Schmidt, 2006).  
However, in order to undertake a PhD level study, it is necessary to provide a clear rationale 
and justification for researching a specific area of interest.  In order to do so , a preliminary 
search of quantitative, qualitative and mixed method research studies was undertaken, using 
electronic databases, including CINAHL, PsycARTICLES, PsycINFO, Science Direct, 
Scopus, Google Scholar and Web of Science, the goal of which was to meet academic 
requirements for justification of this study.   During the data collection and data analysis 
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phases, I kept in mind the potential influence of reviewed research findings when 
interviewing participants and when subjecting the data to hermeneutic phenomenological 
analysis. In collaboration with my research supervisors, I have actively striven to privilege 
and report on the actual lived experience of participants, in this study, over assertions made 
by other researchers. After the findings from the data collection phase of this study had been 
crafted, I was then curious to review further research studies in the field of supervision. 
Reviewing research over the last 30 years has demonstrated that a diverse range of 
supervision related topics have been researched over a significant time period during which 
clinical and psychotherapeutic supervision has evolved and gained recognition within the 
helping professions. Researchers have cast their nets widely. Research studies have been 
carried out with supervisees (Frank and Vaitl, 1987; McMahon, 2003; Tromski-Klingshirn 
and Davis, 2007; Grant and Schofield, 2007; Trepal et al., 2010), the supervisory dyad, 
(Kennard et al., 1987; Zarbock et al., 2009;Dow et al., 2009), supervisors and  supervision 
groups (Conn et al.,, 2009; Ogren and Sunden, 2009) and with the triumvirate that interlinks 
supervisors, supervisees and clients (Freitas, 2002; Bambling et al ,2006; Lambert and Ogles, 
1997; Schoenwald et al., 2009). While, there have been a number of studies carried out 
purely with clinical supervisors (Heru et al., 2006; Nolan, 2007; Nelson et al., 2008; Grant , 
2012), there has been a paucity of research undertaken solely with psychotherapeutic 
supervisors (Clarkson and Aviram, 1995; Du Plock, 2009). 
The overall aim of this chapter, then, is to highlight what is known from previous research 
studies about the psychotherapeutic supervisor and to comment upon what remains unknown 
or hidden about this key agent in the supervisory process. The content of this chapter 
provides a critical discussion of quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods research, 
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focussed on studies involving supervisors and their supervisees and inquiries carried out 
solely with supervisors. 
4.2. Supervisors and Supervisees- Examining Combined Perspectives 
A significant amount of research has been conducted jointly with supervisors and 
supervisees. From the mid-1980s studies have focused on topics pertinent to supervisory 
dyads and have also involved the collection of data from supervisors and their supervision 
group members. Recently there has been a surge of quantitative research studies  focused on 
a variety of subject areas such as levels of satisfaction with the supervisory process from the 
perspectives of supervisors and supervisees (Zarbock et al., 2009); key topics discussed in 
supervision and supervisory styles (Dow et al., 2009); attitudes and levels of satisfaction 
towards technology in group supervision (Conn et al., 2009) as well as Ogren and Sunden’s, 
(2009) research study which actively involved both supervisors and supervisees in 
researching psychotherapy supervision in a group format. The findings from several of these 
studies are extrapolated to provide a flavour of what is known from the perspectives of 
supervisors and their supervisees.  
 
One of the first quantitative research studies with supervisory dyads focused on the variables 
that contribute to positive or negative experiences in psychotherapy supervision was carried 
out by Kennard et al., (1987). They recruited 68 supervisor/trainee dyads. These pairings 
were divided into two groups depending on whether the trainees had previously; by a self-
report, retrospective measure indicated that they had had very positive or very negative 
supervision experiences. The researchers found by surveying supervisory pairs that they 
agreed on either the positive or negative quality of supervision experiences. However, the 
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focus of the research was on trainees’ experiences of supervision, only. The research findings 
indicated that trainees had positive supervision experiences when the supervisory pair shared 
theoretical orientations and when they were open to receiving feedback from supervisors. 
Positive supervision experiences, from the trainees’ perspective involved supportive, 
instructional, and interpretive interactions with supervisors. Kennard et al., (1987) recognised 
the limitations of their own study in terms of potential trainee bias and called for an extended 
longitudinal study in order to generalise their findings. However, an important factor, is the 
absence of psychotherapy supervisors’ voices in this study.  While trainee therapists had the 
opportunity to comment on variables that influenced their positive or negative experiences, 
this is a one-side perspective on an inter-subjective interaction. A more balanced perspective 
could potentially have been achieved my inviting greater supervisor participation in this 
study. By providing supervisors with a greater level of involvement in the study, factual 
information about the variables that impact positively and negatively on supervision 
experiences may have been found. However, while survey design has merit, it can be a blunt 
instrument when trying to understand human experiences (Cresswell, 1998). A mixed 
methods research study which also involved qualitative style interviewing may have been of 
greater assistance than a longitudinal study. Phenomenological interviews create a space for 
participants to talk in an unfettered way about a range of experiences that move beyond the 
answering restrictions which are imposed in surveys.  Such interviews carried out with the 
supervisory dyad, coupled with surveys are, in my view, more likely to provide a more in-
depth understanding of a range of human experiencing in psychotherapy supervision.  
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Expanding on previous research findings, Dow et al., (2009) undertook a quantitative study 
focused on topics discussed in supervision and on supervisory styles. The respondents in this 
study were 86 supervisors who worked with 161 trainee therapists over ten supervision 
sessions each. The researchers wanted to determine if there was agreement between 
supervisees and supervisors about the top two most important topics that they discussed in 
supervision and about the style of the supervisor. Supervisors and supervisees were presented 
with a menu of common supervision topics, from which they could choose (Rabinowitz et al., 
1986). They were also provided with fours definitions of supervisory styles; directive or 
expert teacher; supportive teacher; counselor (personal development) role; and consultant as 
devised by Bernard (1997). Immediately after, supervision sessions both sets of participants 
were invited to independently complete a survey on the topics discussed in supervision and 
complete a supervisory styles inventory.  
 
The findings from the study suggest a statistically significant degree of agreement among 
respondents about the top two topics discussed between the supervisory pair and also there 
was consensus about the supervisory styles employed. While these findings supported 
previous literature and research with respect to the focus of supervision sessions and 
supervisory styles, an anomaly surfaced to which the researchers gave weight. Even though 
there was statistical agreement from both surveys, the findings showed that the respondents 
disagreed quite frequently on the important topics discussed and about supervisory styles. In 
discussing their findings Dow et al., (2009) considered the dichotomy between a statistically 
significant result and evidence of substantial disagreement between supervisor pairs.  
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The researchers hypothesised that supervisors and supervisees may have interpreted the menu 
of supervision topics (Rabinowitz et al., 1986) differently due to their different levels of 
knowledge, training and experience of supervision. They also hypothesised that supervisors 
and supervisees may have had differing expectations and presuppositions about supervisor 
roles which did not fit with the definitions provided on supervisory styles (Bernard, 1997). 
Dow et al., (2009) ultimately raised a fundamental question about how much agreement on 
topics and styles was necessary for the supervisory process to be effective in the development 
of the supervisee and came to the conclusion that perhaps not as much agreement is needed 
as one might suppose.  
 
While a rigorously analysed survey design can provide statistical evidence, in this instance it 
was inadequate in assisting Dow et al., (2009) to understand why there was frequent 
disagreements on topics and styles between supervisory pairs, resulting in the development of 
hypotheses by researchers. While the central question as to whether or not it is necessary to 
have agreement on these matters in order for the supervisory encounter to be meaningful and 
productive, could be answered through a straight forward survey, this does raise a query 
about the validity of applying a purely scientific approach to an interpersonal human 
endeavour in which unique inter-subjective experiences occur. In trying to test the hypotheses 
for frequent disagreements between supervisors and supervisees, it may have been more 
beneficial for the researchers to recommend a mixed methods study as opposed to further 
quantitative studies. A mixed methods study that would, also, involve phenomenological 
style interviews with supervisory pairs, would have the advantage of opening up a discourse 
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about unique understandings and interpretations of supervision topics and supervisory styles 
and the experience of supervising and being supervised.  
 
More recently, Ogren and Sunden (2009) undertook a study actively involving both 
supervisors and supervisees in researching the effectiveness of psychotherapy supervision, in 
a group format. The goal of the research was primarily to ascertain the role of group 
supervision as an educational tool for therapists in training. Researchers developed 
questionnaires to collect supervisee and supervisor opinions about group climate; levels of 
knowledge and skill; psychotherapy orientations; the influence of supervisor style and 
organisational frameworks on the functioning of psychotherapy supervision in small groups. 
Data was collected over a 3 year period in an academic setting and involved responses from 
therapists and supervisors who had participated in 150 supervision groups. Questionnaires 
were developed in supervisor and supervisee versions and completed at the beginning, middle 
and end of supervision groups. There was agreement between supervisors and supervisees 
that participating in supervision in a group format enabled in-depth understanding of clinical 
work. Both sets of respondents considered that collaborative working improved over the life 
of the supervision group and reported limited dysfunctional behaviours by individual group 
members or by sub-groups. A very interesting finding was that supervisees and supervisors 
who worked and were trained in very different psychotherapy orientations such as 
humanistic, psychodynamic, and cognitive behavioural therapy reported no differences in 
terms of the effectiveness of group supervision as an educational tool. This challenges 
Patterson’s (1997) assertions that supervisors and supervisees must be trained in the same 
theoretical modality in order for supervision to be effective.  These research findings suggest 
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that there is a consensus between supervisors and supervisees that group supervision has a 
potential to provide a multiplicity of perspectives and experiences and it confirms the 
assumption that group supervision broadens the frame of clinical reference.  
While the results from this research do not add significantly to what is known about the 
professional development of therapists and is more confirmatory than ground breaking 
(Wheeler and Richards, 2007), they do support a rationale for providing regular group 
supervision in the context of academically based psychotherapy training programmes and 
beyond training, which involve supervisees and supervisors with diverse philosophical and 
theoretical orientations.   Interestingly, the participants in this research study expressed the 
view that it was a more difficult and challenging experience to be a group supervisor than it 
was to be an individual supervisor. However, this aspect of psychotherapeutic supervisors 
experience was not pursued in this study which was concerned with the functional aspects of 
supervision as opposed to participants’ experiences while in group supervision. 
4.3. Supervisors’ Perspectives and Experiences 
An extensive on line-search has demonstrated that there have been a number of studies 
carried out solely with supervisors, with more examples of qualitative than quantitative or 
mixed method research inquiries, in the last few decades. Overall studies with supervisees, 
supervisory dyads and supervision groups significantly outnumber research inquiries which 
primarily focus on supervisors’ perspectives and experiences.  According to Watkins (2012)  
Despite a generation of inquiry, the psychotherapy supervisor still remains 
the largely unknown party in the supervision experience (Watkins, 2012; 45).  
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In this section an overview of recent quantitative studies is provided which highlight the 
types of topics that have been researched with supervisors in the helping professions. 
Thereafter an in-depth critical discussion of qualitative studies, more relevant to my area of 
research inquiry, is offered.   
Recent quantitative studies include research undertaken by Heru et al., (2006) which used a 
survey method to examine gender differences in self-disclosure and the management of 
boundary issues with 43 psychiatry supervisors; Skerjve et al., (2009) investigated, again via 
a survey design, aspects of nondisclosure in a sample of 30 psychotherapy supervisors, 
working within a group format of supervision, while Slavin-Milford et al., (2011) used a 
comparative psychotherapy process scale to research 56 expert cognitive-behavioural and 
psychodynamic-interpersonal supervisors’ views of ideal therapeutic practice.  There has also 
been a recent spate of quantitative and mixed methods studies, involving between 30 and 230 
respondents using questionnaires, self-report measures and interviews focused on the 
development of psychotherapy supervisors (Culbreth et al., 2008) and psychology 
supervisors (Ybrandt et al., 2009).  
These studies have focused on gathering supervisors’ perspectives about the interpersonal, 
theoretical, technical, educative and developmental aspects of ‘doing’ supervision. They have 
successfully provided a platform for the emergence of new knowledge based exclusively on 
the views of novice and experienced clinical supervisors. However, from among these 
studies, the distinctive voice of the psychotherapeutic supervisor is minimal as there have 
been a very limited number of quantitative studies undertaken solely with this specialised 
target group. Studies employing qualitative research approaches have examined trainee and 
experienced clinical supervisors’ perspectives and experiences on highly variable aspects of 
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the supervisory endeavour. These include research inquiries eliciting reflections on being a 
supervisor (Clarkson et al., 1995); the inter-subjective dynamics of supervision (Nolan, 
2007); reflections on approaches to supervision theory (Henderson,  2007); perspectives on a 
triadic model of supervision and its impact on the role of the supervisor (Hein et al., 2008); 
wise supervisors’ perspectives on working with conflict in clinical supervision (Nelson et al., 
2008); reflections on the influence of supervision on clinical practice (Hallam-Jones et al., 
2008); collusion in clinical supervision (Milne, 2009); Korean supervisors’ experiences of 
clinical supervision (Bang et al., 2009); the process of becoming a supervisor (Majcher et al., 
2009);  the meaning of clinical supervision (Du Plock, 2009); reflections on the journey to 
becoming a supervisor (Rapisarda et al., 2011) and perspectives on managing difficulties in 
supervision (Grant et al., 2012).  
These studies have involved psychotherapy and psychology supervisors, with the minority 
focussed purely on the perspectives and experiences of psychotherapy supervisors. A broad 
range of research methodologies were used to address research topics. Several of the studies 
utilised grounded theory or consensual qualitative research approaches or a combination of 
these. Various forms of phenomenology were purportedly employed including interpretive 
phenomenological analysis, descriptive or transcendental phenomenology and existential-
phenomenology. The majority of these studies were discrete, time-bound inquiries involving 
from 6 to 18 participants. However there were several case studies and Majcher et al., (2009) 
undertook a longitudinal study with participants who were training to become supervisors.  
While some of these studies suggested that the research focussed on supervisors’ experiences, 
the notion of experience was at times interpreted as opinions or cognitions (Bang et al., 
2009).   
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From among these recent research studies with clinical supervisors, Clarkson et al’s., (1995) 
inquiry on reflections on being a supervisor; Nelson et al’s., (2008) study on conflict in 
supervision; Du Plock’s (2009) inquiry into the meaning of clinical supervision and Grant et 
al’s., (2012) research on managing difficulties in supervision are worth further consideration 
with respect to my own research project.   
A phenomenological research study about ‘Supervisors reflections on ‘being’ a Supervisor’, 
was carried out by Clarkson et al., (1995) who made the claim that no such research had 
previously been undertaken. This study was interested ‘in revealing the meaning of the 
concept ‘supervision’, from the supervisor’s perspective’ (Clarkson et al., 1995:1). The study 
involved eleven humanistic/existential supervisors who were asked to complete a 
questionnaire focused on the question ‘What does being a supervisor mean?’  The 
participants had been gathered together to learn about phenomenological research and this 
study was used to demonstrate this approach to research. The researchers performed content 
analysis and frequency measuring on the written reports which resulted in six broad 
descriptions of the experience of being a supervisor. The first three descriptions, 'structuring', 
'teaching' and 'nurturing' were representative of  75%  of the statements made by 
participants, with ‘structuring’ (43%) being privileged over ‘teaching’ and ‘nurturing’ which 
were equally important to participants. The remaining 25% of statements referred to the 
'supervisor as person', 'supervisor as colleague', and the 'triangle, client-therapist-
supervisor'. This research is interesting in that the first three descriptions confirm the 
functions or activities of supervision as previously identified by Ellis and Dell (1986) and 
Proctor and Inskipp (1988).  
114 
 
However, the researchers in this study claimed that the uniqueness of this study was that it 
focused on ‘being’ a supervisor (as opposed to ‘doing’ supervision) and claimed that they 
achieved this focus through descriptive phenomenological inquiry. Unfortunately, this claim 
is not well founded from a descriptive phenomenological perspective. Only 25% of an 
already small pool of participants provided substantial descriptions, in written form, of the 
experience of being a supervisor. Descriptive phenomenology seeks to uncover the universal 
essences of a phenomena which are common to all participants (Flood, 2010), however, this 
research study is basing it claims on a small fraction of the responses (3 of 11 participants) 
obtained.   
The researchers  further claim that their phenomenological research study demonstrates that 
research can be carried out on ‘process’ without ‘betraying’ the subjective experience 
(Clarkson and Aviram, 1995). This is a grand claim for a research study which appears to 
have used a qualitative style questionnaire, with a small number of participants, in an attempt 
to gain understanding of a phenomenological experience. In this case, the chosen 
methodology may not have appropriately facilitated an in-depth phenomenological study. 
The qualitative methods used in the study may not have allowed for the generation of 
significant descriptions of ‘being’ a supervisor and the specific use of a questionnaire may 
have prevented the researchers from gaining in-depth understanding of the meaning of 
‘being’ a supervisor. The findings from this study may have been more meaningful if the 
researchers had undertaken a mix methods approach, by doing a larger scale survey followed 
by in-depth interviews with a percentage of respondents. Alternatively a purely qualitative 
study, based on  a descriptive phenomenological approach to research, carrying out in-depth, 
semi- structured interviews within a group context or with individual supervisors, may have 
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revealed more in- depth knowledge  about the meaning of ‘being’ a supervisor, for the field 
of psychotherapeutic supervision.   
Latterly, Nelson et al (2008) undertook a study with 12 experienced, eclectic, male and 
female psychotherapy supervisors. These researchers invited participants to describe their 
philosophies, theoretical understandings, attitudes and effective strategies about working with 
conflict in supervision via semi-structured interviews, carried out by telephone. They were 
also invited to recount specific descriptions of conflict experiences with supervisees.  Data 
was analysed by combining analytic strategies from grounded theory and consensual 
qualitative research, which formulates conceptual domains in initial stages of data analysis. 
Nelson et al., suggest that the most significant finding from this research is that supervisors 
had an openness to conflict in the supervisory space. The majority of participants considered 
that conflict was necessary and beneficial to supervisees’ development. They considered that 
anxiety, opaque expectations and the power associated with evaluating supervisees’ 
performance were all sources of conflict between the supervisory pair.  
In a limited manner, this research then describes participant’s experiences of being in 
conflictual situations. Interestingly, participants reported that in- supervision conflict was 
distasteful, leading to experiences of anxiety and self-doubt. However, negative personal 
experiences of conflict were mitigated by intellectual beliefs that conflict could be highly 
productive and participants were therefore prepared to approach these unpleasant experiences 
openly, with supervisees. In order to deal with conflict in supervision, participants stated that 
they engaged in personal and professional reflection and consulted with colleagues. As wise 
psychotherapy supervisors they employed advanced interpersonal skills with supervisees and 
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openly addressed areas of conflict, even though most participants found this to be 
challenging and painful.  
The gathering of descriptions of specific supervisory experiences in Nelson et al’s study is of 
interest to my own study which endeavours to capture a sense of what it is like being a 
psychotherapy supervisor in specific situations. Participant’s descriptions, in this study, 
capture a disconnection between cognitions and beliefs about professionally acceptable 
discourses about the management of conflict and the actual distasteful experience of being 
confronted with and approaching conflict.  
This research, which had multiple aims, was mainly concerned with identifying effective 
strategies for dealing with conflict between supervisors and supervisees. The results of the 
research, therefore, focus on implications for the education and training of psychotherapy 
supervisors in terms of conflict management. With the emphasis on the identification of new 
strategies and training recommendations, the disconnection between the actual experience of 
being a supervisor in conflictual situations and the intellectual or practical ways of managing 
conflict has been, to a degree, diminished in the research findings. Ultimately the research 
findings emphasise the new knowledge gained from participants’ responses of how to ‘do’ 
conflict management, over exploring further the challenging and painful experiences of 
‘being’ in conflict with another human being and what this means in the specific context of 
supervisory relationships. 
The third study of interest, described as an existential-phenomenological inquiry into the 
meaning of clinical supervision was undertaken by Du Plock (2009). The goal of this study 
was ‘to surface the essential structures of the concept 'existential phenomenological clinical 
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supervision’, as experienced by a sample of eighteen existential therapists who were also 
both facilitating and receiving such supervision (Du Plock, 2009:1).  In order to achieve this 
goal Du Plock (2009) sought to obtain a 'snapshot' of existential supervision through a 
purposive sample. He organised a workshop on the topic and gathered demographic 
information from consenting participants. Thereafter participants were asked to complete a 
form in response to two open-ended questions which were focused on surfacing the 
participants’ descriptions of existential-phenomenological supervision. As part of phase one 
of this study, Du Plock performed content and frequency analysis, on participants’ written 
responses, from which four groups of statements describing existential-phenomenological 
supervision emerged. These were 'attending to the 'Being' of the supervisee'; 'support and 
maintenance of a philosophical attitude'; ‘promotion of relational perspective', and 
'supervisor as colleague/mentor' . Evidence for these broad groupings was obtained from the 
experience of supervisors and confirmed by the experience of supervisees. In phase two of 
the study, Du Plock devised an exhaustive summary statement about the meaning of 
existential-phenomenological supervision, based on the four identified groupings and 
circulated it to participants who were asked to provide written feedback as to how well it 
captured and confirmed their experience of the phenomenon under investigation. There was a 
limited response (33%) to this call for written feedback and the general consensus among 
those who did respond was that the exhaustive summary statement did capture their sense of 
the phenomenon. In phase three of the study, Du Plock asked participants to consider the 
‘impact of the research on their supervisory activities’. Only one participant responded to 
this phase of the inquiry, who commented on having a sense of inclusion in the world of 
existential phenomenological therapy. This study took an unusual approach to existential-
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phenomenological research which usually involves in-depth interviews with participants in 
an attempt to gain understanding of their day to day existence and illuminate meaning about 
their lived experiences. 
Du Plock’s (2009) approach was successful in gaining a descriptive snapshot of existential 
phenomenological supervision from a fairly cohesive group of supervisors and supervisees 
which led to the development of the four groups of statements, describing the participants’ 
experiences of existential phenomenological supervision and the formulation of the 
exhaustive summary statement. However, the research appears to have been less successful in 
confirming the experience of participants, via the summary statement, in phase two of the 
study and appears to have gained insufficient evidence from the experience of the participants 
about the impact of the exhaustive summary statement on their supervisory activities, in 
phase three of the project. In reflecting on the methodological approach to this study, Du 
Plock (2009) appears to have carried out qualitative style research which may not achieve the 
rigour and depth of inquiry required of a pure existential-phenomenological research study. 
Overall, the aims of this research study may have been more fully achieved, if, for example, 
phenomenological style interviews had been conducted with a cross section of the 
participants to capture their ontological responses to phases two and three of the research 
inquiry.  
The final study extrapolated here, was recently carried out by Grant et al., (2012). Their 
research was designed to examine the practice wisdom of 16 expert clinical psychology and 
psychotherapy supervisors in order to ascertain how they managed difficulties within 
supervisory relationships. The methodological approach underpinning this research is 
influenced by social constructivism, phenomenology and the reflective practitioner model 
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(Schön, 1991). Two interviews were carried out with each participant. The first semi-
structured interview invited reflections on theory, practice and experiences of supervision. 
The second interview was more phenomenological in nature and was undertaken while 
observing a recording of a supervision session in order to capture real time thinking and 
experiences of interacting with supervisees. Data was analysed using a form of consensual 
qualitative research and resulted in the identification of an extensive range of difficulties that 
emerged between supervisors and supervisees including incompetence, unethical behaviour, 
transferences and challenging personal characteristics. The supervisors in this study described 
a plethora of interventions to manage such difficulties as they arose. Grant el al., synthesised 
these interventions into 4 overarching themes which are defined as relational, reflective, 
confrontative and avoidant.  
Relational interventions were predominantly used by participants who directly named their 
difficulties with supervisees while also balancing this up with genuine validation and 
supportive feedback. In terms of reflective interventions, supervisors engaged in personal and 
professional reflection and encouraged reflexivity in their supervisees regarding their clinical 
practice and personal behaviour and characteristics. This intervention was only successful 
when the supervisory pair were operating in a safe and trusting psychological space. When 
relational and reflective interventions failed, participants reported that they began to 
tentatively challenge supervisees, becoming more directly confrontative and instructive if 
difficulties prevailed. Avoidant interventions were only used in a limited fashion, mainly 
when participants considered that supervisees’ behaviours, attitudes or characteristics were 
too entrenched to ever change. However difficulties with clinical practice were infrequently 
avoided.  
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Grant et al. also presented two case studies which added rich, context specific descriptions 
about the internal challenges and complexity of working with difficulties within supervisory 
relationships. The case studies also concretised the relational, reflective, confrontative and 
avoidant journey that supervisors went through in order to manage difficulties with 
supervisees. From a phenomenological perspective, participants’ descriptions illuminated the 
very human struggle to remain professional and engage in reflexivity rather than respond 
reactively. Grant et al. offered the view that it was the expertise and practice wisdom of their 
participants that enabled them to handle this human struggle.  
This research study is of interest to my research project as it confirms that rich and evocative 
descriptions of supervisors’ day to day lived experiences can be elicited through a 
phenomenological methodological research study. While the study was also interested in 
knowledge based outcomes, it does clearly describe and hold up to the light the lived 
experience descriptions (Van Manen 1990) of being a clinical supervisor struggling with the 
professional management of difficulties in supervisory relationships.  
4.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a comprehensive critical discussion on national and international 
research studies which have examined combined supervisor/supervisee perspectives and 
inquiries which have focused solely on supervisors’ views and experiences. The review 
clearly shows that there has been a steady interest in recent years in researching the field of 
supervision from widely different standpoints. Several of the studies reviewed, were small 
scale qualitative inquiries, while others utilised quantitative or mixed methods and involved 
large numbers of respondents.  
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Collectively and with varying degrees of authority, the reviewed studies paint a picture about 
what is currently known about the functional, educational, interpersonal, relational and 
experiential aspects of the supervisory endeavour as it has developed over the last 30 years. 
Much of the research carried out to date is focussed on efficacy and satisfaction type studies or 
they have been designed to help us understand what is happening between the supervisory pair 
and what supervisors ‘do’. Many of these studies make assertions about new found knowledge 
regarding clinical supervision in the talking therapies in the contexts of clinical psychology, 
psychiatry and psychotherapy, while the results from other studies are confirmatory, reinforcing 
dominant discourses. The review of research carried out in the last three decades has, however, 
demonstrated that there is a paucity of quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods research 
focused purely on psychotherapeutic supervisors.  
 
It is acknowledged that there have been several descriptive phenomenological research studies 
which purport to examine the experiences of psychotherapeutic supervisors in the last 30 years 
(Clarkson et al., 1995; Nelson et al., 2008; Du Plock, 2009; Grant et al., 2012). Of these, Grant et 
al’s recent study, with clinical psychology and psychotherapy supervisors, elicits a resonance 
with lived experience, a phenomenological nod with its engaging accounts of the human 
struggles that supervisors experience when managing difficulties with supervisees.  
When reviewing the research, I was, however, unable to locate any hermeneutic 
phenomenological studies undertaking in-depth examination of the experience and meaning of 
being a psychotherapeutic supervisor. Researching the experience of being a psychotherapeutic 
supervisor is markedly different from researching what psychotherapeutic supervisors 
consciously ‘do’ in their practice or inquiring about their cognitive and intellectual perspectives 
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about their practice.  This hermeneutic phenomenological research study will move beyond the 
functional, technical, educational, interpersonal and relational aspects of supervision in an 
attempt to provide a reflective space for participants to consider the meaning of their existence 
when being a psychotherapeutic supervisor.   
Furthermore, the approach to descriptive or transcendental phenomenological studies is 
markedly different from the methodological and philosophical stance embraced by hermeneutic 
phenomenological researchers (Flood, 2010). Hermeneutic phenomenological studies move 
beyond describing lived experience descriptions (Van Manen, 1990) and seeking essences in 
human experiencing (Husserl, 1970a).  Hermeneutics is the art of interpretation (Willig, 2008). 
Heideggerian hermeneutic phenomenological research is concerned with describing, 
unconcealing, understanding and interpreting human existence and the unique meanings that 
human beings attribute to their day to day lived experiences. Through cycles of thinking and 
interpretation this research approach considers how meaning-making is influenced by existing in 
specific life-worlds (Heidegger, 1927/1962).  
Finally, notwithstanding the steady interest in researching the broad field of clinical supervision, 
calls continue to be made for further research on this topic by Rose (2003), Pretorius (2006) and 
Slavin- Milford et al., (2011)  who strongly suggest that good quality research evidence focused 
on supervision and in particular on the psychotherapeutic supervisor is limited (Watkins 2012). 
Furthermore, the authors of the vast majority of the research studies cited in this chapter made 
recommendations about furthering their research on supervision (Kennard et al., 1987; Clarkson 
et al., 1995; Bambling et al., 2006; Nelson et al., 2008; Dow et al., 2009; Majcher et al., 2009; 
Du Plock, 2009; Grant et al., 2012).  
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With these recommendations for further research studies and given the paucity of research solely 
focussed on the psychotherapeutic supervisor, the limited number of phenomenological studies 
and absence of in-depth hermeneutic phenomenological studies examining the meaning of being 
a psychotherapeutic supervisor, it appears to be timely to undertake this research study.  
It is anticipated that this study, when completed, will bring to the attention of the 
psychotherapeutic community, an under researched, yet crucial existential component of the 
supervisory endeavour.   
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5. PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGICAL POSITION 
5.1. Focusing on the phenomenon 
This research study came about because of my passion for psychotherapeutic supervision and 
the desire to gain a greater depth of understanding about the experience of being a 
psychotherapeutic supervisor. There are multiple references in the literature to research 
studies which focus on theories, models and techniques associated with psychotherapeutic 
supervision. However, I was interested in exploring the meaning of being a 
psychotherapeutic supervisor as opposed to the intellectual and practical aspects of this 
endeavour.   The natural home for this type of study is phenomenology (Schmidt, 2006) as 
this strand of qualitative research seeks to uncover the meaning of being human in a specific 
context or life world (Van Manen, 1990).  
‘From a phenomenological point of view to do research is always to question 
the way we experience the world, to want to know the world in which we live 
as human beings.’ (Van Manen 1990: 5)  
This research seeks to question the way in which human beings experience their existence in 
the world or specific context of psychotherapeutic supervision. It strives to understand 
participant’s unique everyday experiences while also being interested in opening up a 
discourse on how people interpret and make meaning of such experiences.  
The question guiding this research is ‘What is the meaning of being a psychotherapeutic 
supervisor? It is suggested by Van Manen (1990) that the phenomenological research 
question focusses on what something is ‘really’ like and it seeks to get at the core of human 
existence (Van Manen, 1990: 42). The research question is therefore discovery orientated 
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(Van Manen, 1990) and opens up the possibilities of understanding hidden aspects or taken-
for-granted realms of human experiencing (Vandermause, 2011).  Smythe (2011) concurs 
with Van Manen when she argues that the hermeneutic (interpretive) phenomenological 
question seeks to uncover aspects of human existence. She categorically states that 
hermeneutic phenomenological research is not concerned with solving problems but is 
fundamentally concerned with uncovering the meaning of being, concerned with uncovering 
‘how it is in the living of it (Smythe, 2011:29).   
Maintaining a focus on the phenomena is crucial to uncovering what a human experience is 
‘really’ like (Van Manen, 1990). Holding this focus assists the researcher to move beyond the 
everyday awareness and knowledge of the phenomenon in order to more fully understand and 
interpret the meaning of existing in a specific context (Smythe, 2011). The research question 
has been teased out into a number of discrete aims which are to;  
 Engage in an in-depth examination of the experience of being a psychotherapeutic 
supervisor  
 Develop an in-depth description and analysis of what it means to be a 
psychotherapeutic supervisor  
And the objective of the research inquiry is to: 
 Uncover and render intelligible,  what it is really like being a psychotherapeutic 
supervisor 
Having critically reviewed several philosophical positions and related research 
methodologies, I ultimately decided that hermeneutic phenomenology as purported by Martin 
Heidegger (1889-1976) provides the best philosophical and methodological fit to enable me 
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to focus on and strive to uncover the phenomenological experience and meaning of being a 
psychotherapeutic supervisor.  
To this end, this chapter provides an overview of the philosophy and methodological position 
which guides this research. It critically discusses the relevance of hermeneutic 
phenomenology, which resides within the broad church of qualitative research design and 
will outline the hermeneutic phenomenological philosophical principles that have influenced 
the study. The associated research methods utilised in this Ph.D. inquiry will be considered. 
The procedures for data collection and data analysis will be outlined, alongside, the steps 
taken to establish the trustworthiness of the research. There will also be a discussion on 
being-ethical as a hermeneutic phenomenological researcher. 
5.2. Hermeneutic Phenomenological Philosophical and Methodological Positioning 
In this research inquiry I am concerned with gaining an in-depth understanding of the 
experience of being a psychotherapeutic supervisor and developing an in-depth description 
and analysis of the meaning of being a psychotherapeutic supervisor. In doing so, I privilege 
the lived experience of participants in order to uncover the nuances and complexities of their 
actual lived experience. This is an under researched aspect of psychotherapeutic supervision 
which I consider influences the functions and processes of supervisory practice. Therefore, I 
ultimately hope to be able to offer an accurate and insightful account of the experience of 
being a psychotherapeutic supervisor which will inform understandings of psychotherapeutic 
supervision.   
Trying to find a philosophical stance and associated methodological position that would 
address these aspirations has taken me on a phenomenological journey. From the outset, I 
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was clear that an inquiry rooted in the principles of qualitative research design would be most 
appropriate to the aims and objective of this study. A significant cycle of reading, thinking, 
reflecting and critical examination of qualitative strategies of inquiry ensued.  As the goal of 
this research study is to examine, describe, analyse and uncover the day to day lived 
experience of research participants, I realised that a phenomenological study would provide 
the best philosophical and methodological fit.  
Phenomenological research identifies the ‘essence’ of human experiences 
concerning a phenomenon as described by participants in a study. 
Understanding the ‘lived experiences’ marks phenomenology as a philosophy 
as well as a method, and the procedure involves studying a small number of 
subjects through extensive and prolonged engagement to develop patterns 
and relationships of meaning (Cresswell, 2003:15).     
Having decided that I wanted to undertake a phenomenological inquiry, I critically examined 
two main phenomenological positions, transcendental or descriptive phenomenology as 
formulated by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and hermeneutic phenomenology as developed 
by Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). 
5.2.1. Descriptive Phenomenology 
According to Giorgi and Giorgi (2008) it is a challenging task to define phenomenology as 
there are many divergent perceptions of this amongst phenomenologists. Langdridge (2007) 
attempts to define pure phenomenology in this way; 
Phenomenology is the study of human experience and the way in which things 
are perceived as they appear in consciousness (Langdridge, 2007: 10). 
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This definition is consistent with transcendental or descriptive phenomenology, as developed 
by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and focuses on the nature of human experience which is 
linked to the manner in which people perceive the appearance of ‘things’ in the world 
(Langdridge, 2007). From this philosophical perspective, the underlying assumption is that 
all human experience comes from consciousness. Consciousness or individual awareness is 
directed onto ‘things’ in the world which suggests that there is a relationship between human 
consciousness, perception of ‘things’ in the world and meaningful experience (Moustakas, 
1994). The Husserlian, transcendental phenomenological perspective is concerned with 
understanding and describing lived experience through the illumination of the essences of 
consciousness. Husserlian phenomenology postulates that there are common universal 
essences of experience leading to a ‘correct interpretation of experience’ (Flood, 2010: 9). 
Similarly Giorgi (1992), states that a descriptive approach to phenomenology is essential as 
this will ensure that an accurate and ‘unified meaning’ of the lived experience of the 
phenomena will emerge. 
5.2.2. Hermeneutic Phenomenology 
In contrast to transcendental or descriptive phenomenology, Heidegger, in his early writings, 
proposed that the task of phenomenology was to interpret everyday activity (Cerbonne, 2006) 
and that; 
The meaning of phenomenological description as a method lies in 
interpretation. Phenomenology…..is a hermeneutic in the primordial 
signification of this word, where it designates this business of interpreting 
(Heidegger, 1962: 37). 
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Thus, Heidegger’s philosophical position (1927/1962), postulates that pure description of 
phenomena is insufficient when striving to illuminate and understand human existence as it 
emerges, phenomenologically through every day activity. This is a markedly different stance 
from Husserl’s (1970) view of phenomenology which advocates describing the phenomena, 
under investigation as scientifically as possible. More recently Willig (2008) defines 
hermeneutic or interpretive phenomenology is this way: 
Interpretive phenomenology also aims to gain a better understanding of the 
nature and quality of phenomena as they present themselves. However, this 
version of phenomenology does not separate description and interpretation; 
instead, it draws on the insights of the hermeneutic tradition and argues that 
all description constitutes a form of interpretation (Willig, 2008:56). 
As such hermeneutic phenomenology from the Heideggerian (1962) tradition purports that it 
is not feasible to describe a phenomena without engaging in some level of interpretation. In 
support of Heidegger’s position subsequent hermeneutic philosophers have argued that the 
interpretive method is the primary approach in phenomenological inquiry, postulating that it 
is essential to move beyond describing and reporting on the understandings emerging from 
the data in order to gain a fuller understanding of phenomena (Todres and Wheeler, 2001). 
As a researcher who also works as a psychotherapist and psychotherapeutic supervisor, I am 
unable to reconcile the Husserlian (1970) position with my own lived experience. I am not 
convinced that it is feasible to describe participants’ experience of phenomena, without 
making some level of interpretation of such experience but concur with Willig (2008) that 
description and interpretation are intertwined. 
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In contrast, hermeneutic phenomenology acknowledges that researchers make preliminary 
assumptions about the phenomena being examined. As opposed to transcendental 
phenomenology, this approach to phenomenology, does not strive to ‘bracket’ assumptions or 
prior knowledge but encourages the researcher to use these in order to enhance understanding 
about the phenomena (Schmidt, 2006).  From my own perspective and experience historical, 
intellectual, emotional, psychological, contextual and relational factors are influential in 
human encounters and activities.  I am aware that these may have an effect on how I, as 
researcher, will describe, analyse, interpret and report on the phenomena under investigation. 
However, the hermeneutic phenomenological approach ensures that the researcher monitors 
the influence of pre-suppositions so that the participants’ experiences and interpretations are 
not lost or misinterpreted (Todres and Wheeler, 2001). The relevance or interference of pre-
suppositions is deliberately considered in the formation of research questions, interviewing, 
analysis and discussion of research findings. As previously indicated, in order to identify and 
begin to understand the potential influence of my own pre-suppositions I engaged in a pre-
understanding interview with one of my supervisors. This illuminated aspects of my ‘fore-
structure of understanding’ (Heidegger, 1927/1962) which were monitored by me and my 
research supervisors during the data collection and analysis processes.  
Having engaged in cycles of thinking about transcendental and hermeneutic phenomenology, 
I believe that the latter philosophy and methodological position provides greater assistance to 
this research study as it is primarily concerned with studying and illuminating the nature of 
human existence (Schmidt, 2006).  Heidegger’s unique contribution to philosophy is the 
ontological project (Flood, 2010) upon which he embarked, as he diverged from the 
descriptive phenomenological path;  
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Hermeneutics goes beyond description of core concepts or essences to look 
for meanings embedded in common practices, what people experience rather 
than what they consciously know. Heidegger used the term’ life-world’ to 
express the idea that individuals realities are invariably influenced by the 
world in which they live. This represents a move from an epistemological to 
an ontological project, focussing on how interpretation is intrinsic to human 
existence’ (Flood, 2010:9).  
Heidegger’s philosophical position on hermeneutic phenomenology is a good fit with the 
focus of this research inquiry, which is primarily concerned with understanding the meaning 
of being a psychotherapeutic supervisor. It seeks to provide descriptive and interpretive 
stories from the specific life-world of psychotherapeutic supervision. It does not seek to find 
a unified meaning (Giorgi, 1992) of the experience of being a psychotherapeutic supervisor 
but endeavours to draw out and understand hidden aspects of human experiencing 
(Vandermause, 2011). Much has been written about what psychotherapeutic supervisors 
consciously know and about epistemological paradigms which make assertions about what 
supervision is and how to ‘do’ it. However, this research inquiry seeks to place ontology 
before epistemology and structures of consciousness, in a bid to uncover what it is really like 
living, existing as a psychotherapeutic supervisor (Van Manen, 1990:42).  
5.3. The Meaning of Being 
From Heideggerian philosophical perspective, ontology is the study of the nature of being. 
Ontological inquiry is concerned with what it means to be. Heidegger (1927/1962) states that 
we must consider not only the being of objects but also the being of human beings. His 
ontological project (Flood, 2010) shifted phenomenology from pure description, from a focus 
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and reliance on human consciousness towards ontological inquiry; the examination of human 
existence (Moran and Mooney, 2007). Heidegger reformed philosophical thinking by arguing 
that a phenomenological description and interpretation ‘of our actual experience’ is necessary 
(Schmidt, 2006:58). He postulates that greater understanding of human life will be gained 
through ontological inquiry, by ‘unconcealing’ lived experience and common practices as 
they occur in everyday activities (Cerbonne, 2006), than can be obtained through 
epistemological study (Heidegger, 1927/1962).  Heidegger created the notion of ‘Dasein’ in 
order to extrapolate his ontological position (Heidegger, 1927/1962). This term is extensively 
drawn upon when Heidegger is commenting upon the human mode of existence (Dreyfus and 
Wrathall, 2007) and is the cornerstone from which he developed his philosophical thinking 
(McConnell-Henry et al., 2009). For Heidegger; 
Dasein is an entity whose being has the determinate character of existence 
(Heidegger, 1927/1962:34). 
This German term has been maintained throughout English translations of Heidegger’s 
seminal text, Being and Time (1927/1962). The reason for this appears to be that it is 
problematic to secure an accurate translation (McConnell-Henry et al., 2009). According to 
Schmidt (2006) ‘Da’ means ‘there’ and ‘Sein’ means ‘to be’ and he suggests that Dasein, at a 
purely literal level means ‘there-being’ while Van Deurzen and Young (2009) say it means 
being-there.  Expanding this notion further Flood (2010:7) offers a construction of Dasein as 
‘the situated meaning of a human in the world’.  While, Moran states that Dasein is, the 
temporally situated human being who is constituted by his/her past, present and future 
(Moran, 2008: 289). From an ontological stance, then, the term Dasein encapsulates the idea 
of human existence having meaning in a specific life-world.  Therefore, Heideggerian 
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hermeneutic phenomenology researchers strive to uncover phenomena by examining 
everyday lived experience or Dasein (Flood, 2010). In this study, participants’ are invited to 
reflect upon their everyday lived experiences in the specific life-world of psychotherapeutic 
supervision, in which they temporally exist.  
In contrast to other philosophers, such as Husserl (1970), Heidegger postulates that the 
“essence” of Dasein lies in its existence (Heidegger, 1927/1962:42). He considers that 
Dasein has modes of being and that existence is Dasein’s essential mode of being. 
Dasein is an entity which in its very being, comports itself understandingly 
towards that being. In saying this, we are calling attention to the formal 
concept of existence. Dasein exists (Heidegger, 1927/1962:53).  
Heidegger proposes that only Dasein exists. He goes on to postulate that humans are 
intrinsically link to the world. He states that it is not possible to separate one’s being from the 
world in which one exists (McConnell-Henry et al., 2009). He defines this entwinement as 
‘being-in-the-world’ to highlight that ‘being is intimately and inextricably bound up with the 
world that we find ourselves in (Dreyfus and Wrathall, 2007:4). This means that we, as 
human beings dwell in specific worlds, in an absorbed manner which affects how we act and 
how we exist. So, for example, the supervisor exists and is submerged within the life-world 
of psychotherapeutic supervision. This structured world influences how supervisors are 
attuned or disposed to being in this specific world (Dreyfus and Wrathall, 2007). 
Heidegger describes this fundamental structure of Dasein being-in-the-world as existentials 
in order to clearly distinguish them from the being-in-the-world of other entities (Heidegger, 
1927/1962:44) such as stones and tools (Inwood, 1999:61). Heidegger describes another 
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strand of existence which he termed existentiell, to denote the breadth of existential 
possibilities open to Dasein, how it understands these and the choices that it makes or avoids, 
in relation to them (Inwood, 1999). That is to say, it is an existentiell matter when Dasein 
understands the existential possibilities open to it and it can, for example, decide to become, a 
therapist or a psychotherapeutic supervisor. In choosing such existential possibilities Dasein 
is declaring that which is important to it, in its unique human existence (Heidegger, 
1927/1962). 
5.4. Authentic Existence 
It is Heidegger’s view that Dasein exists authentically, inauthentically or in a mode of 
undifferentiatedness (Heidegger, 1927/1962). The meanings of authenticity and 
inauthenticity from this philosophical perspective are not to be confused with the common 
understanding of these terms such as being real or being false. Nor are they to be confused 
with humanistic views on authenticity as demonstrated by being genuine (Rogers, 1951). 
Initially Heidegger suggests that he places no evaluative content on being either authentic or 
inauthentic, outlining that they are simply different modes of existence (Carman, 2007).  
The authentic mode of existence is one in which Dasein is an autonomous entity. Authentic 
Dasein has the ability-to-be-oneself and to take a first person standpoint in relation to its 
existence.  
Authentic modes of existence, in the strictly formal sense, are those in which 
Dasein stands in a directly first-person relation to itself, in contrast to the 
second and third person relations in which it stands to others, and which it 
can adopt with respect to itself, at least up to a point.  
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This sense of authenticity says nothing about what is better or worse for 
Dasein, but merely marks a distinction between one’s immediate relation to 
oneself and one’s immediate relations to others or to oneself as another 
(Carman, 2007:285). 
The mode of authentic existence, taking a first person stand point on one’s own life is 
constituted by “mineness” or “owndom” (Heidegger, 1927/1962), when Dasein owns up to 
itself in its existence then it exists authentically. Understanding of Dasein’s existence and the 
manner in which it comports itself is authentic when it takes a first person perspective on 
itself.  Authentic Dasein has a unique relation to itself and when it listens to its own inner 
voice it can experience self-fulfilment (Carman, 2007).  
Having suggested that he places no evaluation on being authentic or inauthentic, Heidegger 
appears to contradict himself, later, when he postulates that it is good or better to be in the 
authentic mode of existence. From this revised perspective Heidegger suggests that it is a 
desirable and worthy choice to be in the authentic mode of existence because, when Dasein 
exists authentically, it is “forerunning” into death as it embraces the ‘fragile’ possibilities of 
life (Carmen, 2007:291). 
Furthermore authentic Dasein has “resoluteness”. It is resolute when it is decisive and lives 
with resolve in the manner in which it directly confronts each particular situation that it 
encounters in the world.  
Resoluteness, as authentic being-one’s self, does not detach Dasein from its 
world, nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a free-floating “I”. And how 
should it, when resoluteness as authentic disclosedness, is authentically 
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nothing else than being-in-the-world? Resoluteness brings the self, right into 
its current concernful being-alongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it 
into solicitious being with others (Heidegger, 1927/1962:298). 
For Heidegger, then the full conceptualisation of authenticity is “forerunning resoluteness” 
as both forerunning and resoluteness focus on finitude and the particular (Carman, 2007). So, 
authentic Dasein constantly faces up to its mortality, in the resolute manner, in which it 
confronts the specific situations that it encounters throughout its limited existence of being-
in-the-world. 
5.4.1. Inauthentic Existence 
According to Heidegger (1927/1962) the second mode of being in which Dasein exists is 
inauthenticity. In this mode of being, its comportment and understanding is influenced by the 
third person perspective, by the “They”. In this mode Dasein does what “They” prescribe. 
Dasein becomes lost in the everydayness of existing among Others and things in the world 
(Carman, 2007).   
While Heidegger initially suggests that inauthenticity is not a negative mode of existence and 
indeed, initially, indicates that it is something positive that belongs to Dasein, he goes on to 
describe inauthenticity as existential disorientation or estrangement (Heidegger, 
1927/1962).This shift in perspective suggests that inauthenticity is a worse or less desirable 
mode of being than being authentic. Latterly Heidegger postulates that inauthentic Dasein is 
alienated from itself when its existence is pervaded by the third person point of view. In the 
inauthentic mode Dasein has mainly lost its “owndom” its “mineness”. In inauthenticity 
Dasein is not itself, it is “non-whole” (Heidegger, 1927/1962). As such, Dasein in inauthentic 
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existence avoids, forgets or disregards the reality of its own mortality (Hoffman, 2007). It 
gets absorbed and lost in everydayness (Heidegger, 1927/1962). It loses the sense of finitude, 
of fore-running into death. The being-with Others is privileged at the expense of the loss of 
self. However this later perspective of Heidegger on inauthenticity contradicts his notion of 
“being-with” which is constitutive of the social aspect of existence (Carman, 2007). 
5.4.2. Undifferentiatedness  
Heidegger then postulates that there is a third mode of being known as “undifferentiatedness” 
This is an indifferent mode of being, a neutral form of existence, which Heidegger suggests is 
neither good nor bad. It is not particularly authentic or inauthentic but constitutes Dasein in 
its average everydayness. In this mode of existence Dasein’s self-concept is “modally 
undifferentiated” which is to say that it is a combination of first, second and third person 
points of view. It is considered to be a positive condition which provides Dasein with the 
coping skills to manage social existence. Again, Heidegger refines this notion of everyday, 
undifferentiated existence, as a mode of being in which Dasein is not itself, it is not its 
authentic self. In this mode Dasein is referred to as “oneself” (Heidegger, 1927/1962). 
The modal indifference of the one must instead be understood as an 
undifferentiated conglomeration of first, second and third person points of 
view, which are in fact distinct, but which are ordinarily fused together in an 
unprincipled and even partly incoherent way as if constituting a single 
unified concept of the self (Carman, 2007:295). 
Everyday Dasein, then, is influenced by the predominant norms of the social world in which 
it lives. As there is a loss of “mineness” or “owndom”, Dasein has a perfunctory 
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understanding of self in this indifferent mode of being. Critics of Heidegger’s demarcations 
of authenticity suggest that there is some blurring of distinction between the undifferentiated 
mode of being and the inauthentic mode of being. They suggest that this was not fully cleared 
up by the time that Heidegger (1927/1962) finished writing Being and Time (Carman, 2007). 
However, Heidegger places emphasis on the mode of undifferentiatedness, in which Dasein 
exists in its average everydayness, as he states that it is the starting point for the analytic of 
human existence. He suggests that all of human existence flows back and forth from this 
mode of being (Heidegger, 1927/1962). The hermeneutic phenomenological researcher 
begins by exploring this average everydayness and that which is taken for granted in the 
everyday experience of ‘being’ (Smythe, 2011). This study sought to uncover glimpses of the  
undifferentiated, inauthentic and authentic modes of being; to understand what it is actually 
like to exist in the world of psychotherapeutic supervision; to uncover the meaning of being a 
psychotherapeutic supervisor. 
5.5. Uncovering the Meaning of Being 
From the Heideggerian perspective, uncovering the meaning of being is bound up with the 
phenomenon of truth (Heidegger, 1927/1962). According to Dreyfus and Wrathall (2007), 
Heidegger had an enduring preoccupation with truth, throughout his philosophical writings 
and lectures. They are of the view that Heidegger builds on and expands the epistemological 
position or the traditional conception of truth on what constitutes truth as he formulates and 
articulates his ontological position. In the traditional conception of truth it is postulated that 
the locus of truth is assertion. In this conceptualisation, when a judgement is made about 
something and there is agreement about the assertion, then the essence of truth has been 
found (Dreyfus and Wrathall, 2007). However, the cornerstone of Heidegger’s treatise on 
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truth is his argument that truth has not been examined from an ontological position in over 
2000years of philosophical thinking. Dreyfus and Wrathall (2007) suggest that Heidegger’s 
philosophy about truth has evolved and changed overtime. They state that Heidegger, 
initially, acknowledged the tenets of the traditional conception of truth but, latterly, emerged 
with an ontological position on ‘being-true’ wherein he ultimately determined truth as 
uncovering (Heidegger, 1927/1962:221). He contends that:  
‘‘Being-true’ (truth) means being-uncovering. Taking entities out of their 
hiddenness and letting them be seen in their unhiddeness (uncoveredness). 
The phenomenon of truth, in the sense of uncoveredness (unhiddenness) 
(Heidegger, 1927/1962: 219). 
So, for Heidegger, ‘being-true’ is phenomenological and truth is only possible from the 
ontological philosophical stance of Dasein being-in-the-world. Heidegger postulates that 
‘being-true’ is a fundamental aspect of Dasein and as such ‘being-true’ as uncovering is a 
way of being for Dasein (Heidegger, 1927/1960; 220). In essence ‘being-true’ is uncovering 
that which has been concealed from Dasein (Schmidt, 2006:78). Yet, Dasein is equally in 
truth and in untruth (Heidegger, 1927/1960; 222). 
Heidegger does not make an evaluation of ‘being-true’ or ‘being-untrue’ as being either 
positive or negative modes of being.  However, ‘being-true’ is a facet of being-authentic 
while ‘being-untrue’ is associated with the notion of ‘falling’ or living inauthentically. As 
such making a decision to live authentically enables Dasein to ‘wrestle’ the truth from 
entities (Heidegger, 1927/1960:220). Dasein’s ‘falling’ has prevented it from understanding 
entities in the world, authentically (Heidegger, 1927/1960; 200). According to Heidegger, 
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when understanding is based on realism, there is a lack of understanding of the meaning of 
being which will not be answered by epistemology. Therefore, an existential analytic is 
necessary in order to authentically understand the meaning of being of entities- in- the- world 
(Heidegger, 1927/1960).  
Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenological philosophical position, therefore, is concerned 
with uncovering how people make sense of their average everyday lived experiences of being 
in the world, their place in that world and the intelligibility required to self-interpret, one’s 
place in the world (Heidegger, 1927/ 1962). This study aspires to uncover, what is the 
meaning of being a psychotherapeutic supervisor and draws on Heidegger’s ontological 
position of being-true as being-uncovering (Heidegger, 1927/1960:220) in order to achieve 
this aspiration.  
5.6.  Techne – The ‘know how’ of hermeneutic phenomenological research 
According to Conroy (2003) there has been confusion in many research studies as to whether 
they have been guided by transcendental or hermeneutic phenomenological positions. In 
order to remain true to the hermeneutic phenomenological position in this study, I have 
critically reviewed the literature on approaches that have guided hermeneutic 
phenomenological research inquiries. There are mixed views about how to carry out such a 
study. For example, Conroy (2003) states, that there is limited guidance in the literature on 
implementing a hermeneutically focussed study.  In contrast Smythe et al., (2008) state that; 
Many authors have written about the epistemology of Heideggerian 
hermeneutic research. Early researchers revealed the ‘how’ of methodology 
and method and others eagerly engaged in such research. Techne (know 
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how) from the wider qualitative domain informed questions of rigour, which 
was later renamed trustworthiness. There was a sense that there was a 
method to follow (Smythe et al., 2008: 1390). 
The approach that I have taken to this research has been influenced by the work of van 
Manen (1990), Schmidt (2006), Smythe et al., (2008) and also by Vandermause (2011). 
These hermeneutic phenomenologists draw on the work of Heidegger (1889-1976) and to an 
extent on Gadamer (1900-2002) in the approaches that they take to hermeneutic research. 
The techne or ‘know how’ of hermeneutic phenomenological research does not follow a fixed 
set of guidelines but is ‘always in motion, never linear and always going back and forth’ 
(Smythe, 2011:52).  
In the case of this research the circular process or method of hermeneutic phenomenological 
research started with identifying the phenomenological experience that I wanted to 
investigate and formulating the research question and aims of the study. This led me on a 
circular journey of reviewing literature and research on the subject of psychotherapeutic 
supervision. Smythe (2011) advocates that it is essential to stay focussed on the phenomena. 
So I became absorbed in the literature which was an invigorating experience but it was also 
somewhat overwhelming to be faced with a plethora of competing descriptions and 
arguments about the topic.  
I regularly had to pull myself back to reflect on and re-focus on the experience and meaning 
of being a psychotherapeutic supervisor. At the same time, it is vital that the researcher get to 
grips with Heideggerian philosophy with respect to hermeneutic phenomenology (Conroy 
2003). This proved to be a frustrating and challenging encounter. As I grappled with 
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commentaries and articles which were designed to illuminate Heidegger’s  ‘Being and Time’ 
(1927/1962) and delved directly into the dark corners of  this seminal text, I came to realise 
that Heidegger’s way of communicating his philosophy is convoluted yet elegant, dense with 
glimpses of  illumination, contradictory yet penetrating. From this experience I realised that I 
needed to be able to tolerate not knowing, to exist in the absence of techne and to tolerate 
being confused for significant periods of time. I had to wait for understanding and insight to 
slowly emerge. ‘Being and Time’ (1927/1962) has been a constant companion throughout the 
research process. As phenomenological experiences, interpretations and patterns of meaning 
have emerged from the data I read and re-read aspects of Heidegger’s treatise so that 
philosophical notions that resonate (Smythe, 2011) could be integrated into findings and 
discussion chapters. However, committing to the Heideggerian approach to hermeneutic 
phenomenology caused me to go through a period of soul searching as I was very troubled by 
his connection to Nazism. I have endeavoured to stand back and review his major 
contributions to hermeneutic phenomenological philosophy in a bid to detect fascist 
influences in his writings which, to date, I have not observed.   
Smythe et al., suggest that in hermeneutic style research there is a balance to be achieved 
between ‘structure and freedom’. When this positive tension is maintained there is sufficient 
‘space’ to ‘play, respond and think’ (Smythe et al., 2008: 1391). The approach that I have 
adopted to this research study enables a sense of ‘freedom’ while being a researcher, such as 
freedom to spend time in  multiple cycles of reading, thinking and writing; freedom to be 
immersed in the participants’ lived experience of the phenomena; freedom to be curious 
and/or confused about emerging understandings; freedom to reside in the unknown territory 
of phenomena;  freedom to think and rethink interpretations of participant’s unique lived 
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experiences; freedom to wait for patterns of meaning to emerge (Vandermause, 2011)  and 
freedom to articulate the meaning of the phenomena (Smythe, 2011). In turn, these freedoms 
are balanced out with the academic structure required to complete PhD level study and being 
able to craft the findings and discussions into a coherent whole, which reflects the sum of the 
parts of the study. 
5.7.  Borrowing Participants’ Experience 
Hermeneutic phenomenology as a research method is rooted in the need to;  
‘Borrow people’s lived experiences so that the researcher can better 
understand the meaning or the significance of the event’ (McConnell-Henry 
et al., 2009). 
This requires a reasonably homogenous group of respondents, in order to capture the nuances 
of the experience being researched (Langdridge, 2007).  In order for  a research study to be 
evocative and provide a rich source of data, the selected participants must have ‘stories’ to 
tell, about the phenomenological experiences that they have in common (Smythe, 2008). 
According to Smith (2007) the size of the sample depends on a number of issues, including 
the quality or thickness of the data collected, the depth of analysis and the boundaries or 
limitations of the study. It should also allow for the emergence of convergences and 
divergences between the experiences of the participants in the study. In order to find a 
homogenous group, the following inclusion criteria for participants were developed: 
 Female and male psychotherapeutic supervisors 
 A minimum of 3 years of experience as a psychotherapeutic supervisor  
 Trained as a psychotherapeutic supervisor in Ireland or the United Kingdom 
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 Currently providing individual, shared or group psychotherapeutic supervision to pre-
accredited and accredited counsellors or psychotherapists 
These inclusion criteria were designed to ensure that the selected participants, in this study 
were experienced psychotherapy supervisors who worked with a broad spectrum of 
supervisees, from trainee practitioners to highly experienced counsellors/ psychotherapists 
and were trained in broadly similar cultural and statutory contexts. These inclusion criteria 
were designed to provide a homogenous group of participants whose lived experience stories 
would assist in illuminating stories, distinctive accounts of the meaning of being a 
psychotherapeutic supervisor.  
 
Participants were identified and purposefully selected and recruited through a range of 
sources in Ireland and the United Kingdom, including the Health Service Executive, statutory 
agencies, and non-governmental organisations as well as counselling and psychotherapy 
training organisations. Purposive sampling is a strategy used in qualitative and hermeneutic 
phenomenological research and the rationale behind this strategy is to;   
 
Purposefully select participants or sites that will best help the researcher 
understand the problem and the research question (Cresswell, 2003: 185).  
 
These types of organisations were selected for participation in this research as they met key 
aspects of purposive sampling in that they provided the appropriate setting for the research; 
they employed the target group of participants; they had experienced psychotherapeutic 
supervisors who met the criteria to be interviewed and who would share a ‘common 
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language’ and be ‘skilled in capturing the description and mood’ of their experiences (Miles 
and Huberman, 1994; Smythe, 2011:41). 
 
I contacted, in writing, chief executives, clinical managers and project leaders in the above 
organisations, for the purpose of seeking permission to circulate research information sheets 
to psychotherapeutic supervisors. Once permission had been received I sent out an 
information sheet with the inclusion criteria, to psychotherapeutic supervisors inviting them 
to participate in the study.  When they registered interest in taking part in the study, I 
forwarded a confirmation letter, a plain language statement and an informed consent form. 
Thereafter I contacted the participants by telephone to arrange a mutually suitable time and 
confidential venue to carryout individual interviews. As advocated by Conroy (2003) I 
ensured that the aims, objectives and hermeneutic phenomenological nature of the research 
project were made explicit to participants. 
 
A total of 14 participants were interviewed during the first round of interviews in the period 
September 2008 and April 2009. An overview of the participants’ psychotherapeutic 
supervision profiles is presented in the Table 1, below. Table 1 includes the participant 
identification number, allotted pseudonym, age at the time of the interview plus information 
on their experience as supervisors and the contexts for their practice.  
Table 1 is arranged in chronological order in terms of when the participants were interviewed 
across the island of Ireland. At the time of the interviews all of the participants provided 
psychotherapeutic supervision in an organisational context or contexts. Also, all of the 
participants had private supervision practices.  
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TABLE (1) 
 
Participant 
Number 
Pseudonym 
(Age) 
Participants’ Psychotherapeutic Supervision Profiles 
1 
 
Anne  
(49)  
Anne had 4 years supervision experience in Northern 
Ireland. She primarily provided individual and group 
supervision in the not-for-profit sector and had a small 
private supervision practice. 
2 
 
Lily 
(60) 
Lily had 10 years supervision experience in Northern 
Ireland. She provided individual and shared supervision in 
the not-for profit, statutory and education sectors. She also 
had a private practice.  
3 
 
Liz 
(59) 
Liz had 7 years supervision experience in Northern Ireland. 
She provided individual, shared and group supervision in 
the not-for profit and education sectors. She also had a 
private practice.  
4 
 
Pat 
(49) 
Pat had 5years supervision experience in Northern Ireland. 
She provided individual, and group supervision in the not-
for-profit and statutory sectors. She also had a private 
practice.  
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5 Mary 
(53) 
Mary had 3 years supervision experience in the Republic 
of Ireland. She provided individual, shared and group 
supervision in the not-for profit sector and had a private 
practice. 
6  Claire 
(63) 
Claire had 7years supervision experience in the Republic 
of Ireland. She provided individual, shared and group 
supervision in the not-for profit sector and had a private 
practice.  
7 Dorothy 
(67) 
Dorothy had 10years supervision experience in Northern 
Ireland. She provided individual supervision in the not-for 
profit sector and had a private practice.  
8 Jane 
(67) 
Jane had 19years supervision experience in Northern 
Ireland. She provided individual and group supervision in 
the not-for-profit and statutory sectors. She also had a 
private practice.  
9 Alice 
(59)  
Alice had 11years supervision experience in the Republic 
of Ireland. She provided individual, shared and group 
supervision in the not-for profit and statutory sectors. She 
also had a private practice. 
10 Nora 
(57) 
Nora had 3years supervision experience in the Republic of 
Ireland. She provided individual and group supervision in 
the not-for profit and statutory sectors. She also had a 
private practice. 
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11 Eilish 
(47) 
Eilish had 6years supervision experience in the Republic of 
Ireland. She provided individual and group supervision in 
the statutory sector and had a private practice. 
12 Sharon 
(50) 
Sharon had 20years supervision experience in the Republic 
of Ireland. She provided individual, shared and group 
supervision in the statutory and education sectors. She also 
had a private practice.  
13 Sheila 
(50) 
Sheila had 10years supervision experience in the Republic 
of Ireland. She provided individual and group supervision 
in the education sector and had a private practice. 
14 Sinead 
(42) 
Sinead had 8years supervision experience in the Republic 
of Ireland. She provided individual, shared and group 
supervision in the statutory and education sectors. She also 
had a private practice. 
 
In summary, the profile of the participants included supervisors with an age range of between 
42years and 67years. Participants had been practicing as psychotherapeutic supervisors 
between 3years and 20 years. All of the participants were female. Six of the participants 
practiced in Northern Ireland while 8 of the participants practiced in the Republic of Ireland. 
Subsequently a further round of interviews, were carried out with eight of the participants. 
Anne, Pat, Dorothy and Jane from Northern Ireland agreed to participate in second 
interviews. A further 2 participants from Northern Ireland declined the offer to participate in 
subsequent interviews. Additionally Claire, Sinead, Alice and Eilish from the Republic of 
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Ireland were willing to undertake second interviews. An even spread of participants in terms 
of age, psychotherapeutic supervision experience, work contexts and geographical contexts 
were included in the second round of interviews. All of the participants met the inclusion 
criteria, at the time of the first and second round of interviews and provided 
psychotherapeutic supervision in one or more of the targeted organisational contexts. Also, 
all of the participants had private supervision practices. As such, the participants represent a 
wide age spectrum and an extensive breadth of experience. While the participants are fairly 
evenly balanced in terms of working in either Northern Ireland or the Republic of Ireland, all 
of the participants who offered to take part in the research were female. Despite efforts to 
recruit male participants, by re-contacting organisations, with a welcome message for male 
participants, there was no interest registered by men to take part in this study. The lack of 
male participants is not all together surprising, as all of the organisations who responded to 
the invitation to participate in this study, have a workforce of psychotherapeutic supervisors 
who are predominantly female. Interestingly, in common with the participating organisations, 
the recent report (2010) from the Central Statistics Office highlights that the majority of 
workers in the health and education services in Ireland are female.  
The method used for identifying and borrowing participants average everyday experiences of 
being a psychotherapeutic supervisor was individual semi-structured interviews (McConnell-
Henry, 2009). Semi-structured interviews are commonly used in qualitative and hermeneutic 
phenomenological research studies (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2008).  After preliminary social 
interactions, the aims and objectives of the study as well as the nature of hermeneutic 
phenomenological research were discussed (Conroy, 2003). Participants had the opportunity 
to ask questions about any aspect of taking part in this study. Thereafter consent forms were 
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signed and returned to me and these indicated agreement to participate in the research study 
and for the interview to be audio taped. Participants’ confidentiality and anonymity were 
ensured by carrying out interviews in a mutually agreed suitable environment. 
 
A flexible and open approach was taken towards the collection of data. A series of open-
ended questions were arranged into an interview guide however these did not dictate the 
entire progress of the interviews (Appendix 1).  The interview guide was formulated after I 
had reviewed the literature on semi-structured interviews in qualitative research design 
(Kvale and Brinkmann, 2008: Cresswell 2003). The specific questions were developed to 
meet the aim and objectives of the research and to focus on uncovering the day to day lived 
experience of being a psychotherapeutic supervisor. For example I initially asked the 
participants to describe their experience of being a supervisor and what it meant both 
professionally and personally to be a supervisor. I enquired if they had similar or different 
experiences in individual, shared or group supervision and if their experience had changed 
over time. According to Kvale and Brinkmann (2008); 
 
The very production of data in qualitative interview goes beyond a 
mechanical following of rules and rests upon the skills and situated personal 
judgement in the posing of questions…The quality of the data produced in a 
qualitative interview depends on the quality of the interview skills and subject 
matter knowledge (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2008:82).  
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While I had prior training in interviewing techniques and a sound knowledge base on the 
topic, I decided to invite the first three participants to give feedback on the types of questions 
asked, the interview style and the process of the interview, after their interviews were 
completed. This feedback was discussed with research supervisors and appropriate 
adjustments were made to the interview guide, so that the questions helped to keep the 
participants and I focussed on the lived experience of being a psychotherapeutic supervisor.  
This was important as some of the participants drifted into talking about how they practiced 
and wanted to describe supervision theory or practical strategies and at times, I got caught up 
in this level of discussion. In line with Plager (1994) I strove to encourage the active 
participation of research participants in interpreting their experiences of being 
psychotherapeutic supervisors during the interview process. This was achieved by clarifying 
participant’s responses and by actively inviting them to consider the meaning of their 
experiences, both professionally and personally. While the feedback from the pilot interviews 
was generally very positive, there were some comments about the timing and pacing of 
interviews and suggestions were made about allowing the participants more time to reflect on 
questions, as they were not used to having in-depth discussions about their lived experience. 
Some of the interviewees suggested that it took them some time to understand that I wanted 
them to describe their day to day lived experience and to try to interpret the personal and 
professional meaning of such experience. This was very useful feedback, as it helped to 
ground me and later participants in the hermeneutic phenomenological focus of the research.  
 
Through further reading (Smythe et al., 2008) on approaches to hermeneutic 
phenomenological research and by subjecting my interviewing style and transcripts to 
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critique by experts in the field and my research supervisors, further adjustments were made to 
the approach to interviewing (Appendix 2) so that more explicit ‘stories’ of the experience of 
being a psychotherapeutic supervisor would emerge.  
 
‘To draw a participant into conversation is to encourage them to bring words 
to shape, colour and texture the account of what happened. To stay close to 
the experience itself, is to recount the story itself. Questions therefore need to 
prompt such telling. Useful prompts are: Tell me about the last time? Tell me 
about a time that went well? Tell me about a challenging time?’ (Smythe, 
2011:42). 
 
Shifting the emphasis of interviews to inviting participants to talk about their experiences in 
specific and recent psychotherapeutic supervision sessions resulted in participants vividly 
recounting many evocative stories. Many of these stories demonstrated affirming, positive 
experiences, while a significant number of stories reflected on anxiety provoking and 
negative experiences. This focus on uncovering, specific actual lived experiences of being in 
the life-world of psychotherapeutic supervision, is an important aspect of hermeneutic 
phenomenological researching, as in doing so, the phenomenon ‘shows itself from within 
itself’(Heidegger, 1927/1962). 
 
According to Conroy (2003) it is important to respect the value of each participant’s 
experience during the hermeneutic phenomenological interview. This stance stood me in 
good stead as participant’s generally responded well to my respectful approach and curious 
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questioning. At times, my own pre-suppositions and assumptions did interfere with 
uncovering and initially understanding participants experiences. For instance, when a 
participant talked about how she handled a very challenging situation with a supervisee, I 
found myself thinking about how I might have dealt with this based on my own supervision 
training and experience. During the interview, I realised that this was distracting me from 
listening to and appreciating the participant’s actual experience and we revisited this during 
the interview.  
By bringing my attention and focus back to the participant’s story and by engaging in a 
circular process of listening, clarifying, and interpreting, a shared understanding or a ‘fusion 
of horizons’ (Gadamer 1975) slowly emerged about the meaning that she attached to this 
troubling experience. In this circumstance, the benefits of having undertaken a pre-
understanding interview became apparent as this helped to check my own ‘fore-structure of 
understanding’ during interviews and latterly to be aware of these, when I was soaking, 
dwelling in the data (Heidegger 1927/1962).  
All of the interviews were audio-taped. The data was transcribed within 2 weeks of the 
interviews taking place. The transcribed data was stored on the researcher’s computer, which 
was password protected. Audio tapes have been locked in a confidential filing cabinet. The 
raw transcribed data has been made available to the principle and co-supervisors. 
 
It has been advocated by (Smythe, 2011) that doctoral level research could include between 
12-20 participants for a hermeneutic phenomenological study. However, the overall number 
of interviews is also determined by the quality of the data in terms of how much of the 
participants lived experience it uncovers, the patterns, interpretations and  meanings 
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emerging from the data and the common human experiences  illuminated in participants 
stories (Vandermause, 2011;Smythe, 2011). Overall, 22 interviews have been undertaken 
over the 2 rounds of interviewing. Individual interviews lasted between 40 and 75 minutes 
with the majority of interviews taking approximately one hour.   According to Smythe (2011)  
 
‘One reaches a state of ‘knowing’ that one more interview will be too many. 
Already the insights are emerging like a river of thought. To keep pouring in 
more runs the risk of overflowing the banks which somehow hold the thoughts 
in a coherent whole’ (Smythe, 2011:41). 
 
This certainly resonates with my own experience. By the time I had completed the second 
round of interviews there was a wealth of evocative stories and a real sense of emerging 
phenomenological patterns (Vandermause, 2011) of the experience and meaning of being a 
psychotherapeutic supervisor and that this phenomenological experience manifested itself in 
similar yet different ways for participants. 
5.8. Being Immersed in the Data 
From a Heideggerian hermeneutic phenomenological perspective the researcher engages in 
data analysis in order to ‘uncover’ truth (Heidegger, 1927/1962). Heidegger considers truth to 
be a phenomenon. In seeking truth the research strives to move beyond the taken-for-granted 
aspects of lived experiences. Hermeneutic phenomenological research seeks to illuminate or 
disclose hidden and unknown aspects of being human (Dreyfus and Wrathall, 2007). In 
accordance, Vandermause (2011) states; 
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This approach is valuable when the intention is to see deeply into a 
phenomenon that is complex and puzzling and when questions of meaning are 
entertained. (Vandermause, 2011:8) 
In order to gain an in-depth understanding of the meaning of phenomenological experiences, 
when seeking to uncover truth, the hermeneutic phenomenological researcher becomes 
‘immersed’ in the data (Benner, 1994). Being immersed in the data has previously been 
referred to as ‘dwelling’ in the data (Heidegger, 1927/1962; Smythe et al., 2008). 
Collectively, these metaphors amount to being absorbed in the data, existing in the world of 
the data for significant periods of time, while the researcher lingers with and ponders 
emerging phenomena. Data analysis from the hermeneutic phenomenological perspective is a 
measured and slow process. As insights and understandings emerge about the participant’s 
lived experience the hermeneutics of this phenomenological research perspective, come into 
to play. This approach to data analysis moves beyond pure description of phenomena (Todres 
& Wheeler: 2001). The researcher engages in multiple cycles of thinking and interpretation in 
order to uncover hidden aspects of the phenomena and draws upon hermeneutic 
phenomenological philosophical ideas that ‘resonate’ with those understandings that emerge 
from the data (Smythe, 2011). Such data analysis is discovery orientated (Van Manen, 1990). 
The hermeneutic phenomenological researcher is curiously open to uncovering, interpreting 
and making sense of complex phenomena (Vandermause, 2011:8).   
Making sense of the data is an intricate process. Phenomenologically, there are differing 
positions on the techne of data analysis. According to Langdridge (2007) data analysis from a 
phenomenological perspective involves carrying out a rigorous in-depth thematic analysis. 
This approach to data analysis tends to result in descriptive accounts of participant’s 
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experience. Indeed, my preliminary attempts to analyse data had the flavour of rich 
descriptive representations of day to day lived experience. Significant themes emerged and 
these were supported with appropriate excerpts from transcripts. However, from a 
hermeneutic phenomenological perspective developing themes from the data does not 
amount to simply reducing the participants’ narratives into tidy categories or providing 
repetitive evidence to justify specific themes (Smythe et al., 2008).  
In our experience, the theme itself is not the ‘finding’ stripped out of the data, 
but a way to show what we ‘see’ or ‘hear’ in a text (from a participant) 
signalling the reader of the region in which further discussion and thinking 
will occur. The ah-ha of our research is not the theme in and of itself but the 
understanding that is evoked by the thinking and re-thinking the experiences 
participants share always keeping new understanding in play and offering 
them to readers to further explore  (Smythe et al., 2008; 1392). 
From the perspective of hermeneutic phenomenological analysis the goal is to privilege the 
participants’ lived experience and to maintain a constantly questioning and curious stance in 
order to identify misunderstandings or partial understandings and ultimately to gain deeper 
understandings of the phenomena (Benner, 1994). In this way the hermeneutic 
phenomenological researcher strives to move beyond describing the phenomenon in order to 
disclose the meaning that participants make of their unique experiences (Heidegger, 
1927/1962). 
There came a point in the process of analysing data when I realised that my initial findings 
lacked a hermeneutic phenomenological quality, as they were rich, descriptive thematic 
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accounts, of participants lived experiences. So I took a step back from analysing data and 
immersed myself in reading Heideggerian philosophical texts, original sources and 
commentaries. I attended hermeneutic phenomenological workshops to develop my 
understanding about interpreting lived experiences.  
This was beneficial in my journey to becoming a hermeneutic phenomenological researcher. 
It became clearer that the hermeneutic phenomenological researcher strives to recognise 
her/his pre-suppositions and assumptions about the phenomenon and the potential influence 
these have on the identification and interpretation of human experiencing (Todres and 
Wheeler, 2001). My pre-understandings about qualitative research and my previous 
experience of phenomenological methodologies and thematic analysis methods were 
influencing my engagement with and presentation of the data.  
It has been postulated by hermeneutic phenomenologists that the researcher’s pre-
suppositions, assumptions, expert knowledge, interpretations and re-interpretations create a 
dynamic rigorous phenomenological analytical process (Packer and Addison, 1989b). 
Therefore I decided it would be appropriate to undertake a pre-understanding interview in the 
hermeneutic phenomenological style with one of my supervisors before continuing with data 
analysis.  As previously indicated this was an illuminating experience. The combination of 
developing understanding about hermeneutic phenomenology, subjecting my data analysis to 
critique by hermeneutic phenomenologists and the experience and insights gained through the 
pre-understanding interview resulted in a shift in the manner in which I carried out data 
analysis.  
158 
 
The first set of interviews was revisited. Smythe (2011) advocates ‘plucking’ aspects of text 
across a transcript in order to craft coherent and evocative stories. This led to another round 
of immersion in the voice recording and transcript of each individual interview. Standout 
stories presented themselves over several pages of text as I followed the thread of 
participants’ experiences of being with their supervisees. Vandermause (2011) suggests that 
preliminary ‘patterns of ideas’ should be created and that all transcripts should be reviewed 
while considering these patterns. In my study this led to the identification of several 
significant patterns including the experience of being responsible and the experience of being 
anxious.  
The second round of interviews built on the common human experiences that had emerged 
from the first round of interviews. In this subsequent round of interviews I enabled 
participants to tell stories about their experiences in specific supervisory contexts by asking 
them to reflect on, for example, the last supervision session they had or a positive supervision 
session or a challenging supervision session (Smythe, 2011). I was trying to elicit ‘situations 
that standout’ (Vandermause, 2011), experiences that were meaningful for participants. This 
involved listening, reflecting and regularly clarifying with the participants the meaning they 
attributed to the phenomena and the interpretations they made of them. At times, I offered my 
understandings or interpretations back to the participants and encouraged them to contradict 
or confirm these. In this way I was seeking ‘a fusion of horizons’ (Gadamer, 1975), 
uncovering the sense that participant’s make of their experiences and wondering what sense 
these make in the context of my own fore-structure of understanding.  
The horizon is the background of various assumptions, ideas, meanings and 
experiences which are fluid and open to change. Understanding and getting 
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to know others is based on a personal horizon of experience and meanings; 
thus the art of interpretation is always bounded by the separate intersecting 
horizons of researchers and participants (Geanellos, 2000:114). 
The data analysis phase proceeded by listening to the audio-taped sessions of each interview 
on several occasions in order to get a deeper understanding of the participants’ stories, the 
context for their narratives, the manner in which they expressed their experiences and the 
sense that they made of these. Subsequent interview questions were influenced by emerging 
common human experiences such as being responsible or being anxious. In a bid to 
understand the big picture, I read the transcripts of each interview many times and further 
notes were made on emerging and evolving understandings. Detailed comments were made 
on transcripts highlighting key sections which appeared to be representative of standout 
experiences. These were then ‘plucked’ and crafted into stories which strove to be true to the 
story teller’s experience (Smythe, 2011). In this way participant’s day to day lived 
experiences came alive.  
The data was reviewed, interpreted, re-thought and re-written on several occasions, keeping 
in mind the meanings that participants were attributing to being psychotherapeutic 
supervisors, while also striving to be cognisant of my own pre-suppositions, experience and 
knowledge about being a psychotherapeutic supervisor.  I have endeavoured to be aware of 
my own perspectives through reflective journaling, active use of research supervision as well 
as carrying out a rigorous pre-understanding interview. Additionally, I have opened up the 
interpretation of the data beyond the co-constituted meanings that emerged between the 
participants and myself, into a hermeneutic spiral (Conroy, 2003) by discussing my 
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preliminary meaning-making and interpretations with informed others, which have included 
hermeneutic phenomenologists and my research supervisors.  
The hermeneutic spiral represents the spiralling process of interpretation 
where the interpretations of a group of people build on each other’s 
understandings over a period of time. …this allows the research process to 
grow and include interpretation by others rather than just the researcher and 
study participants (Conroy, 2003:39).  
In accordance with Conroy (2003), it is also advocated by Vandermause (2011) that the 
‘emerging pattern of ideas’ and interpretations are, when possible, discussed with a research 
team. The oral and written feedbacks received through this process challenged me to avoid 
developing premature understandings or perpetuating misunderstandings and have 
encouraged me to reconsider initial interpretations that have not resonated with the meaning 
they have made of the textual data.  These invitations and challenges led to further rounds of 
listening, reading, thinking, dialoguing, interpreting and writing in a bid to remain open to the 
possibility of new and deeper levels of understanding. However these thinking and 
interpretive processes are only a part of the data analysis process  as the researcher is also 
encouraged to draw upon hermeneutic phenomenological philosophical texts to stretch and 
inform interpretations, to open up further avenues of  understanding and to uncover 
unforeseen meanings. So immersion in the data goes hand in hand with reading and reflection 
as the researcher waits for emerging patterns from the data to resonate with Heideggerian and 
other philosophical notions (Smythe, 2011; Vandermause, 2011).  In this study I have 
gathered together stories which represent similar yet different common human experiences. 
Stories have been interpreted in a bid to uncover new understandings and unspoken meanings 
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about the experience of being a psychotherapeutic supervisor. The interpretations have been 
considered in the light of Heideggerian philosophical perspectives which make sense in the 
context of these human experiences. This circular, revolving hermeneutic phenomenological 
research process has enabled a reformed understanding of the meaning of being a 
psychotherapeutic supervisor.  
5.9. Being-Ethical 
Being-ethical was at the fore-front of my mind in embarking on this research project. The 
main priorities were the maintenance of confidentiality and anticipating the potential 
consequences or impact of the research on participants (Kvale and Brinkmann 2008). Before 
commencing this research endeavour, the research proposal was submitted to the Research 
Ethics Committee at Dublin City University for ethical approval. It was anticipated that there 
was limited potential risk within this research project, as supervisors were being invited to 
voluntarily discuss the experience of being a psychotherapeutic supervisor, in a confidential 
fashion. However, there is an ethical dilemma about promising absolute confidentiality 
(Kvale and Brinkmann 2008).  For example, a potential risk was that participants might 
disclose or allege unethical practice.  
To manage this potential risk, I applied the guidance of my professional accrediting body, the 
United Kingdom Council for Psychotherapy (2008) regarding the limits of confidentiality, 
which defines the ethical duty of practitioners to protect clients from poor clinical practice. In 
order to ensure transparency, I outlined the limits of confidentiality in the Plain Language 
Statement, in the supervisors’ information sheet and the consent form, in relation to any 
allegations or disclosures that might put clients at risk of unethical practice. When it became 
apparent that there was a need to undertake a second round of interviews, further ethical 
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approval was sought and granted from the Research Ethics Committee at Dublin City 
University.  
Regarding potential consequences of the research on participants, there was the possibility 
that supervisors might feel their practice was being exposed in this research and this might 
cause some feelings of discomfort or anxiety. Phenomenological research has the potential to 
open up previously undisclosed aspects of life (Smythe, 2011). The hermeneutic 
phenomenological research process which involves uncovering and interpreting that which is 
taken for granted or hidden, had the potential to be both positive and disturbing for 
participants. To address this, firstly, I was mindful of the ethical principles of beneficence 
and non- malevolence as defined by the United Kingdom Council for Psychotherapy 2008.  I 
sought to ensure that potential risk of harm to participants was minimised by the sensitive 
style and manner in which interviews were carried out. I was very careful not to push or 
coerce participants into disclosures. The information sheet highlighted that participants could 
terminate their participation in the research at any time and this option to withdraw from the 
research was reiterated at the beginning of interviews. Secondly, I am an accredited 
psychotherapist and an accredited psychotherapeutic supervisor and would, if necessary, 
provide immediate interpersonal support.  
Thirdly, in the event of participants being left with discomfort or anxiety, they would be 
encouraged to contact their supervision consultants. Finally, psychotherapeutic supervisors 
were reassured that it would not be possible to identify any particular participants’ experience 
or opinions in the research, as pseudonyms would be used. As it has transpired, all of the 
participants’ actively engaged in the interview process. There was no evidence of emotional 
or psychological distress in any interview. The majority of participants appeared open and 
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honest in the stories that they related about their lived experiences.  Although, one participant 
was very clear about her need to control and limit the duration of the interview which may 
have been due to some uncertainty about what she was prepared to discuss. There were no 
disclosures or allegations of unethical practice. In fact, many of the participants reported that 
their experience of being involved in the research was stimulating and thought-provoking. 
Striving to be ethical as a hermeneutic phenomenological researcher was fundamental to the 
trustworthiness of the project. 
5.10. Being-Trustworthy  
Being-trustworthy is a central aspect of being a hermeneutic phenomenological researcher as 
participants may disclosure aspects of their practice and experience, that they did not 
anticipate (Smythe, 2011). Being-trustworthy means being-respectful of participants’ unique 
experiences inside and outside of the interview room.  
It means honouring and privileging their unique experiences while, as faithfully as possible, 
representing their stories in the hermeneutic process. Being-trustworthy is about acting with 
integrity at each stage of the research process.   
From the perspective of descriptive phenomenology trustworthiness occurs when the 
researcher pays close attention to the phenomena, gains an accurate understanding of it and 
describes it in a manner that is self-evident and recognisable to others (Langdridge 2007). 
However, the matter is more complicated with respect to hermeneutic phenomenological 
research, as this philosophical and methodological approach suggests that researchers move 
beyond pure descriptions of data and engage in a process of interpretation and re-
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interpretation through the hermeneutic circle (Heidegger, 1962) and the hermeneutic spiral 
(Conroy, 2003). Gray (2009), suggests that trustworthiness is rooted in    
…authenticity which relates analysis and interpretation to the meanings and 
experiences that are lived and perceived by subjects of the research. This 
means the researcher being aware of the multiple voices contained within the 
data and the subtle sometimes conflicting realities within it (Gray, 2009:194). 
From a Heideggerian philosophical stance, the trustworthy researcher is ‘being-true’ as 
‘being-uncovering’ of the hidden phenomenon (Heidegger 1927/1962). In this vein, Ironside 
(2005) suggests that trustworthiness is evident in hermeneutic phenomenological research 
when the ideas that emerge from the data resonate with informed others, when they catch the 
attention and ‘hook’ the reader. Similarly, Vandermause (2011) suggests that trustworthiness 
is evident when the interpretations and outcomes of the study ‘ring true’. This suggests that 
the reader is taken on a journey. They move through the description and interpretation of 
participants stories and arrive in a place wherein the findings resonate or make sense for 
them. In essence a phenomenological nod occurs (Smythe, 2011). 
In striving to be-true, the trustworthy researcher bears in mind her/his ‘fore-structure of 
understanding’ (Heidegger, 1927/1962) and is prepared to open up pre-suppositions to the 
scrutiny of others. Keeping a reflective journal has assisted with this. My journal has been 
updated after semi-structured interviews have been completed and has been utilised to 
capture reactions to particular participants as well as intellectual and emotional responses to 
evolving understandings and potential patterns emerging in the data. Writing a reflective 
journal has illuminated many of my assumptions about being a psychotherapeutic supervisor 
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and challenged my expectations of participants as psychotherapeutic supervisors. So for 
example when I was analysing some data in which a participant told a story about her 
concerns regarding a trainee counsellor’s fitness to practice, I remember thinking that her 
response was a bit over the top. That she was over-reacting.  In judging this participant, I was 
not attending to her actual lived experience when being-with this supervisee. Nor was I 
being-uncovering of the hidden meanings that she attributed to being a psychotherapeutic 
supervisor. Having confronted my negative judgments, I latterly re-immersed myself in this 
story and really listened for her unique lived experience.  
As indicated in chapter 2, a significant step in striving to be-true was undertaking a pre-
understanding interview with one of my research supervisors. According to Smythe; 
The purpose of this is to draw forth their own stories so they may be mindful 
of the assumptions and prejudices they carry with them into the study 
(Smythe, 2011:40). 
This interview raised awareness of my subtlety hidden attitudes and firmly held prejudices 
about the nature and techne of psychotherapeutic supervision which could have clouded the 
hearing, description and interpretation of participants’ stories. On an on-going basis, 
recordings and transcripts of interviews have been shared with my research supervisors. This 
has provided an opportunity for research supervisors to provide feedback on the flow of 
interviews and to offer advice on improving interview technique. Data analysis has been 
critiqued by several research supervisors and adjustments have been made to more accurately 
reflect the participants’ experiences of the phenomena. Emerging understandings have been 
presented to research supervisors and hermeneutic phenomenologists, who have both 
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questioned and affirmed various interpretations. During the second round of interviews, 
participants were asked to consider if common human experiences that emerged from the first 
round of interviews resonated with their own experience. In this way they were able to 
articulate and clarify their own experiences by telling standout stories.  
While these measures have been helpful with regards to the trustworthiness of the research 
project, they have also been beneficial in encouraging me to think more deeply about my own 
thinking and to realise that there is no one truth but multiple truths about the lived experience 
of being a psychotherapeutic supervisor. 
5.11. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has described the philosophical and methodological positioning of this research 
study. Hermeneutic or interpretive phenomenology as proposed by Heidegger (1927/1962) 
underpinned the ontological approach to the study. This research was concerned with 
uncovering the meaning of being a psychotherapeutic supervisor. A total of 22 interviews 
were carried out via first and second interviews with 14 experienced psychotherapy 
supervisors from Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The data collection and 
analysis phases of the study were enabled and enhanced by the work and writings of Van 
Manen (1990), Schmidt (2006), Smythe (2008, 2011) and Vandermause (2011).   
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6. RESPONSIBILITY AS BEING-TRUE AND BEING-UNTRUE 
 
6.1. Introduction  
In this chapter and in subsequent chapters, I borrow the experiences of psychotherapeutic 
supervisors and subject these to a hermeneutic phenomenological data analysis (McConnell 
and Henry, 2009). According to Heidegger (1927/1962) hermeneutic phenomenological 
research seeks to unconceal hidden or previously unknown aspects of being human. While 
Vandermause (2011) further suggests that hermeneutic phenomenological analysis is 
worthwhile when questions associated with the meaning of being are central to the research 
project. These perspectives have informed and influenced the ontological analytic of data and 
the manner in which findings are presented in this thesis. 
In accordance with Smythe (2011) I have ‘plucked’ stories from individual transcripts and 
formulated them into comprehensible, thought provoking stories, which remain true to the 
participants’ experiences. In this chapter, four standout stories have been gathered together 
which are representations of common human experiences for these participants. These 
narratives articulate distinctive meanings associated with being a psychotherapeutic 
supervisor, in specific contexts wherein each participant experienced a heightened sense of 
responsibility when being-with supervisees.  
Pseudonyms have been assigned to ensure anonymity and protect the identity of 
psychotherapeutic supervisors and supervisees. While these experiential stories reflect upon 
common human experiences, they have similar and yet differing characteristics. Collectively, 
they begin to uncover a phenomenological aspect of being-responsible as a psychotherapeutic 
supervisor while also being a unique account of participants’ lived experiences (Van Manen, 
168 
 
1990).    The emerging patterns in these stories have been considered with respect to 
Heideggerian philosophical perspectives and where these have resonated with these 
participants common human experiences, they have been drawn upon, in a bid to enhance 
understanding of the phenomenon and uncover hidden meanings (Smythe, 2011).  
These stories emerged in the context of individual psychotherapeutic supervision. This is 
deemed to be an interpersonal interaction in which there is an expectation that the supervisor 
regularly engages with the supervisee in a bid to improve clinical performance and to assist 
with the maintenance of high standards of safe and ethical practice (Hess, 1980). Through the 
process of psychotherapeutic supervision, it is anticipated that the supervisee will be able to 
reduce their blind spots, increase awareness and competence, in order to ensure that the best 
interest of clients are held as paramount (Page and Wosket, 2001). In order for it to be 
possible for the psychotherapeutic supervisor to carry out these inter-mingling functions, 
there is an expectation that supervisees will be prepared to openly discuss aspects of their 
therapeutic casework. 
6.2. An Experience of Mistrust  
Pat is a psychotherapeutic supervisor with 5 years practice experience who provides 
supervision in a diverse range of sectors. This specific story, which had happened some time 
ago, stood out for her when she reflected on her experience of being a psychotherapeutic 
supervisor working in the not-for-profit sector, with John, a male supervisee. She was quite 
animated and energised in her storytelling (Pat, 2: 6-14).  While she told this compelling 
story with a level of jocularity, her demeanour and tone suggested that she was quite shocked, 
a bit stunned, even traumatised by this experience.  
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I had been supervising, the supervisee, for two years and this supervisee was 
never out of my own supervision. He was always brought to my own 
supervisor because he was a source of worry and I’d check the boundaries, 
check the practice and try to put safety in place, to try to develop the 
supervisee, try to get him to check himself, to save me having to do it all the 
time and try to assess the supervisee’s capability and confidence which, is 
always a worry. The supervisions were generally strained, I was aware that I 
was working far too hard. I felt an enormous sense of responsibility and I was 
left lingering afterwards. I was always left feeling unsure about the work. 
Supervision starts with him presenting the clients and then I try to get to the 
specifics. The information is too vague, is too wafflely. It was the 
intentionality behind the waffle that I was mistrusting. He was vague in order 
to not give me the information, rather than being vague because he was just 
struggling to describe the case. There was withholding of stuff that probably 
he knew I wouldn’t want to hear. So he was trying to keep me away from 
what wasn’t going well. I knew then I was chasing and probably I wasn’t 
going to be given it. He would answer the questions but they were half 
answered. But that wasn’t always obvious to me, it was later but not at the 
time. I was always left doubting as to whether I had heard it all. 
The strained supervisory environment with John elicited a heightened experience of 
responsibility in Pat. A lingering sense of doubt, a sense of being-excluded from the actuality 
of the supervisees practice pervaded the mood (Heidegger, 1927/1962) of the supervisory 
encounter. This lingering disquiet manifested as Pat being-mistrusting of her supervisee. She 
170 
 
did not believe John’s case presentations, she was experiencing untruth in the supervisory 
space. 
I then started to make some judgments. I said quite clearly I had doubts about 
his competence and we did have a conversation over several supervisions 
about competence. I was worried about his judgment. He would always prove 
that his judgment was correct. It didn’t get into an argument but part of the 
difficulty was he was quite good at proving he was correct and also would’ve 
said that he had the backing of his line manager. I would doubt myself that I 
had misread him or I had not given him the benefit of the doubt or actually he 
was better than I thought. But then I would swing the other way and say no I 
am right to doubt. By then it was too late, a complaint had been made. 
Carrying such a high level of distrust was an anxiety provoking experience, which fuelled 
Pat’s sense of responsibility.  This experience appears to have prevented Pat from being able 
to comport (Heidegger, 1927/1962) herself as a psychotherapeutic supervisor and she began 
comporting herself as an investigator. In the melodramatic telling of the story, it almost 
sounded as if a game of cat and mouse was being played out. Pat, as the cat, was chasing the 
truth, poised to pounce on John, in order to catch him out as being-untrue. While, as the 
mouse, the supervisee was scurrying into hidden corners, trying to save his own skin and 
escape the dangerous supervisory encounter. 
What happened was that several supervisions previous to that, I had actually 
warned him that this client could make a complaint. His grandioso idea was 
that he could deal with anything and he was competent for anything. It made 
171 
 
me very nervous, as this is a woman presenting with very complex issues. So, 
there was a complaint, so the client called him incompetent. Oh he was 
panicky, nervous, frightened, possibly in a state of shock. I thought, this was 
waiting to happen, this was probably inevitable. It was stressful for me too. I 
was angry but my first thought was, what needs to be done in order to 
manage it? It was very difficult. I had a lot of sleepless nights. It was 
impacting on my own level of confidence. I was anxious. It ruined my 
weekends. It made me jumpy in other supervisions, I over reacted sometimes 
in other supervisions. I then had to pull back from it and try and settle myself.  
The cat and mouse game ceased with the client’s allegation of incompetence. While Pat’s 
concerns about John’s competence were vindicated, dealing with the complaint proved to be 
an extremely disturbing experience for her. Her experiential response to dealing with the 
complaint was very powerful. She was stressed, anxious, jittery and it impacted negatively on 
her thoughts and supervisory behaviour, over a significant period of time. In the telling of the 
story, it almost sounded, as if Pat had made some terrible mistake herself, that she had done 
something wrong. As she animatedly articulated this aspect of the story there was a sense of 
how difficult it was for Pat to be faced with an experience of failure. There was a primitive 
depth of reaction that seems to have undermined her very existence as a supervisor. 
I still tried to work with him. I didn’t get into any kind of authoritarian 
position, there was no point and that was not going to help. I tried to stay 
with him and get him to think through where he was and what he was going 
to do. He was very appreciative, felt supported although he was very worried. 
When and if it got dealt with I was going to withdraw my supervision. I was 
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withdrawing my supervision essentially because his work wasn’t safe. I think 
I stayed with him too long and I left it too late. That was a hard lesson for me. 
And then the organisation sacked me. I can laugh about it now but I couldn’t 
then. I was completely shocked. (Pat, 2: 6-14) 
Pat began to comport herself as a psychotherapeutic supervisor again. She strove to be 
supportive and enabling towards John as he struggled with the complaint. However, it seems 
that the supervisory relationship was beyond repair. The hidden agendas in the supervisory 
space, the perceived being-untrue of the supervisee, appear to have left Pat with an overriding 
experience of mistrust about this supervisee. At this stage of the supervisory journey, she was 
living with regret, being-self-critical. In the event, she did not get the chance to end the 
supervisory relationship as the agency sacked her. This was a totally unexpected outcome, 
shocking Pat to the core. As this outstanding story drew to a close, Pat’s tone and demeanour 
suggested that her unsettling, negative experience of being-with John lingered and festered.  
Pat’s story is peppered with evolving layers of her human experience of being-with John in 
the world of psychotherapeutic supervision. From the outset, Pat experienced heightened 
responsibility, very possibly because she had been trained and indeed is required by her 
professional body to ensure safe and ethical practice (BACP, 2013; IACP, 2013). As Pat was 
unconvinced by John’s accounts of his clinical practice, an atmosphere of perpetual mistrust 
pervaded supervisory encounters. Pat appeared to be existentially shocked by the agency’s 
indifference to seeking the truth about the client complaint and that it was prepared to allow 
John to continue in counselling practice. In peeling back and interpreting Pat’s experience 
ontologically, it could be construed that being-true as being-uncovering was a manifestation 
of primordial responsibility (Heidegger 1927/1962; 220). 
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However, it sounded as if epistemological influences such as fulfilling the demands of the 
monitoring and evaluating functions of psychotherapeutic supervision (Holloway, 1995), 
fuelled Pat’s investigative stance with John. Despite Pat’s persistent attempts to act 
responsibly and fulfil the requirements of her professional body, she was unable to uncover 
that which was hidden and the human to human interaction with her supervisee, John, broke 
down.   
6.3. An Experience of Being-Critical  
At the time of this hermeneutic phenomenological interview, Eilish had been practicing as a 
psychotherapeutic supervisor for approximately 6 years. When Eilish was asked to talk about 
a specific supervisory encounter, she pondered for some time before sharing her experience 
of being-with a trainee therapist, whom she supervised in an educational setting. As she told 
this story (Eilish, 2:5-11) about Margaret her tone and demeanour changed from concern to 
incredulity.  
Yeah, I am thinking of one young lady (trainee therapist) and if I say 
something to her, I think it is received as criticism. They are very diligent, 
very academic, very theoretically grounded (trainee therapists). Yeah, I 
suppose with this student there is a bit of a pattern, it waxes and wanes, 
where I wouldn’t necessarily see it as critical of this person’s work but it 
would probably be mostly constructively critical. Well this is somebody were 
I have examined my own counter transference, have I something against this 
poor unfortunate as opposed to the others. 
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Eilish described how an atmosphere of criticism affected the mood in the supervisory space. 
There as a sense that it was difficult to give feedback to Margaret, as there was an inference 
that she was overly- sensitive to criticism. Eilish was juxtaposed in her reflection about 
being-with Margaret. On the one hand she recognised and affirmed Margaret’s theoretical 
ability but then she swung to being ‘mostly’ constructively critical. This seems to suggest that 
whatever Margaret was demonstrating in the supervisory space, it was not good enough for 
Eilish. However, there appeared to be an important difference for Eilish, in being critical and 
being constructively critical, the latter seemed to imply that Eilish was trying to be helpful to 
Margaret as opposed to putting her down for the sake of not liking this poor unfortunate. 
 I experience her outwardly as being very dedicated, committed, all correct, 
all the ticked boxes, I experience a people pleaser but I am not quite one 
hundred per cent sure, am I getting the goods, as it were, or the honesty or 
the truth, the authentic piece. So I think at times that part of my frustration is 
that you needn’t gloss it up to me that it has been absolutely fantastic.  I 
would be much happier that you would tell me the bits that are going belly up 
or pear shaped or that you are not sure of the truth. 
Again Eilish reflected on her conflicted experience of being-with Margaret. On the face of it, 
Margaret was a hard working diligent trainee therapist but Eilish experienced her as not being 
credible. In the telling of this story it became evident that Eilish did not trust Margaret. At 
this stage of the narrative her language was quite powerful as she experienced a level of 
dishonesty and untruth in the supervisory encounter.  The façade of the ‘people pleaser’ left 
Eilish with a sense of vexation that she was not hearing what was really happening with 
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clients. She seemed to want to uncover the ‘truth’ about the difficult aspects of the work 
because she did not believe the spin that Margaret gave to her work.  
 So for example in one supervision session I had the notes and it was session 
one and the notes were all about ‘I Thou’ moments.  And I questioned the ‘I 
Thou’   moment. Explain it to me? Describe it to me or what happened? It 
was all beautiful clanging symbols. I would try not to be critical per se. But I 
would be going, in session one, it is rare that you would have that much ‘I 
Thou’. Even being quite skilled, I think that is quite a leap. Almost trying to 
discern well what was it really, ‘I Thou’ or what was their experience? Yes 
and in reality not wanting to knock the student, if that was a very definite ‘I 
Thou’ moment, fair play to you, but having a question mark. So to me there 
would absolutely be a mistrust issue.  I would be trying to say would there be 
almost too much ‘I Thou’ in the first session and I am not criticising her, 
maybe she needs to take a step back in the intensity or something. 
At this stage of the story telling, Eilish became quite animated. The incredulity she 
experienced about Margaret’s description of her early relationship with the client was evident 
in her tone of voice. Having an ‘I-Thou’ experience with a client appeared to mean that there 
was a significant and meaningful connection made between the client and Margaret, after one 
therapeutic session. Eilish was highly sceptical about this as it did not match her experience 
of being-with clients. Eilish was not able to accept Margaret’s description of having a 
‘beautiful’ experience with the client. She was preoccupied with trying to understand what 
actually happened in the therapeutic space; what was the real experience of being with the 
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client? It seemed as if she was unable to get a satisfactory understanding of or even a glimpse 
of the real therapeutic experience between Margaret and the client.  
The mood of the supervisory encounter was now pervaded by ‘mistrust’. Indeed Eilish was 
emphatic about her experience of being- mistrusting when being-with Margaret. She did not 
believe that her supervisee’s intense experience with the client was possible or indeed 
healthy, at that stage of the therapeutic work. However, she appeared to be having difficulty 
bringing this to Margaret’s attention as the supervisory relationship appeared to be a tentative 
one, in which supervisor and supervisee were skirting around the thorny issue of giving and 
receiving constructive criticism. Interestingly while Margaret was describing ‘I Thou’ 
moments in the therapeutic relationship, there appeared to be a real absence of ‘I Thou’ 
experiences, a lack of connection, in the sense of being-with another, in the supervisory 
space. Eilish was unable to shake off the sense of scepticism that engulfed her experience of 
being-with Margaret.     
 So it is something that I have brought to my own supervision that I am 
struggling a bit with this student in kind of trying to put it that, I am not 
judging the person here but I am trying to look at what might be happening in 
the room between the two of you. So I struggle, a little bit with the student. So 
it (the student) is not being authentic, is not seeing the whole picture.  
Eilish’s dual concerns about not being able to give Margaret feedback in a non-critical way 
and the difficulty in uncovering the actuality of her practice did not appear to be relieved by 
attending supervision consultation as she seemed to remain disturbed by her supervisee’s lack 
of insight. 
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 I mean it is hard because there is a part of me thinking she is not getting it. I 
will try a different way and she is still not getting it. So I think it has been a 
difficult experience in some ways. I don’t not trust her. I think she is a very 
kind lady she is very compassionate and knowledgeable. I think her 
motivation is very good so I don’t feel that she is going to do anything wrong 
per se but I think she is a bit misguided at the moment in her enthusiasm for 
clients. Maybe she gets pulled into the client’s world a bit too much.  
Being-with Margaret was a difficult experience for Eilish. There was almost a sense of failure 
that Eilish has not been able to develop her trainee’s depth of insight or level of 
understanding, about effective therapeutic practice. As she reflected on being-with Margaret, 
as she noted her strengths and attributes, as she endeavoured to understand the supervisee’s 
experience, she swithered in her level of mistrust. 
I have worked on it but for some reason she is not able to reflect enough, to 
give me an answer and I think that maybe frustrates me slightly at times. Part 
of me is dying for her to get it because it would make the work so much easier 
for her. I think she is making this work very hard for herself at times and I 
don’t think the clients are getting the benefit of her and her potential. Yes, so 
I think that is a gap for me at the moment and I have not quite kinda got her 
to go there. 
In Eilish’s story, I wondered why she had not mentioned or taken into consideration, 
Margaret’s stage of development as a trainee therapist, which might have accounted for her 
overly-enthusiastic engagement with clients and her limited professional understandings. In 
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Heideggerian terms I was interested in her situated meaning of being (Dasein) as a 
psychotherapeutic supervisor in an educational setting (Flood 2010). Eilish’s last words in 
this standout story are poignant, as ultimately, she seemed to be taking responsibility for 
Margaret’s lack of ability. She was unable to get Margaret ‘to go there’, as in getting her to 
uncover the truth about the actuality of her practice. There seemed to be a correlation 
between being-responsible as an educator and the amount of focus that Eilish gave to trying 
to uncover what was happening in the then and there world, that the trainee therapist shared 
with her client. As such, it seemed to be difficult for Eilish, as being-responsible as being-an-
educator to exist in the here and now world of psychotherapeutic supervision and be-with 
Margaret in her situated meaning of being (Dasein) as a novice therapist.  
While this psychotherapeutic supervisory relationship continued, it was evident that the mood 
of criticism that pervaded it, continued to create an atmosphere of mistrust. That which was 
hidden at the outset, was not uncovered through the application of theoretical pre-
understandings or educational techniques. Indeed, as the story came to an end, it sounded as 
if Eilish realised that something was missing, that a gap needed to be filled. Indeed, I was left 
wondering about the influence of being-bound by educational paradigms and if these 
prevented Eilish from existing authentically in the here and now world that she shared with 
Margaret. From a Heideggerian philosophical perspective, authentic existence occurs when 
Dasein takes a first-person position with respect to itself, as opposed to taking a stance that is 
prescribed by Others (Carman, 2007). In other words authentic existence occurs when Dasein 
is being-true to itself (Schmidt 2006). I am left wondering, if Eilish and Margaret were able 
to be- true, to be liberated from the theoretical discourse that defined their experience of 
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psychotherapeutic supervision, would the mistrust and criticism have dissolved and would 
the actuality of the supervisees practice been unconcealed.    
6.4. Grappling with Powerlessness 
At the time of this interview Claire had been practicing as a psychotherapeutic supervisor for 
about 7 years. She provided individual, shared and group supervision in the not-for profit 
sector and also had a private practice. This story was related during a second interview 
(Claire, 2:7-11). The story unfolded in a measured and thoughtful manner. Claire’s tone was 
reflective throughout the narration as she spoke about her experience of being-with Michelle, 
whom she supervised in a not-for-profit organisation.   
 I had one supervisee who was also a supervisor. Her attendance at 
supervision was mandatory. I don’t know (pause) I was not sure of the value 
that she placed on supervision.  She comes to me because she has to.  
As Claire opened up this story, there was almost a sense of disappointment that the 
supervisee was only coming to supervision because she was required do so. This seemed 
unusual, somehow different for Claire as she would regularly have had supervisees assigned 
to her. These assigned supervisees, generally, engaged willingly in psychotherapeutic 
supervision. Claire marked up, at the outset, Michelle’s status, as a supervisor. Being-with 
Michelle appeared to be an uncomfortable experience for Claire as she perceived Michelle as 
a reluctant supervisee. Claire’s tone was hesitant as if she was pondering the reason that 
Michelle, as a supervisor herself, would under value the supervision process.  
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She talked a lot. A bit like she keeps talking and I don’t get in and even if I try 
to say something, very often she will keep talking. And when I do say 
something she then repeats it as if she is saying it. I find that curious. 
There was a sense that Claire was being kept out, being excluded and that her attempts to 
engage with Michelle were thwarted by this constant talking. Heidegger raises the notion of 
‘idle talk’ which he associates with an inauthentic mode of being. He does not use this term 
in a denigrating way but suggests that in idle talk something is being hidden, in a non-
deceitful way. ‘Idle talk is the possibility of understanding everything without previously 
making the thing one’s own’. Idle talk is an average everyday human activity.  There is a 
superficial quality to idle talk which closes off authentic existence (Heidegger 1927/1962; 
168-170). 
There seemed to be a flavour of this in the way that Claire portrayed Michelle’s comportment 
in psychotherapeutic supervision. The supervisee appeared to be idly talking over Claire, 
almost taking on the role of supervisor, in some way rendering Claire redundant. Michelle’s 
controlling way of being seemed to have elicited a quietly wondering mode of being in 
Claire.  
 Well the details of the case kind of goes off onto an academic conversation 
because she would be an academic and it is a much more out there 
conversation, than being here between us, techniques and theory and the 
details of the case. Sometimes I kind of give up a little bit. I just let her talk. 
Sometimes I do battle with her and try to get my spoke in. I haven’t ever said 
to her ‘well I just said that’. I don’t know why, you know thinking about it.  
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Claire observed that Michelle’s discourse was epistemologically orientated. She was telling 
Claire what she knew rather than what was actually happening with her clients or disclosing 
who she was as a therapist.  The ‘out there’ quality to the supervision suggests that the 
interaction between Michelle and Claire lacked a sense of connection; an absence of being-
with one another. Trying to have a meaningful case discussion with Michelle was a wearying 
experience for Claire. It was a struggle for her to be listened to; to be heard over Michelle’s 
chatter; to be acknowledged as having anything valuable to offer as a supervisor.  Claire 
vacillated between being defeated by Michelle’s dominant chatter and going into ‘battle’ 
against her in order to have her voice heard.  This was a confusing experience for Claire as 
she appeared to realise that Michelle did not recognise or value her existence as a 
psychotherapeutic supervisor and that the idle talk was excluding her from the actuality of 
her supervisee’s practice. 
I get on reasonably well with her. I find her an interesting character, so I 
can’t say that I get angry or even impatient with her but I am getting a bit 
bored sometimes and I have made use of that but it is a bit like she has batted 
me off. I’m not sure, how much she has taken on board. I say to her ‘I wonder 
what is going on now. I have given you the time and I have lost interest in 
this’ and she doesn’t really take on those hints and she will just keep talking 
about the case.  
As Michelle continued to disregard Claire and hide behind her talk-talk-talk barrier, Claire 
did not experience an aggressive response but seemed to succumb to existential boredom. In 
a bid to connect with Michelle she shared this boredom but this appeared to have had no 
significant impact on creating more openness in the supervisory encounter. Claire was unable 
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to pierce her supervisee’s defensive battlements. When she took a charge at these battlements 
through self-disclosure or by encouraging Michelle to illuminate her practice, she seemed to 
be aware that her efforts were not penetrating the battlements and that her advances were not 
welcome or acknowledged. 
I suppose I give up a little bit of my own power because I think it is another 
bit of a power struggle, counter transference, and I think my ethos is to give 
up and give in rather than do battle.  
Claire revealed that she preferred to avoid going into battle. There was a hint that being-
powerless was not a new experience for her, that she was familiar with the experience of 
powerlessness when being-with powerful people. From the tone of her voice it sounded as if 
withdrawing from the battle was somehow more acceptable; more dignified that fighting for 
power.  
I think there is a bit of her that tells me what she thinks I want to hear and I 
can ask or dig or hint but I don’t really get anywhere. I don’t know, she is 
quite inscrutable in a way. I don’t really get anywhere. So I don’t think she 
would be that worried about my opinion to be honest. It’s like she knows 
what’s best for her. It’s frustrating sometimes. Then I am conscious of sitting 
back and it is not worth the struggle. 
When Claire tried to uncover the hidden aspects of Michelle’s practice she came away with a 
sense of being placated; a sense that the supervisee was controlling her by keeping her in the 
dark with her idle talk; a sense that the she was powerless to illuminate or influence 
Michelle’s practice. Despite Claire’s attempts at probing for the truth and trying to get behind 
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Michelle’s academic discourse, the defensive battlements remained intact.  In this standout 
story, it is almost as if she accepted that she was powerless, that she was almost invisible as a 
psychotherapeutic supervisor.  Conversely, on other occasions, she stood her ground and 
confronted her experience of being-powerless. 
 There has been a domestic abuse situation where I did insist and we did 
work through it and I insisted she followed the policy on domestic abuse and 
we worked through that and it worked out ok. There were a couple of 
situations were domestic abuse came to light. I was concerned to the extent 
that I know she wouldn’t have implemented the policy if I hadn’t of insisted 
and in her private practice that she wouldn’t have implemented that policy, 
she would have worked in a different way. So we have had that discussion 
about working in an organisation and safety of clients, where these things are 
coming to light! So it makes me think that we can make it and with that 
incident we worked through that. 
When it came to matters of client safety, Claire was not prepared to retreat or tolerate being 
kept in the dark. It seemed that when she chose to grapple with being-powerless, she was 
more able to comport herself resolutely. Heideggerian philosophy suggests that ‘resoluteness’ 
is a characteristic of Dasein as being-authentic. So, on those occasions when the actuality of 
Michelle’s practice did come into the light, the experience of being-bored appeared to 
dissipate in Claire. She became visible in the supervisory space. She was undaunted by 
Michelle’s idle talk.  
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As the story came to a close, it seemed that Claire was aware that being-true as being-
uncovering when being-with Michelle would continue to be a battle. However, in order to 
exist responsibly as a psychotherapeutic supervisor she was prepared to grapple with her 
sense of powerlessness. Indeed, there was a sense of quiet optimism, that overtime she could 
get beneath Michelle’s idle talk and form a real connection with her, in their shared world of 
psychotherapeutic supervision.  
6.5. The Never-Never Knowing Experience 
Jane, as a highly experienced psychotherapeutic supervisor, told me a story about her 
experience of working with a supervisee in the not-for-profit sector (Jane, 2:8-12). The story 
stood out for her because her experience of being-with this supervisee was quite unusual, out 
of the ordinary realm of her experience. The supervisee, Ruth was deemed to be an 
experienced counsellor but was relatively new to the organisation wherein Jane worked as a 
psychotherapeutic supervisor. Jane narrated the story of her experience with Ruth with calm 
conviction.    
This is actually someone who made the decision to leave the organisation. 
Now, I had only been seeing her over a period of six months but I guess I 
sussed out quite early on that she had nothing to learn, the way she did it, 
was the way she would do it. If I had been happy to talk to her about her 
travels and her time abroad and all the rest of it, actually that would have 
been fine and her boundaries weren’t great. 
Jane related the ending of the story, at the outset. This aroused my curiosity and I wondered 
why she would need to tell me, at the beginning, that Ruth was responsible for her own 
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departure from the organisation. This supervisory contract was short lived. Indeed, from the 
defeatist tone of Jane’s narrative it would appear that she was unable to form a working 
supervisory alliance with Ruth. It sounded as if Jane thought that this supervisee was 
entrenched in her own way of working and implied that Ruth gave the impression that she did 
not need psychotherapeutic supervision; that Jane had nothing to offer her with respect to the 
development of her practice. 
Jane sounded as if she was quietly annoyed about the fact that Ruth would only engage in 
social chit-chat and was inappropriately using up supervisory time and space. This aspect of 
the story, again, made me think about Heidegger’s notion of ‘idle talk’ which manifests in  
fleeing…in the face of its authenticity (Heidegger, 1927/1962:185).  
When I actually met her at a training course, she didn’t actually recognise 
who I was. Now she had maybe only met me once before, spoken to her on the 
phone a couple of times but it was just a totally unsatisfactory situation. It felt 
like we never really made a connection at all. She found it very difficult to get 
a date to come to supervision.  I never got any sense of how she really worked 
and she never really held onto clients very well either. It was really terrible, I 
have an expectation that I will make a connection with most people because 
that is actually what happens. I was quite alarmed and surprised when it 
didn’t happen.  
As the story unfolded there followed a flurry of complaints about Ruth’s level of engagement 
with Jane.  She suggested that there was both physical and psychological avoidance, by Ruth, 
of being-involved in the situational world of psychotherapeutic supervision. She was absolute 
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in her conviction that she knew nothing about Ruth’s practice yet conversely knew enough to 
be concerned about client welfare. The flurry of complaints culminated in Jane disclosing 
that being-with Ruth was a dreadful experience. This was outside of Jane’s normal 
experience of being-with supervisees. She sounded most confident that she had a well-
developed capacity to connect with and make meaningful relationships with supervisees. It 
was most ‘alarming’ and quite extraordinary that she was unable to achieve this with Ruth.  
Basically in this particularly case, it was like, she doesn’t have a clue. So I 
am left wondering what on earth is it all about, and probably dreading the 
next supervision. Well I mean what tended to happen was that she just talked 
about what she did and it was all going brilliantly and the clients were really 
happy and she had done the genogram and then she had done a whole lot of 
other bits that were maybe some other way of working but ‘just tell me about 
what you are doing’? Well, I never, never knew anything. I never just got 
beyond the scope of it, a lot of content only and there would not have been a 
lot of content only I pushed her. We could have done an hour and half 
supervision in about twenty minutes if she had of got her way. 
In Heideggerian terms, it could be considered that Ruth was existing inauthentically when 
being-with Jane. Ruth’s ‘idle talk’ seemed to consume the supervisory space. The impact of 
the constant ‘idle talk’ seemed to fuel Jane’s sense of distrust.  She appeared to hold the firm 
conviction that Ruth was not competent and that she was glossing over the truth about her 
practice with her ‘idle talk’, concealing her incompetence with inflated descriptions of her 
practice. In pushing her, it sounded as if Jane was experiencing a heightened sense of 
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responsibility to expose what was actually happening in the then and there of Ruth’s 
engagement with clients.  
When being-with Jane, time hung heavily. It sounded as if Ruth was trying to escape from 
the supervisory encounter while Jane was determinedly trying to hold her in it for the allotted 
time. ‘Never, never’ knowing as an experience seemed to be difficult for Jane.  As the 
disconnected psychotherapeutic supervision progressed, it seemed as if Jane was increasingly 
comporting herself as a truth-seeker, in order to overcome the disconcerting, perpetual never-
knowing experience.  
 I think she was keeping me out. I didn’t get an awful lot of information about 
the cases that were difficult and in fact they tended to finish after two sessions 
and then I’d try and talk about why that didn’t work at the next session. It 
wasn’t ever anything that she had done. It was obviously that the couple were 
in a different place and that it wasn’t what they needed. So really trying to 
unpack it and it just wasn’t going to happen. I mean it is really frustrating 
getting nowhere and you do tend to think, is it something to do with me? 
Surely there is something else I could be doing here and taking it to my own 
supervisor and talking to whoever will listen to me. 
Jane had the firm belief that she was being-excluded from the actuality of Ruth’s practice. 
Meaningful talk between the supervisory pair seemed to be impossible.  Jane’s attempts to 
get beyond the idle talk and to understand what was happening in therapeutic sessions were 
thwarted.  She seemed to experience her supervisee as being-untrue.  Jane as being a 
frustrated truth seeker did not trust Ruth’s excuses or rationale for the pattern of ruptures with 
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clients. Being a truth-seeker appeared to have been an exasperating, unproductive experience 
for her. It almost sounded as if her very existence as a psychotherapeutic supervisor was 
threatened by never-never uncovering the truth.  
As I listened to this part of the story, I found it interesting that there were ruptures in Ruth’s 
therapeutic relationships with clients and that the situated meaning of being-with the other 
was ruptured in the here and now supervisory relationship.  It seemed to be difficult for Ruth 
to move beyond idle talk and for Jane to move back from truth seeking. She appeared to have 
the firm conviction that it was her responsibility, as a psychotherapeutic supervisor, to expose 
the actuality of Ruth’s practice; to get actual evidence of poor practice.  
In the end, I couldn’t get her to make another appointment. She couldn’t 
come in June. She couldn’t come in July or in August. I think eventually the 
manager had to call her and she was not returning the paperwork so there 
were all sorts of clues bubbling up and an ultimatum was laid down. She 
never contacted me to say that she wasn’t coming back or that she had 
resigned or anything, I never heard another word from her. I suppose it felt 
like I had no other choices here. I had gone as far as I could go. I suppose, I 
highlighted to management that I think this person is completely unsuitable 
for the organisation. So I felt, I had a responsibility to the clients and also to 
the organisation and that if you take a placement from an organisation you 
are buying into the way that they work and you keep the rules and I guess, 
she was breaking the rules so blatantly. That would just offend me anyway. 
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Jane’s emphatic language about breaking the rules, reminded me of the manner in which 
Dasein equips itself with a fore-structure of understanding in order to make sense of the 
world. Jane’s prior view of the past (Heidegger, 1927/1962: 150), the combination of her 
previous knowledge and expertise, appeared to inform her assumptions  that supervisees must 
be prepared to engage in open dialogue about their practice, take and implement feedback 
while adhering to organisational policies and procedures.  It was an intolerable experience for 
Jane, when Ruth’s fore-structure of understanding did not match her own fore-structure of 
understanding, resulting in a complete breakdown in the supervisor relationship.     
At the outset of this standout story, Jane seemed to be suggesting that Ruth left the 
organisation of her own freewill. However, epistemologically speaking, one of the key 
functions of supervision is monitoring and evaluating the quality of supervisees practice. It 
appears as if this function of supervision got played out in Jane, predominantly, being a truth 
seeker when being-with Ruth. From this perspective, when the truth could not be uncovered 
Jane, as being-responsible, seemed to be obliged to assist Ruth’s departure from the 
organisation. From Jane’s fore-structure of understanding, it is conceiveable that being-
responsible meant that Jane felt obliged to bring her mistrust about Ruth’s incompetence to 
management; being- responsible meant that she had a responsibility to protect clients; being-
responsible meant that she had a responsibility to work in the best interests of the 
organisation; being-responsible meant excluding Ruth from practicing in the organisation 
This heightened experience of being-responsible seemed to have been closely aligned to the 
monitoring and evaluation function of psychotherapeutic supervision in which Jane is called 
to be accountable for ever-ever knowing, what is actually occurring in the then and there of 
therapeutic practice. 
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6.6. Fore-structures of Understanding and Responsibility   
The situational meaning of being a psychotherapeutic supervisor has been evocatively told by 
each of these participants. Each narrative demonstrated a set of unique experiences while 
uncovering a common human experience of heightened responsibility. From a Heideggerian 
perspective, it is suggested that each of these experienced psychotherapeutic supervisors 
brought their fore-structures of understanding into their encounters with supervisees. These 
fore-structures of understanding influenced how they coped with perceived untruth about 
their supervisees’ day to day therapeutic practice.    
From this perspective, illuminating fore-structures of understanding can assist with 
understanding the meanings attached to lived experiences. Pre-understandings are influenced 
by expert knowledge as well as personal and professional experiences. From analysing the 
stories in this chapter, the participants appear to have pre-understandings and well embedded 
assumptions that strongly influence them to believe that supervisees must be open, honest 
and transparent within the supervisory relationship, about their therapeutic practices. This is 
consistent with the dominant psychotherapeutic discourses which influence the manner in 
which psychotherapeutic supervisors expect supervisees to engage with them in the 
supervisory encounter (Rogers, 1951: Compton, 2005: Creaner, 2014).  
Psychotherapeutic supervision is deemed to be an endeavour in which two people come 
together to discuss the psychotherapeutic casework of one of the parties (Hess, 1980). As 
previously indicated, there are primarily three core functions of psychotherapeutic 
supervision which are to support the supervisee to manage the psychological and emotional 
impact of the content of their client casework, to educate and develop supervisees in their 
theoretical knowledge and psychotherapeutic skills and thirdly to monitor the quality of their 
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work to ensure safe and ethical practice, to ensure the protection of the public (Kaduskin, 
1976; Carroll, 1988: Hewson, 2001). In these stories the emphasis resided on the monitoring 
function and manifested as investigating and truth-seeking.  
Much has been written about the importance of the supervisory relationship and how the 
quality of this relationship impacts on the manner in which the key functions or tasks of 
supervision are achieved. A supervisory relationship is deemed to be effective when there is 
mutual respect and trust between the supervisor and the supervisee. It is considered that this 
facilitates an open and honest dialogue about what is occurring in the therapeutic space 
between the supervisee and the client. When this occurs, the supervisor is in a position to 
provide support, develop the supervisee and monitor the quality of therapeutic practice 
(Hawkins and Shohet, 2006; Omand, 2009). So the traditional dynamic in psychotherapeutic 
supervision is to talk about what is happening between the therapist and the client (Feltham 
and Dryden, 1994). The focus of supervision is overseeing therapeutic practice by exploring 
what is happening in an external environment.  So the psychotherapeutic supervisor is 
interested to know what is happening out there in the therapeutic space. In essence the 
supervisor wants the supervisee to paint a true or real picture of the actuality of their 
experience of being-with the client.  Psychotherapeutic supervisors are then in a position to 
be-with their supervisees in the therapeutic endeavour. 
However, from a Heideggerian hermeneutic philosophical perspective, it is considered that 
drawing on knowledge or realist based constructions that prescribe what should occur 
between psychotherapeutic supervisors and their supervisees, could in these scenarios, result 
in pre-reflective judgements about untruth. Within these stories, participants were 
mistrusting, critical and indignant about supervisees who they perceived to be excluding them 
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or keeping them in the dark about the actuality of their practice. These participants seem to 
have experienced high levels of responsibility, based on their fore-structures of understanding 
about psychotherapeutic supervision. Without uncovering the actuality of therapeutic practice 
they could not be satisfied that client safety was being monitored.  
While I can fully appreciate the concerns raised by these participants and understand their 
real experiences of being-responsible, I was left wondering about the influence of these fore-
structures of understanding on the lack of interconnectedness and meaningful experiences in 
these specific supervisory encounters.  
6.7. The Phenomenon of Truth  
While the participants in this chapter found themselves battling with supervisees to uncover 
the truth about their therapeutic practice, eminent thinkers such as Aristotle, Socrates and 
Plato have been philosophising about what constitutes ‘truth’ for centuries. Indeed 
philosophy has been referred to as the science of truth (Dreyfus and Wrathall, 2007). There 
are, however, differing and competing philosophical structures which endeavour to answer 
the age-old question about that which constitutes truth.   
Analytic language philosophers, such as Bertrand Russell (1946), proposed the 
Correspondence Theory of Truth. This theory of truth postulates that; 
 True beliefs and true statements correspond to the actual state of affairs. 
This type of theory posits a relationship between thoughts and statements on 
the one hand and things and objects on the other (Prior, 2012). 
The Correspondence Theory of Truth states that there is common agreement with assertions 
about everyday objects. So it is possible to identify an object like a table and say that this is a 
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table and there would be a general consensus that this is a table. The truth or untruth about an 
object is determined by its correspondence to external reality. Famously, Moore (1962) 
looked at his hands and stated categorically that these are hands. His statement was accepted 
as true because it corresponds to common beliefs. In this conceptualisation, when a judgment 
is made about something and there is agreement about the assertion, then the essence of truth 
has been found. The Correspondence Theory of Truth goes on to suggest that there is a true-
false continuum when making statements about the actuality of entities. In essence, the more 
concrete the object the more agreement there is about what it actually is (Russell, 1946). 
However this becomes more opaque when subjective things are being scrutinised (Cerbonne, 
2006). 
According to Dreyfus (2010) there are ‘common practices’ that can assist with determining 
the truth about a factual statement when subjective things are being considered. He gives the 
example of an assertion being made that a wall is white. There might be some disagreement 
between observers about this assertion, however, according to Dreyfus, there are ‘common 
practices’ to determine whether the wall is white or not. So, Dreyfus suggests that a painting 
expert could be called in, who would produce a colour chart and determine the whiteness of 
the wall. Having made his assertion on the whiteness of the wall, the original judgment is 
then deemed to be true. This is an epistemological or knowledge based structure of ‘truth’, 
which assumes that understanding is based on realism (Heidegger, 1927/1962).  
From a Heideggerian philosophical perspective, the conceptualisation of truth as assertion 
and purely knowledge based structures of truth are ‘empty constructions’ (Heidegger, 
1927/1962:215). There are differing voices in the literature on Heidegger’s relationship with 
the Correspondence Theory of Truth. According to Inwood (1999:228) Heidegger rejects and 
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attacks this philosophical position. While Schmidt (2006) considers that he problematises 
epistemological based structures of truth. However, Dreyfus and Wrathall (2007) state that 
Heidegger has had an enduring preoccupation with truth throughout his philosophical 
writings and lectures. These authors are of the view that Heidegger builds on and expands the 
epistemological position on what constitutes truth as he formulates and articulates his 
ontological position. The cornerstone of Heidegger’s treatise on truth is his argument that 
truth has not been examined from an ontological position in over 2000years of philosophical 
thinking. Dreyfus and Wrathall (2007) suggest that Heidegger’s philosophy about truth has 
evolved and changed overtime. They have tracked his evolving philosophy of truth which 
initially acknowledges the Correspondence Theory of Truth but latterly emerges as an 
ontological position on ‘being-true’ wherein he ultimately determines truth as 
‘unconcealment’ (Heidegger, 1927/1962:221). As such, Heidegger has written a treatise on 
that which he deems to be the phenomenon of truth and he contends that:  
‘Truth is something that shows itself’ and ‘Being-true’ (truth) means being-
uncovering. Taking entities out of their hiddenness and letting them be seen 
in their unhiddeness (uncoveredness). The phenomenon of truth in the sense 
of uncoveredness (unhiddenness) (Heidegger, 1927/1962:213,219).  
This ontological position on what constitutes truth appears to suggest that something must 
occur before an assertion and a judgment on an entity can be agreed. In order for an assertion 
to be made, the entity must firstly be brought into the light. Going back to Dreyfus’ example 
(2010) of the whiteness of the wall, it is argued that until the wall is unconcealed as being-in-
the-world, then it does not exist. Therefore, until this occurs, an assertion about the wall 
cannot be made and the truth about the whiteness of the wall cannot be made. The ‘being-
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true’ of the assertion is only possible in the entity being-uncovered, that is to say 
‘unconcealed’ (Heidegger, 1927/1960). This suggests that the entity is made visible or 
available by being-uncovered. Such ‘unconcealment’ then renders it possible to consider 
whether or not the assertion can be confirmed. So, for Heidegger, ‘being-true’ is 
phenomenological and truth is only possible from the ontological philosophical stance of 
Dasein being-in-the-world.  He argues that; ‘Being-true as being- uncovering is a way of 
being for Dasein’ (Heidegger, 1927/1960: 220). So, ‘being-true’ is a fundamental aspect of 
Dasein’s existence. Heidegger takes this proposition further and states that: 
There is truth only in so far as Dasein is and so long as Dasein is. Entities 
are uncovered only when Dasein is and only as long as Dasein is, are they 
disclosed.  Before there was Dasein there was no truth, nor will there be any 
after Dasein is no more (Heidegger, 1927/1960: 226). 
Therefore, it is Heidegger’s proposition that the Correspondence Theory of Truth is only 
feasible, once the entity has been ‘unconcealed’ and that this is only possible because 
uncovering is a primordial mode of being of Dasein. Therefore, ‘being-true’ is uncovering 
that which has been concealed from Dasein (Schmidt, 2006:78). Furthermore, Dasein is 
equally in the truth and in untruth (Heidegger, 1927/1960: 222). Heidegger does not make an 
evaluation of ‘being-true’ or ‘being-untrue’ as being either positive or negative modes of 
being. ‘Being-true’ is a facet of being-authentic while ‘being-untrue’ is associated with the 
notion of ‘falling’ or living inauthentically, as if death does not exist. As such making a 
decision to live authentically enables Dasein to ‘wrestle’ the truth from entities (Heidegger, 
1927/1960: 220). However, in privileging realism a ‘genuine existential analytic of Dasein 
gets diverted’ (Heidegger, 1927/1960; 200). Dasein’s ‘falling’ has prevented it from 
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understanding entities in the world, authentically. When understanding is based on realism, 
there is a lack of understanding of the meaning of being which will not be answered by 
epistemology. According to Heidegger, an existential analytic is necessary in order to 
authentically understand the meaning of being of entities-in-the-world (Heidegger, 
1927/1960). 
6.8. Responsibility as Being-true and Being-Untrue 
The evocative stories from the participants in this chapter demonstrate that they became 
preoccupied with seeking the truth about the reality of their supervisees’ therapeutic practice. 
They had the common human experience of being-responsible when being-with supervisees 
whom they perceived to be less than truthful about their practices. It is suggested that their 
constructions of truthfulness are rooted in their fore-structures of understanding about how 
supervisees should behave in psychotherapeutic supervision. They appeared to hold firm to 
assumptions that assert that supervisees must be open and transparent about positive aspects 
of their casework and about the therapeutic challenges that they grapple with. When 
supervisees’ fore-structures of understanding were oppositional to those of their supervisors a 
mood of distrust pervaded the atmosphere.  
The epistemological or knowledge based structures associated with the psychotherapeutic 
supervisory process assert that supervisors are responsible for monitoring safe and ethical 
practice (Kaduskin, 1976; Carroll, 1988: Hewson, 2001). Such structures give 
psychotherapeutic supervisors the authority and justification to examine and probe into the 
actuality of therapeutic practice. They reinforce the assumption that practitioners are in some 
way deficit if they are unable or unwilling to be honest and open about their casework and 
their perceived shortcoming therein.  
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When supervisees did not conform to theoretically informed fore-structures of understanding, 
supervisors had varying and unique responses which appear to have influenced their 
experiences of responsibility when being-in-the-world of psychotherapy supervision. For 
instance Eilish and Claire seemed to persevere in trying to uncover the perceived truth and 
were prepared to invest time and energy in this activity. While Pat and Jane were convinced 
that their supervisees were not fit to practice and the supervisory relationship ruptured. 
Whatever, the response, these participants were unwavering in their responsibility for 
monitoring safe and ethical practice.  
The monitoring function places the focus on the then and there occurrences of 
psychotherapeutic practice. However, I would suggest that this locus of attention on the 
psychotherapeutic work, especially when the supervisor is concerned about the quality of 
clinical practice, can become a barrier to noticing what is happening in the here and now or 
immediate experience of being-in-the-world of psychotherapeutic supervision. From a 
hermeneutic phenomenological philosophical stance, understanding the meaning of here and 
now experiences comes before examining then and there happenings. So for instance, there 
was a significant amount of idle talk in the here and now of supervisory human interactions. 
On first encounters with the data, it could be construed that supervisees were engaging in idle 
talk and as such were being-inauthentic when being-in-the-world of psychotherapeutic 
supervision.  However, I am also wondering, if the focus on the then and there occurrences, 
prevented meaningful talk about here and now experiences for supervisors and were they, 
also, existing-inauthentically in these specific situations. 
 Heidegger suggests that idle talk negatively affects the authentic social aspect of human 
existence that is being-with another (Heidegger, 1927/1962:211).  From this perspective it is 
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offered that the supervisory pair was unable to be-with one another in the world of 
psychotherapeutic supervision as they were both, at times, existing-inauthentically, were 
being-untrue. An existential analytic of here and now experiences, from the Heideggerian 
hermeneutic philosophical perspective, has the potential to uncover the truth about what is 
actually happening in the world of psychotherapeutic supervision. Dasein’s basic mode of 
being-true and being-uncovering is freed through authentic existence.   
No judgement is being made about psychotherapeutic supervisors or supervisees in this 
interpretation as it is considered that Dasein exists equally in truth and untruth (Dreyfus and 
Wrathall, 2007). The push-pull of being-untrue and being-true in the circumstances described 
is understandable. However, it is suggested here, that being-untrue as being a 
psychotherapeutic supervisor contributes to heightened experiences of responsibility.  
So privileging the existential analysis of the ‘here and now’ experience over seeking the truth 
about the ‘then and there’ experience may assist psychotherapeutic supervisors to exist- 
authentically, and give rise to meaningful talk about their experiences of being-responsible.    
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7. RESPONSIBILITY AS LEAPING-IN AND LEAPING-AHEAD 
 
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter gathers together and interprets several stories from psychotherapeutic  
supervisors in which participants reflected on their experiences of being-with supervisees in 
which the mood (Heidegger, 1927/1962: 134) of the supervisory encounter was pervaded 
with anxiety. Indeed, the findings from these stories strongly suggest that participants 
experienced multiple layers of anxiety as psychotherapeutic supervisors. In the following 
narratives they described their supervisory experiences as anxiety provoking, nerve-
wrecking, worrying, concerning, frightening and they even described being-panic stricken. 
The layers of anxiety, as experienced, are related to specific supervision sessions in which 
participants experienced varying degrees of responsibility when faced with perceived 
incompetence, concerns about supervisees’ lack of insight and reactive responses to clients as 
well as practice and ethical dilemmas. Each story has its own unique quality and the nuances 
in the participants’ stories point to differing personal and professional experiences.  
 
This chapter seeks to illuminate the way that psychotherapeutic supervisors cope (Heidegger,  
1927/1962) with the experience of being-responsible. The interpreted findings are reflected  
upon through a Heideggerian lens in an attempt to uncover the phenomenon inherent in these 
   unique yet common human experiences. 
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7.2. A Worrying Experience  
Pat had been working for approximately 5 years supervising experienced and novice couple 
counsellors in the not-for-profit and private sectors, at the time of the first research interview 
with her. During the early stages of this interview, she recounted how she had had a rigorous 
training in couples counselling and had a strong allegiance to excellence in therapeutic 
practice with married and cohabiting couples. As she settled into the interview process, she 
also told me that she believed that it was her role, as a psychotherapeutic supervisor, to 
provide supervisees with support around the emotional, intellectual and practical challenges 
of the work, to develop their psychotherapeutic skills and knowledge and to ensure that her 
supervisees were working in a safe and ethical manner with clients.  This latter aspect of 
being a psychotherapeutic supervisor had been troubling for her over the years. 
I was very much trying to see where I was around holding my position of 
accountability and responsibility because as a supervisee I don’t like being 
told. So I was trying to find a balance of holding accountability but not 
coming across as telling or an expert or authoritarian or falling into the trap 
of trying to do the counselling bit and trying to leave that to the counsellor.   
So, I was very much trying to find my balance in being responsible to the 
supervisee, accountable to the agency, but also trying to be holding, actually 
to support development and be responsible, all of that.  So I was trying to 
hold onto not panicking and not jumping in too quick but at the same time if I 
felt I needed to step in and do something then I was going to do it and I think 
that’s probably one of the hardest jobs as a supervisor.  
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So, it seemed to be a real struggle for Pat to find her equilibrium when faced with issues of 
accountability and responsibility. She seemed to take the experience of being responsible as a 
psychotherapeutic supervisor, seriously, at a professional and maybe more meaningfully as a 
personal standard. She, also, had to deal with a second layer of responsibility which was 
being accountable to her employing organisation for the well-being of clients. This pull and 
tug between competing responsibilities appears to have made Pat’s existence as a 
psychotherapeutic supervisor somewhat insecure. She seemed to fluctuate between being 
highly anxious, while trying to hold herself back from prematurely leaping-in (Heidegger, 
1927/1962:122) and taking charge over her supervisees’ therapeutic work. She seemed to 
find it difficult to cope with allowing her supervisees to have autonomy in their clinical 
practice as she seemed to watch over them closely, in case she needed to jump in. So, on the 
one hand it sounded as if she did not want to disempower her supervisees, while on the other 
hand, it was clear from the tone of this discourse that if she was worried about a supervisee 
she would, as a responsible psychotherapeutic supervisor step in and take action on behalf of 
the supervisee.  
From a Heideggerian perspective, it could be construed that Pat was struggling to cope with 
the troublesome experience of being responsible which elicited anxiety provoking 
experiences, while being with some of her supervisees. Heidegger describes two modes of 
solicitude or caring, leaping-in and leaping-ahead (Heidegger, 1927/1962:122) which have 
the impact of either disabling or enabling the other person.  
It was clear from Pat’s discourse that she aspired to support and to empower her supervisees. 
However, when support was deemed to be insufficient she became anxious because she 
believed that she was, ultimately, responsible for ensuring safe and ethical practice.  As if to 
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emphasise her struggle with responsibility, Pat told me the story (1: 4-6) of her experience 
with a novice practitioner, Barbara, whom she came to believe, was incompetent as a couple 
counsellor.  
I had a trainee counsellor that just seemed to be constantly out of her depth 
and was struggling in the work, struggling to engage the clients. The 
supervisee’s ability to be reflexive in supervision wasn’t coming and I 
persevered and persevered and persevered and probably ended up taking on 
too much responsibility for the work myself. 
Being-with Barbara was an anxiety provoking experience for Pat. As she recounted this story 
her demeanour became fretful and she sounded very worried that Barbara was unable to 
demonstrate the most basic tenets of couple counselling. There was a sense of Pat being 
concerned that Barbara was floundering as a practitioner and that her attempts to help her 
supervisee stay afloat were also floundering. However, Pat emphasised that she had been 
tenacious in her perseverance with Barbara. It seemed as if she had tried and tried and tried to 
fix Barbara, to turn her into a good enough couple counsellor before she finally realised that 
she had gone too far, intervened too much and had taken over responsibility for Barbara’s 
clinical practice.  
But then I had to come to a decision, to say that I couldn’t continue to 
supervise her and I didn’t think that she would make a couple’s practitioner.   
But I found that very stressful and I, constantly was saying, is it me? Would 
she be better off with another supervisor? Could she have gone further? 
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Could she have done better? Would somebody else have understood her 
better? 
Making the decision to stop supervising Barbara was a most stressful experience for Pat. 
Having leapt-in and taken on too much responsibility, it seemed that Pat considered that her 
only choice was to jump out of the supervisory alliance, once she was convinced that Barbara 
was incapable of being a couple counsellor. However, she did not do this lightly. She 
appeared to have agonised over the decision to end the supervisory relationship.  
The mood of the supervision was angst ridden as Pat struggled to cope with being responsible 
for Barbara’s perceived incompetence, while Barbara was struggling and failing to be a good 
enough couple counsellor. Pat went through a difficult period during which she wrestled with 
self-doubt. She questioned her own ability as a supervisor, she fretted over the quality of the 
relationship with Barbara. She compared herself to other supervisors and wondered if they 
could have offered a more understanding style of supervision, could they have helped 
Barbara to be a competent couple counsellor. 
But I got a lot of supervision and consultation around that myself and kept 
coming back to’ NO’, she’s just not able, she just doesn’t have the 
competency to be a couple counsellor. But it was evidence based she wasn’t 
getting past holding clients by about 3 weeks. Sometimes clients rung in after 
2 weeks and said they wanted somebody else.  We taped a number of sessions 
over a period of time and I’d asked her to sort of critique  5 or 10 minutes 
and even in that she told me a lot, but I actually had to trawl through those 
sessions myself and what I ended up doing was actually, I documented her 
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interventions with the clients. It was clear that she couldn’t track and follow 
and open up conversations, she couldn’t work with the issues.  
Having grappled with her self- doubt, she repeatedly presented her worries to her own 
supervision consultant. Then she seemed to cope with her self-doubt by comporting 
(Heidegger, 1927/1962) herself as a logical investigator. The experience of self-doubt ebbed 
and flowed as she struggled with her responsibility to Barbara, as her supervisee and with her 
responsibility to ensure that clients got a good couple counselling service. It seemed as if Pat 
felt compelled to have hard evidence of Barbara’s incompetence, in order to be able to cope 
(Heidegger, 1927/1962) with the dreadful experience of being-rejecting of her supervisee. 
So whenever I had that more or less in black and white, it was at that point 
that I said “No, I can’t stand over your practice”. In the end I had to say it to 
her, which was very difficult because she felt that she did have the 
competency, she wanted to continue and she was very cross.  So that was just 
horrible for us both.  
It was an awful experience getting out of the supervisory relationship which was 
compounded by the fact that Barbara was angry and challenged her judgment. By this stage 
of the story telling there was a real sense of Pat being-keen to get the supervisory alliance 
ended. Having leapt-in so far and intervened so much, it was difficult for Pat to extricate 
herself from her way of being-with Barbara. There seemed to be a pre-reflective, primordial 
sense of being-responsible, absolutely, for the protection and well-being of clients in their 
vulnerability that overrode her conscience desire to be-supportive to another human being 
who was floundering in her presence. The need to escape from this primordial sense of being-
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solely-responsible was so powerful that it appears that once Pat had made her decision to end 
the supervisory alliance, there was no room for discussion or compromise with Barbara on 
this matter, in case she got pulled back into an over-responsible position. It had been a 
tremendous struggle for her to let go of her responsibility, as a psychotherapeutic supervisor, 
to support and develop Barbara but once she had managed her worry, confirmed her concerns 
and overcame self-doubt, then her decision was rigidly absolute. 
7.3. An Anxiously Responsible Experience 
Anne had been working as a psychotherapeutic supervisor for approximately 6 years when 
she agreed to undertake a second interview for this research project. Her primary experience 
was in providing individual and group supervision in the not-for-profit sector and she also 
had a small private, supervision practice. The following story emerged when Anne was 
reflecting on working with a supervisee Denise, in a not-for-profit organisation. Anne 
deliberated for some time before this story slowly unfolded (Anne 2:15-20).   
 
There is one that I am thinking about........I am trying to think........ The client 
really needs to be the paramount bit here. There is a case where we had to 
actually take action for the client which was about responsibility….. for the 
client, in terms of what happened with the counsellor. 
 
Anne seemed to be hesitant to disclose this story and had a number of false starts before she 
got into her flow. Initially she was very measured as she clarified her thoughts and pondered 
what she wanted to say.  Interestingly, she tells the end of the story at the beginning and in 
doing so put the client’s needs at the centre of the discourse. Already, Anne was marking up 
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that she was concerned about Denise’s practice and that she had some level of responsibility 
to be proactive in ensuring that the client’s needs were being met in the therapeutic space.  
 
The supervision session had started out with the supervisee giving me an 
account of the situation of the client. The client had suffered bereavement and 
the counsellor was discussing how she had managed the situation and was 
discussing the story. She was not hugely experienced and so she was talking 
very much about the story of the client. What concerned me was the language 
that was being used. In the language that was being used, there were two 
pieces that concerned me. The first piece that concerned me was that the 
language was what I would call social sympathy. I was not happy about it.  
You know like “aw dear help him” and I was uncomfortable. I was becoming 
uncomfortable and I didn’t think it was appropriate in terms of the 
professional relationship that I was expecting in the counselling room. 
 
Anne’s tone and demeanour gradually changed as she related her experience with this novice 
practitioner. She quietly suggested that Denise was at the story telling stage of being a 
counsellor. It seemed that Denise had not worked out how to draw out the salient aspects of 
the case, for discussion in supervision and was giving a blow by blow account of what 
happened with the client. As the facts emerged, Anne started to experience a sense of being-
concerned.  
She seemed to be concerned that Denise had lost her ground as a professional counsellor and 
had become a sympathiser to a man in mourning.  As Anne repeated the words and tone of 
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Denise’s discourse with the client, the momentum of the interview picked up and she 
sounded most confident that her supervisee’s interactions with the client were inappropriate. 
She was disturbed by Denise’s verbal interventions, considering them to be most unhelpful to 
a grieving man. There was, then, a re-enactment, in the interview, of the interaction between 
Anne and Denise. 
 
The first thing was that I listened to get some sense of how I could address it, 
as you can’t just say “don’t use those words”.  So I said “what sort of 
relationship, do you and the client have? What do you feel the relationship is 
like? Because what I hear you saying is, that you almost seem to feel sorry 
for the client” and she said “yes I did. I felt so sorry for him and it must be so 
difficult”.  I said. “Okay and how does that fit in the counselling context? 
You see yourself as very much Person Centred, so in terms of Person 
Centred, what exactly is going on between you and client? And do you think 
that it is helpful?” And the supervisee said “Well I do because I am really 
there for him and I am really listening to what he is saying”. And I said “how 
does the bit where you are almost being sympathetic towards the client,” 
when you said “oh dear help him” and “that must be terrible for him” and I 
said “that must be terrible for you? So the language that you are using is 
almost like a conversation isn’t it?”  
 
During this re-enactment Anne, initially, took up a wondering, curious position, as if she was 
genuinely trying to understand what was happening between the client and the supervisee. As 
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she became clearer, that Denise was acting and reacting as a social sympathiser, Anne’s 
demeanour in the telling of the story altered. It was evident that she was uncomfortable with 
Denise’s way of caring for this client, who was struggling with the pain of grief.  
She seemed to be experiencing a sense of disbelief that Denise had stepped over a line by 
caring and trying to mind the client in an unhelpful way that infantilised him, in a way that 
could potentially disable him. Denise’s lack of insight about her way of being, her way of 
leaping-in to mitigate hearing the client’s pain resulted in Anne becoming increasingly 
anxious. 
 
But she was struggling to see that and I became anxious. I became anxious as 
I started to think about the client’s experience….. and I was thinking about 
the client particularly because I became aware from the story that the client 
was not finding this easy. There was some indication that the client was 
(letting the supervisee know), “I don’t need this or this is not what I want”.  
And I became concerned on a number of different levels, first of all the client 
had started to get distressed about the situation and I felt had started to get 
angry. 
 
Anxiety now dominated the mood of the psychotherapeutic supervision. Anne’s experience 
of anxiety was multi-layered. She was anxious about Denise’s lack of insight. She was 
anxious about the client having a poor therapeutic experience, she was anxious that Denise’s 
way of being with the client was increasing and not decreasing this man’s emotional and 
psychological distress. Anne seemed to be grappling with continuing to care for Denise as a 
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fledgling supervisee, while she was worried that Denise was not caring, appropriately for the 
client. In order to cope with these competing experiences of anxiety, Anne tried to uncover 
more of what was happening between the client and Denise. It seemed as if she was hoping, 
in some way, to fix the deficits in her supervisee’s practice.  
  
I went back in again to see what could be done or what could be addressed 
and I went back in by asking, what sort of relationship she had with the 
client? And I ask her to tell me, again what the client had said? And again I 
was getting very little in terms of awareness from the supervisee of what the 
problem was. It was very anxiety producing in that it was almost as though 
the supervisee and I were speaking different languages. And I found that it 
was producing anxiety in me. I was worried about what happened during the 
session. I was worried that she had gone into sessions with the attitude that I 
am nice and kind and that this is the Person Centred bit. I was worried about 
that and I was also concerned for the agency in as much as, is this a safe and 
ethical practitioner?  
Unfortunately, Anne’s actions did not bear fruit. There was limited insight from Denise about 
the fundamental problem and in fact, it seemed as if a gulf was widening between them. As 
Anne told it, it seemed to be impossible to get a ‘horizon of understanding’ (Gadamer, 1975) 
between the supervisory pair. Being in a psychotherapeutic supervision session wherein a 
shared language could not be found was a highly anxious experience for Anne. This was 
evident in the way that this further re-enactment of the psychotherapeutic supervision with 
Denise was delivered.   As she reflected on these further layers of anxiety and worry, her 
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pace of speech became very rapid, almost inarticulate, she sounded like a very anxious 
supervisor, who was struggling to cope with her responsibilities. She was anxious about the 
safety of the client; worried about the lack of connection with Denise; concerned about her 
supervisee’s lack of insight and ability; and she was fretting about her responsibilities to the 
employing organisation. Then there was a twist in the story. 
 
What I also knew was that the client had chosen not to come back. The client 
had withdrawn. I felt like alarm bells were going off all over the place. Well I 
said “you know I have got a few concerns and we need to maybe have a think 
about how you could approach clients differently. I am also aware of the fact 
that you have had two short term clients”. So I already had a warning bell 
and I was concerned as to what would be the best way forward. I asked her, 
“do you need to be thinking about ways to work differently? Would that be 
possible?” She was a bit defensive. She was a bit like, “well I don’t really 
know”. She said “I feel like I’m there and I am listening to him”. So I was 
working on being helpful and asked “when you were doing your training, 
what kind of information where you using? What kind of language would you 
be using?” So there was a bit at the end of it which was a bit like teaching, a 
bit of education. So my plan was to tell her that “I have concerns, so it would 
be best if she did not take another client until we have had got this sorted 
out”.  
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The client’s withdrawal from counselling was an alarming experience for Anne. Her sense of 
anxiety was escalating. She animatedly described the warning bells that she could not ignore.  
In the manner of the story telling, it sounded as if she had made a judgement that firm action 
needed to be taken about Denise’s practice. She seemed to have vacillated between being the 
caring and nurturing supervisor, trying to support and empower Denise in her clinical work 
and being the responsible supervisor, who needed to take charge of the situation, in order to 
cope with an alarming situation. The experience, of being an anxious supervisor, when being-
with Denise could not be dissipated as Anne seemed to be clear that future clients needed to 
be protected from Denise until the supervisory pair could speak the same therapeutic 
language.   
   
So, I thought how am I going to sort this out? It’s very much that piece of 
responsibility. It’s not how is she going to sort this out? It is how am I going 
to sort this out? I took the responsibility. Probably me being person I am, 
once I take the responsibility I think it through. I had to take some action. I 
felt I wasn’t happy enough for this person to practise. I had had three goes at 
it. I wasn’t happy to leave it and for this person to take another client.  
 
By this stage, it seems that Anne, in her alarmed state of mind, had leapt in and taken 
responsibility for the care, protection and well-being of the grieving man and for future 
clients. It was almost as if Anne felt compelled to take up the mantle of responsibility 
because the anxious mood that pervaded her experience of being-with Denise could not be 
dissipated until she had taken steps to stop Denise practising. 
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In Heideggerian terms (1927/1962) leaping-in as opposed to leaping-ahead is fundamentally 
a different existential position.  If the anxious mood that engulfed the supervisory space had 
been rendered tolerable, it might have been possible for Anne to cope with her dual sense of 
responsibility towards both clients and her supervisee. In this way then Anne may have leapt-
ahead of Denise by actively educating her and supporting her towards more competent 
clinical practice with the grieving client, eventually enabling her to practice more 
autonomously. However, the compelling sense of responsibility that she experienced about 
protecting the client, and her need to ensure that he was provided with the best possible 
service (over attending to the developmental needs of the supervisee) resulted in Anne 
leaping-in and absolving Denise of her responsibility to engage with the client in his 
suffering.  
 
I said, “So I think you should not take another client and we will have 
another chat about this”. She was a bit reluctant but I had been supportive 
about the first two.  I asked was she happy enough to do that? My next step 
was to have a conversation with someone else about it. So there is a bit about 
taking the responsibility and handling it the way you think needs to be 
handled and then going to speak to someone else and say I am really worried 
about this.  
 
Once the decision to stop Denise’s practice had been taken, it sounded as if Anne was, once 
again able to comport herself as a caring and enabling psychotherapeutic supervisor. Once 
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she had ‘sorted’ out the problem and felt reassured that she had protected future clients, she 
seemed to be able to leap-ahead and be open to collaborating in Denise’s professional 
development. However, in Heideggerian terms, it could be construed that the act of leaping-
in had existentially disabled Denise to the point that she ‘did not know’ if she could become a 
competent practitioner.  
 
As this story came to an end, the burden of responsibility was palpable in the interview room. 
It was evident from Anne’s tone and demeanour that this anxiety provoking experience still 
weighed heavily upon her. Embracing responsibility for others had been a costly personal and 
professional experience for her. Yet she seemed unaware of the hidden dimension of being 
human that is leaping-in that so powerfully influenced her interactions and interpersonal 
relationship when being-with Denise. 
7.4. A Scary Experience 
Dorothy had been practising for over 10 years as a psychotherapeutic supervisor in Northern 
Ireland at the time of the first interview. She had a breadth of experience and over the years 
had provided individual supervision, shared supervision and group supervision in the not-for 
profit sector and she also had a private supervision and counselling practice. My sense of 
Dorothy was that she comported herself as a wise woman. The tone of the interview was one 
of calmness and she was fairly unflappable throughout the interview until she came to 
recount her experience of being-with Paul in psychotherapeutic supervision. This was a 
handle-on-the-door-nob story, (Dorothy 1:20-22) in that we were just about to finish the 
interview when she paused and said: 
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I suppose the bit, maybe that you haven’t asked, that might be interesting is 
when you come across a supervisee who’s struggling with a complaint. That 
might be a relevant piece and how that impacts on the supervision and on the 
supervisee. It’s difficult stuff and it’s a whole big area on its own, I think. I 
worked with one guy in particular and I found it extremely demanding.  I felt 
hugely pressured.  I used my own supervisor one heck of a lot to help me 
through it and it’s a scary piece of work, very scary. Scary because there’s 
the authority bit attached to it, you know, that this person is maybe having to 
fulfil some criteria to get back on to the register again and that feels like huge 
pressure and I wondered did I do it right? 
Dorothy had exposed an anxiety provoking experience that had not come up in the course of 
the interview. She described the magnitude of dealing with a client complaint, not only on the 
supervisee but also on herself and the process of psychotherapeutic supervision. Dorothy’s 
unflappability started to fade as she moved into the detail of this story. While her tone of 
voice remained calm, she began to emphasise in a slow and deliberate manner  how 
‘difficult’, ‘demanding’, ‘pressured’ and ‘scary’ an experience it had been to supervise Paul 
when he was grappling with a client complaint. It seemed as if Dorothy was signalling to me 
the burden of responsibility that she carried as the psychotherapeutic supervisor when a client 
had complained about one of her supervisees.  This pressurised and frightening experience 
seemed to be compounded for Dorothy because Paul needed the expressed support of his 
psychotherapeutic supervisor to get back on the register which in turn appeared to place 
another layer of responsibility upon her. In inheriting the responsibility for Paul’s fitness to 
practice, Dorothy began to question herself as to whether her actions, in this demanding 
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situation, were appropriate. So, carrying the burden of responsibility was a very frightening 
experience for Dorothy. In the way that she set up this story, it was almost as if she was 
telling me that being-scared was not a normal experience for her, as a psychotherapeutic 
supervisor and as such she found it difficult to tolerate this burdensome experience alone. It 
sounded as if she had gone to her supervision consultant to share the weight of responsibility 
and get additional support with this scary experience.  
Then this person comes along and he is very hurt, very low, self-esteem rock 
bottom. I am trying to help him, you know, get some balance within that 
complaint, but equally facing up to the fact  that some of his work is, perhaps, 
leaving him open to further complaints, so having to deal with that. So 
complaints are a huge area and I was fortunate in my supervisor at that time, 
who worked hand in glove with me to deal with it.  Without that person I 
would have been totally at sea, so it was very hard. 
Dorothy was then caught in a dilemma. On the one hand she was witnessing Paul’s 
vulnerability and initially, seemed to be pulled into a supportive mode of being, assisting 
Paul to get some perspective on the complaint.  However, she was also holding the 
responsibility for the quality of his clinical work and having to confront him with his practice 
shortcomings.  This appeared to be a tough dilemma to navigate. At this stage of relating the 
story, Dorothy was very hesitant and it sounded as if the memory of this supervisory 
encounter still troubled her. There was a sense that she was really depending on her 
supervision consultant to get her through these troubled waters.  
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 I had particular fears and I told the supervisee that I needed to talk this over 
with my supervisor, so that he knew that I was concerned and then devising 
the best course of action with my supervisor and then having to go into the 
supervisee and tell him these were my decisions and I’d consulted with my 
supervisor and we had to deal with the fallout from that complaint. 
As well as talking out her fears with her supervision consultant, Dorothy was able to be 
transparent with Paul about this concerning experience and shared her worries about his 
practice.  In her openness, it seemed as if Dorothy was laying the groundwork for changing 
Paul’s practice. She did not leap-in and take immediate action but took time to establish the 
best way forward with her supervision consultant. Having been well supported, Dorothy then 
sounded less anxious, more confident about the steps required to remediate Paul’s practice. 
However she knew there would be consequences to discharging her responsibilities.  
It was tough, obviously unforgettable.  You’ve very few like that. Tough for 
me in that I knew that this particular person could be quite arrogant, had 
some difficulty with reflection. I was insisting that he would be best helped by 
getting counselling for himself and he was not happy about it and that if he 
didn’t, there would be repercussions.  But I had to be more formal again and 
I was back at the very beginning of being a supervisor, trying to be quite 
formal and going through this mental checklist of things that I had to do.  So I 
kind of got into a business mode, professional mode, which was kind of alien 
to the normal relationship that you’d have developed, but it was necessary in 
this particular case.  It had to be done, so although, the supervisor, my own 
supervisor was great and we’d worked it out, how best to handle it, what I 
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should do.  It still was nerve wrecking going in to say ‘this is what I need you 
to do, if you want to continue as a counsellor’.     
As Dorothy reflected on this aspect of the story, she seemed to lose her voice. Encounter with 
Paul had been a scary experience.  A mood of anxiousness consumed the space between us. 
She seemed to be experiencing a loss of confidence as she remembered telling Paul about the 
steps that he needed to take, to remediate his counselling practice. It was a tough experience 
holding her ground, exercising her authority, challenging this over-confident supervisee. In 
order to cope she went back to basic principles and protocols, drew on her innate phronesis 
and in Heideggerian (1927/1962) terms was able to exist in a resolute mode of being, holding 
her ground while grappling with anxiety and a heightened sense of responsibility.  
The upside of that was he came back a number of months later and said it 
was the best thing ever happened to him.  So there was a good side to that 
one. This person needed to know that the client wasn’t safe in that situation 
and therefore we couldn’t continue with counselling or supervision unless 
this piece was completed and I think it was a fairly salutary lesson for all of 
us, you know, not just for him, but for me too.  
However, by the end of this story, Dorothy was once again comporting herself with the quiet, 
confident composure of the wise woman. She seemed pleased that Paul had gained from the 
interventions to improve his practice and that she and Paul had managed to survive the 
troubled waters of client complaints. It seemed as if a phronetic mode of being contributed to 
tempering Dorothy’s sense of anxiety and her innate need to be-responsible for safe and 
ethical practice. As such she had not leapt-in or reacted prematurely to this difficult 
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experience but in Heideggerian (1927/1962:122) terms had leapt-ahead of Paul in order to 
liberate him, in his journey towards becoming a safe counsellor. 
7.5. Being-protective 
Sinead was a highly experienced systemic supervisor who worked primarily in the Republic 
of Ireland. At the time of this second interview she had been providing individual, shared and 
group supervision in the statutory, private and education sectors for over 10 years. She had 
explained to me that the systemic approach to supervision during the training of systemic 
family therapists was to provide ‘live’ supervision. This means that the trainee therapist is 
observed during family therapy sessions, usually, through one-way glass, and the supervisor 
can communicate, give advice or direction by telephoning the trainee therapist during the 
session.   
This story (Sinead 2: 4, 8-10) evolved out of a conversation about a negative experience of 
being a psychotherapeutic supervisor.  
A bad one for me is coming away feeling that maybe I have been too forceful 
and when I have done the training, I have been a bit too hard and not given 
enough positive reinforcement at the learning or have I trampled on them…. 
And I do not like coming away with that feeling. 
 
On reflecting on her way of being as a psychotherapeutic supervisor, Sinead was concerned 
that she could, on occasion, intervene too much, during ‘live’ supervision. She was worried 
that she did not get the balance right in terms of praising her trainee therapists and riding 
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roughshod over their therapeutic efforts. It was a concerning experience for Sinead when she 
reflected back to sessions wherein she had trodden on her supervisees and she said: 
 
Sometimes I flog the horse too much 
 
Sinead’s metaphors were powerful and evocative. It sounded as if, as a psychotherapeutic 
supervisor she believed that she had could not let therapeutic sessions get out of control and 
that she was responsible for reining in trainee therapists who did not understand or strayed 
away from good practice guidelines, even if that meant, to some degree, crushing the novice 
practitioner. In this vein, Sinead called up the memory of a ‘live’ supervision with a trainee 
systemic therapist, Carla, wherein she was struggling with whether or not she should 
intervene in a family therapy session.  
 
We had a case were the client mentioned slapping and the trainee didn’t 
really go into that with the client, just heard it but kept talking about 
something else. I was watching this, it was a live supervision and I was 
observing. I can ring in. So I rang in and I redirected. So then they did ask 
about it and they did struggle around it a little bit. Well there was a part of 
me that was ok initially because I was thinking she didn’t go after it, so 
maybe she was waiting to see if we don’t have to.  
 
Sinead had given Carla some time to examine the slapping matter and initially sounded really 
understanding that her supervisee had not pursued the risk that the slapping posed to the 
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children of this family. Then she leap-ahead of Carla and telephoned into the session, in what 
appeared to be a supportive, educative and enabling manner. There was a sense that she 
expected Carla to act on her redirection and this seemed to settle her concern, for a while, 
about the child protection issue. However, Carla did not follow Sinead’s guidance. 
 
But as it goes on I am getting a little bit more anxious that we are getting 
further and further away from it. So it is then that I worry.  Will I let it play 
out to see what else is happening in the story? Is there more slapping or more 
behaviour that is risky? So do I let it play out? And I did on that occasion. I 
did let it play out.  
 
Observing Carla, after the redirection, was an anxiety provoking experience for Sinead. The 
fact that Carla did not immediately pursue the child protection issue meant that Sinead found 
herself in a whorl of escalating worry. She struggled and on this occasion managed to contain 
her inclination to step back in and take over control of the direction of the therapeutic session. 
So she gave Carla a little more time and waited to see what she would do.  
 
But as it emerged then I did have to come in. At the time we were doing this 
hour session with the family. Before we got to the end, we needed to be sure 
about this incident, before time runs out. If I sat with it, as I did in this 
particular one, then we were coming to the end, so we needed to go back and 
make sure, just to be sure about that piece. It is for the agency, it is for 
221 
 
Children’s First, all those pieces there that we have to address. But also good 
practice and safety issues for the child. 
 
Time was running out and Sinead was experiencing a sense of pressure to get more hard facts 
about the extent of the slapping before the clients left. The sense of responsibility that she 
carried for protecting children accompanied by the sense of responsibility that she had 
towards the employing agency and towards good practice guidelines meant that she could no 
longer ignore the worrying questions that she had around this family. So, under multiple 
pressures she leapt-in and took responsibility for the therapeutic work away from her 
supervisee.  Interestingly, having leapt-in and taken over the session, Sinead sounded much 
less anxious, lighter and somehow less burdened. 
 
One of the things about the live part of supervision is that you become a 
frustrated therapist. You sometimes want to jump into the room with ten 
questions and that has always been a struggle for me, that frustration. The 
frustrated therapist comes out but you know in this case this trainee is well 
versed in child protection. But if I was in there, I would have immediately 
asked this or that about the slapping. This part of me flares up, depending on 
the trainee; it flares up more with some people more than others because of 
their experience and their clinical practice. 
 
As Sinead came to the end of this story, she seemed to be very aware of her tendency to want 
to leap-in in order to ensure that the clients got the best service. The push-pull between 
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leaping-ahead and leaping-in appeared to be an on-going battle for Sinead. When she was 
able to comport herself as an appropriately responsible psychotherapeutic supervisor she was 
able to leap-ahead and empower her supervisees. When she was the over-responsible 
psychotherapeutic supervisor or when she was comporting herself as frustrated therapist 
there seemed to be a greater tendency to leap-in and trample on her supervisees. This was not 
a comportment that Sinead wanted or was comfortable with but seemed to be a way of coping 
with anxiety provoking supervision experiences. 
7.6. An Alarming Experience   
Mary had been practising as a psychotherapeutic supervisor for 3 years in the Republic of 
Ireland when she agreed to undertake this interview. She provided individual, shared and 
group supervision in the not-for profit sector and had a private practice. Prior to recounting 
this story (1:13-14), she had been telling me that she very much enjoyed working with 
student counsellors and this had lead into a discussion about her philosophy around 
supervising them. She believed that she was good at allowing novice practitioners to develop 
their own style as counsellors and that it was crucial that she was non-directive, in this 
process. Mary presented herself in a quietly confident way and my impression of her was that 
she comported herself in a very caring, even nurturing way towards her supervisees. 
Reflecting upon her philosophy immediately took Mary back into a psychotherapeutic 
supervision with a student counsellor, Michael.  
I mean I have one example of a student in September the alarm bells were 
going off all over the place. After the first one or two meetings and then by 
the third meeting something happened and I said look we need to talk. I said 
is there anything I need to know because I actually have some concerns at 
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this stage and is there anything I need to know about you and then he told me 
without crossing the boundary into therapy, and it all made sense. 
As Mary began to reflect on this story, she became pensive. Her heightened worry about 
Michael was evident in the way that she spoke. She was almost whispering as she confided 
her apprehension about Michael, in the early days of the supervisory alliance. It sounded as if 
Mary had fears from the outset about Michael but she was able to contain these. When she 
did raise her concerns, she did this in a quiet and exploratory manner. She was open and 
transparent that she was worried about him. It was as if Mary was offering Michael an 
invitation to share his problems with her and that she was ready to support him if he took up 
her invitation.  
When he disclosed, it actually made me feel a lot better because I was saying 
you know this guy is projecting.  He was coming straight from personal 
therapy to me and there was a huge amount going on. There was a parallel 
process going on with his college stuff and anyway when we worked it 
through, he said that he would change his personal therapy day, even though 
he’s travelling up from the country as well.  I think it’s very difficult for 
students, I really do. 
Mary was clear that she was not going to stray in to being Michael’s therapist and seemed to  
view the disclosure as a confirmation that her intuition as a psychotherapeutic supervisor was 
correct, that Michael was having personal difficulties that were impacting on his clinical 
practice. As Mary told this part of the story, she was demonstrating a real concern for the 
well-being of her novice supervisee. She sounded most understanding and patient about 
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Michael’s personal struggles. She seemed to be able to empathise with what it was like to be 
a psychotherapy student. The fact that Michael offered to take some action to stop his 
personal issues spilling into supervision was reassuring for Mary.  
But I had a hunch there was something going on, so rather than going in and 
saying actually you’ve mixed up an appointment, you’ve just left your 
personal therapy.  I just actually went in very gently and that would be my 
style and I was surprised at what came out actually but it has changed the 
whole relationship and now he’s got going with his clients and he’s doing 
really well with them. 
This mutual shift, to open dialogue, seemed to lead to a turning point in the supervisory 
relationship and in Michael’s work with clients. The fact that Michael had agreed to take 
some action, appeared to mean that Mary did not need to jump in and take action on 
Michael’s behalf. So she avoided direct challenge, as is her way of being as a 
psychotherapeutic supervisor and affected change by raising and naming her fears about the 
enmeshment between personal therapy and supervision. Then as Michael improved his 
practice, Mary sounded very pleased and almost proud of the good work that he was able to 
do with clients.  
I think it shifted because I didn’t jump in, I didn’t.  I wasn’t directive. I 
actually found a way of going around it and he had the choice then to say yes 
or no and if he had chosen not to, it may have stopped there. Creating a 
space, yeah, what’s going on for him? How it might affect his work? 
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So Mary did not need to leap-in. Indeed it almost seemed as if leaping-in would be contrary 
to her patient, understanding mode of being. In a soft and caring tone, she was actually 
emphatic that she did not leap-in and take too much responsibility for trying to fix Michael’s 
problems. She laid out her fears in a way that Michael could hear and understand these. She 
let him know, in a caring and concerned way that he had to take responsibility for the choices 
that he was making. In Heideggerian terms, there was a real sense that she leapt-ahead of 
Michael, illuminating the way forward for him on his journey to becoming a counsellor, 
supporting him during existential angst, modelling for him the meaning of being-responsible. 
Being-alarmed when being a psychotherapeutic supervisor, while unpleasant, was a lived 
experience that Mary seemed to be prepared to cope with in order to fulfil her sense of 
responsibility towards her supervisee. 
7.7. The Phenomenon of anxiety  
These stories were told by psychotherapeutic supervisors who had been working in this field 
for between three and ten years. Collectively they had experience of working in the not-for-
profit, statutory, educational and private sectors. Their background training and theoretical 
orientations varied considerably and their stories related to student counsellors, pre-
accredited and accredited therapists. Yet the burden of dealing with troublesome 
responsibility was a common human experience for these participants. Heightened 
responsibility manifested in actions and responses determined by the unique state of mind 
that each of these participants experienced.  Heidegger (1927/1962) considers that a state of 
mind is a fundamental way in which Dasein is its “there”, how it finds its self in a particular 
situation. State of mind is made manifest by mood and being in touch with one’s experience 
in the world; 
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What we indicate ontologically by the term” state- of-mind” is ontically the 
most familiar and everyday sort of thing; our mood, our Being-attuned 
(Heidegger, 1927/1962:134) 
Heidegger describes this as the phenomenon of ‘mood’ (Heidegger, 1927/1962:139). He 
postulates that mood tells us something significant about our way of ‘being-in-the world’ and 
that it ‘conditions and determines how everything shows up’ (Cerbonne, 2006:60).  
The stories in this chapter highlight participants’ experiences of being-in-the-world of 
psychotherapeutic supervision in which the pervading mood was anxiety. This phenomenon 
of anxiety spoke to each participant in different ways. Pat experienced a persistent and 
simmering mood of anxiety about Barbara’s competence as a couple counsellor. Anne 
vacillated between concern about her supervisee’s lack of insight and being highly anxious 
about ensuring client safety. Dorothy, normally a wise and contained psychotherapeutic 
supervisor had a peak anxiety experience when one of her supervisees was subject to fitness 
to practise issues. Sinead experienced a whorl of escalating worry when her supervisee did 
not respond to her re-direction in ‘live’ supervision. While Mary reflected on how she 
experienced and coped with an alarming experience when being-with a counselling student, 
who was struggling with a personal issue.  
From a Heideggerian perspective moods are always already there. That is to say they are pre-
reflective. They are primordial and not driven from a psychological position or the conscious 
mind. Mood affects how one is disposed to entities in the world (Heidegger, 1927/1962:137). 
Our disposedness is revealed to us in the way that our moods govern and 
structure comportment by disposing us differently to things in the world. So 
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disposedness is an “attunement”, a way of being tuned in to things in the 
world (Dreyfus and Wrathall, 2007:5).  
So, from the Heideggerian perspective it could be argued that the manner in which each of 
these participants comported themselves towards their supervisees was reflective of the way 
in which they were attuned to their supervisees, as entities in the world. In these standout 
stories we have seen how experiences of being-anxious-in-the-world of psychotherapeutic 
supervision pre-reflectively disposed participants to comport themselves in modes of being 
that caused them to ‘act or exist’ (Dreyfus and Wrathall, 2007:5) as an investigator; as an 
authoritative superior; as a wise woman; as a stern collaborator; as a frustrated therapist; as a 
directive boss and as a caring companion. 
Heidegger claims that we are ‘thrown’ into moods and that they ‘assail us’ that is to say that 
they take over, pre-reflectively and emerge out of unique experiences of being-in-the-world 
(Heidegger, 1927/1962:137).  This suggests that these psychotherapeutic supervisors were 
‘thrown’ into anxious, worried, concerned and alarming moods purely by virtue of their 
experience of being-with these specific supervisees. It suggests that the fears that they had 
about their supervisees were not driven by psychological factors or by what they consciously 
knew about theory or safe and ethical psychotherapeutic practice.   
Heidegger suggests that moods overcome us, individually and collectively. He argues that 
moods are not restricted within the bounds of individual experience, for example, the mood of 
the party or the mood of the nation (Dreyfus and Wrathall, 2007:5) or in this case the mood 
of the psychotherapeutic supervision. The shared mood which pervaded each of these lived 
experience descriptions points to a common human experience of anxiety as being a 
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psychotherapeutic supervisor. Heidegger (1927/1962:121) would argue that this phenomenon 
of anxiety exists because concern for others is a basic mode of being for Dasein. 
7.8. Responsibility as Leaping-in and Leaping-ahead 
An underlying principle of Heideggerian phenomenological philosophy is that Dasein’s 
everyday way of being is being-in-the world. This suggests that Dasein’s exists in a public 
world in which every day lived experience ‘reveals both direct and indirect presence of 
others’.  Heidegger considers that concern for others is fundamental to Dasein being-in-the-
world and he calls this concern ‘care’ or the care-structure’ (Cerbonne, 2006:50).  So from 
this philosophical perspective concern is a basic mode of being for Dasein which Heidegger 
describes as ‘the phenomenon of care’. He goes on to make an important postulation that ‘as 
“care” the Being of Dasein in general is to be defined (Heidegger, 1927/1965:121). 
Heidegger uses three distinct words, Sorge, Besorgen and Fursorge to extrapolate and 
distinguish his view of care and the care structure. Sorge relates to Dasein itself. Heidegger 
(1927/1962) postulates that Dasein’s very existence, its basic mode of being is an issue for it 
and as such Dasein’s existence matters. This mattering is a manifestation of Sorge or care of 
Dasein itself.  
Besorgen pertains to “concern” for activities in the world and things or equipment that are 
connected to worldly activities. For example, psychotherapeutic supervisors are likely to be 
concerned with text books or written policies or procedures about psychotherapeutic practice 
and have this equipment ready-to-hand when they are trying to cope with anxiety provoking 
or responsibility inducing experiences when being-in-the-world of psychotherapeutic 
supervision. 
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Heidegger goes on to elaborate on the concept of ‘Fursorge’. Fursorge, as a distinct part of 
the care-structure, is care for other people as opposed to care for Dasein itself, or concern for 
activities and equipment. Fursorge is translated from German as solicitude. Solicitude then 
takes into account the direct and indirect presence of others while being-in-the-public-world. 
As such Heidegger opines that solicitude is a central part of Dasein’s everyday being-in-the-
world (Cerbonne, 2006:50).  
So, solicitude or Fursorge is the type of care that is associated with taking care of others. In 
Heideggerian terms the concept of solicitude is related to social welfare work, ‘a factical 
social arrangement grounded in Dasein’s state of Being as Being-with’ (Heidegger, 
1927/1962:121). As such psychotherapeutic supervision is a state of being-with the Other and 
falls within the realm of solicitude, caring for the welfare of clients as well as caring for the 
well-being of supervisees. However, there are deficit and positive modes of solicitude.   
The deficit mode of solicitude manifests itself when human beings are indifferent to each 
other, when they turn against each other, when they do not matter to each other. According to 
Heidegger this is an average everyday way of being-with-one-another. It is an inauthentic 
mode of existence which negates the finitude of Dasein’s own existence. In this deficit mode 
of solicitude, concern can be more focussed on activity as a way of being in the world and the 
equipment that is ready-to-hand in undertaking these activities (Cerbonne, 2006).  For 
example, the psychotherapeutic supervisor could be less concerned about the welfare of the 
supervisee when they get into a flurry of activity around implementing policy and procedures 
around safe and ethical practice issues. Within the positive modes of ‘solicitude’ there are 
‘two extreme possibilities’, authentic and inauthentic Fursorge or ‘solicitude.’ 
230 
 
… authentic, releasing Fursorge attentively leaps ahead of the other, in order 
from there to give him back care, i.e. himself, his very own Dasein, not take it 
away’(Heidegger 1927/1962:12).  
In this extreme possibility of solicitude Dasein as being-authentic takes care of the welfare of 
the supervisee. This type of solicitude is mindful of the other’s potential-for-being. In 
authentic solicitude Dasein is ready to hold or catch the Other when they are struggling to 
cope but actively encourages the Other to stand on its own two feet, as soon as they are able 
to do so (Inwood, 1999:36). Accordingly authentic solicitude creates independence and 
encourages the Other to become autonomous.  Heidegger describes authentic solicitude as 
Dasein ‘leaping ahead’ of the Other in order to ‘liberate’ him, in order to free him to be his 
authentic self (Heidegger, 1927/1965:122).  
In my description, analysis and interpretation of the stories in this chapter I have already 
alluded to the concepts of authentic and inauthentic solicitude and their manifestations of 
leaping-ahead and leaping-in. Several of the stories, in my view, have resonances of 
authentic solicitude. For example, Dorothy’s story highlighted a pressurised and frightening 
experience when she was working with a supervisee who was trying to get back on to the 
register of his professional body. This was a peak anxiety experience for a psychotherapeutic 
supervisor who normally had a calm and measured demeanour. In this scary experience,  
from the perspective of authentic solicitude, it could be argued that Dorothy leap-ahead of 
Paul and held firm boundaries about what he needed to do personally and professionally to 
get back on the register. However, it was clear that her intention was to work with him and to 
enable him to get back to being an independent therapist as soon as this was feasibly possible. 
Indeed it is evident from the story that while Paul initially resisted Dorothy’s guidance, 
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ultimately he did remedy his shortcomings and move back to being an autonomous 
psychotherapist.  
Mary’s story could also be considered as a manifestation of authentic solicitude as she 
appeared to leap-ahead in order to liberate her supervisee. She reported an alarming 
experience when being-with Michael, a psychotherapist in training who was struggling with a 
personal issue. She emphasised, in her story-telling that she didn’t jump-in or be directive 
with Michael. Instead she caringly collaborated with him. She held Michael while he 
floundered around with his personal problem. She offered and opened up some ways for him 
to resolve his personal enmeshments that were negatively impacting on the supervisory 
process. In illuminating the way forward for Michael, in leaping-ahead, Mary was able to 
‘free’ him up to make decisions, to take actions that ultimately assisted him to grow and 
develop as a psychotherapist.  
The other extreme possibility is inauthentic solicitude or Fursorge which can: 
‘..take away ‘care’ from the Other and put itself in his position of concern: it 
can leap-in for him. This kind of solicitude takes over for the other that with 
which he is to concern himself. The Other is thus thrown out of his position…. 
In such solicitude, the Other can become one who is dominated and 
dependent, even if this domination is a tacit one and remains hidden from him 
(Heidegger, 1927/1965:122).  
Heidegger considers that inauthentic Fursorge is also a positive form of solicitude. However, 
he opines that this form of solicitude results in the Other being disempowered or infantilised. 
This form of solicitude, while still regarded as Dasein being-caring, is a form of caring that 
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may not fully be concerned, with the welfare of the Other. It is a form of caring that may 
delay or even stunt the growth and self-sufficiency of the Other.  
From the stories in this chapter, there also appears to be a common human experience of 
leaping-in when psychotherapeutic supervisors are being- anxiously-responsible when being-
with specific supervisees. Being-with Barbara was an anxiety-provoking experience for Pat. 
It was an encounter in which she appeared to exist in a state of heightened responsibility. 
Ultimately, the weight of responsibility appeared to overcome Pat and she leapt-in and 
stopped her supervisee from practising. From the Heideggerian perspective, it could be 
construed that Pat’s mode of being was one of inauthentic solicitude, in that she dominated 
Barbara and took away her choice to be a couple counsellor. However, from the tone of the 
story, it was clear that Pat considered that she had no choice but to leap-in as she became 
very worried that the clients were not being sufficiently cared for. In this context, it could 
also be conceived that Pat was leaping-ahead for the sake of the client’s well-being. 
Heidegger postulates that while leaping- in is an inauthentic form of solicitude, it is also a 
positive form of Fursorge (Heidegger, 1927/1962:122). However, in the recounting of this 
standout story, it did not appear that leaping-in was a positive lived experience for Pat.  
In listening to and striving to understand Sinead’s story, it became apparent that she had an 
on-going internal battle between encouraging autonomous practice during live supervised 
therapeutic sessions and needing to take over the running of sessions by redirecting her 
supervisees. In this standout story, Sinead was observing a case in which child protection 
issues had arisen. Initially, it could be construed that she leapt-ahead of Carla, her 
supervisee, and gave her a re-direction that was designed to be objective and educative. This 
act of re-directing seemed to move Sinead away from the anxious not knowing experience. 
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However, the level of responsibility that Sinead carried about protecting children, as a family 
therapy supervisor, quickly re-emerged. She found it difficult, if not impossible to contain 
this and she recognised that she wanted to jump into the room.  Having leapt-in and taken 
over the running of the session, Sinead’s level of anxiety was reduced. Yet, Sinead told me 
that being a highly directive psychotherapy supervisor and a frustrated therapist, were not 
comportments that she wanted but that they helped her to cope with anxiety provoking 
experiences and the weight of responsibility that she carried as a psychotherapeutic 
supervisor. 
Again, a dichotomous experience arose with the expression of solicitude. As according to 
Cerbonne (2006:50), solicitude concerns the direct and indirect presence of others. Here 
Sinead encountered the direct presence of Carla who was struggling to address a child 
protection issue. She also encountered the indirect presence of a child who was being 
physically assaulted. To act solicitously towards Carla, by leaping-ahead, and allowing her 
whatever time and  supportive feedback she needed to recognise a child protection issue, may 
have resulted in the manifestation of a deficit mode of solicitude, an indifference, on Sinead’s 
part, to the human suffering of a child who was being subjected to parental slapping.  
I consider that Anne had multi-layered experiences of inauthentic and authentic solicitude of 
leaping-in and leaping-ahead within this supervisory encounter. When supervising Denise, 
Anne became concerned that this supervisee was expressing social sympathy to a bereaved 
client. She was worried that Denise had stepped over a line and had leapt-in in a bid to rescue 
the client from the pain of grief. Initially, Anne supervised Denise in such a way as to help 
her to understand her short-comings and to gain insight into the infantilising consequences of 
social sympathy. However, when it became clear that Denise was not modifying her clinical 
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practice, Anne’s alarm bells started ringing. Almost, in parallel to Denise’s behaviour with 
the client, it could be argued, that Anne leapt-in and took away her supervisees opportunity to 
continue practising. She removed her from her position as a trainee counsellor. It was clear in 
the telling of this stage of the story that this was a difficult, even unwanted, experience for 
Anne. She realised that she had absolved Denise of responsibility to clients and that she had 
whole-heartedly embraced the responsibility for the care and welfare of current and future 
clients. While the impact of Anne’s leaping-in was that, Denise lost her growing autonomy as 
a counsellor, it seemed that once future clients were protected, Anne was able and open to 
leaping-ahead of her supervisee in the hope that she could develop her potential as a 
bereavement counsellor.   
These psychotherapeutic supervisors, in my view, were not intentionally, in their leaping-in 
trying to dominate their supervisees or trying to make them dependent but were trying to 
cope with the anxious mood that assailed then, pre-reflectively, when being-with such 
supervisees. The connection between being-anxious and the acts of leaping-in and leaping-
ahead, appeared to be hidden from these participants. It seems that this was concealed by the 
weight of responsibility that they carried for the welfare of the clients and by being 
gatekeepers for standards of safe and ethical practice in the profession. When they were 
unable to leap-ahead and privilege the care and welfare of the supervisee due to their 
responsibilities for clients or to agencies, they were assailed by existential angst. Leaping-in 
and existing in inauthentic solicitude appeared to be a distressing, unwanted experience for 
many of these psychotherapeutic supervisors. 
From these evocative stories, the phenomenon of care has been illuminated and participants’ 
experiences of authentic and inauthentic solicitude have shown that there is a push-pull 
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between leaping-in and leaping-ahead for psychotherapeutic supervisors when they are 
grappling with anxiously responsible experiences when being-in-the-public-world of 
psychotherapeutic supervision.  
In Heideggerian terms, authentic and inauthentic solicitude are features of everyday being-
with the Other (Dreyfus and Wrathall, 2007). However, Heidegger also postulates that the 
deficit mode of solicitude, in which Dasein’s way of being-with others is indifference is an 
average everyday mode of being-with-one-another. There are a multitude of examples that 
give witness to Dasein as being-indifferent in average everyday being-in-the world. However, 
in the standout stories told by these participants, the deficit mode is not evident. In all of 
these stories, it could be construed that the phenomenon of care has manifested in the positive 
extremes of authentic and inauthentic solicitude. Even on those occasions when 
psychotherapeutic supervisors leapt-in, the nature of care was authentic. They were being-
caring for the indirect presence of clients. In circumstances where supervisees were unable to 
directly care for clients, supervisor and supervisee were not able to devote themselves to the 
same common affair and were not authentically bound together in the supervisory space 
(Heidegger, 1927/1962:122). Consequently, psychotherapeutic supervisors were compelled 
to solicitously leap-in. When the supervisory pair did share the same common affair, the 
psychotherapeutic supervisor was free to leap-ahead and concernfully care for both 
supervisees and clients. 
Being and existing as a responsible psychotherapeutic supervisor really seemed to matter to 
each and every one of these participants. This mattering is reflective of Sorge or care of 
Dasein itself because Dasein’s very existence, its basic mode of being is an issue for it. So it 
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could be argued that these participants leapt-ahead and or leapt-in because their unique 
existence as being-responsible as being psychotherapeutic supervisors is a concern for them. 
7.9. Conclusion 
This chapter gathered together stories of the experience of being psychotherapeutic 
supervisors when a mood of anxiety pervaded the supervisory encounter. The phenomenon of 
anxiety emerged in their concerned, worried and alarmed narratives. These participants 
related powerful stories in which they had common yet quite unique human experiences of 
being highly responsible when being-with supervisees about whom they carried varying 
levels of anxiety.   
These stories were described and interpreted through a hermeneutic phenomenological lens. 
They resonated with the Heideggerian notion of the phenomenon of care. Experiences of 
authentic and inauthentic solicitude were illuminated as these psychotherapeutic supervisors 
tried to cope with the burden of responsibility by leaping-in and leaping-ahead of their 
supervisees. The reader has been invited to consider that these story tellers moved into these 
modes of being in order to cope with the push-pull of existing solicitously with regard for the 
best interest of clients while dichotomously trying to act with concernful care for the personal 
and professional well-being of their supervisees. 
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8. RESPONSIBILITY AS EXISTING-RESOLUTELY 
8.1. Introduction 
This chapter gathers together stories from psychotherapeutic supervisors in which they 
evocatively talk about their unique experiences of being-with supervisees who have 
transgressed in some significant way, who have crossed a therapeutic line, who have 
breached the boundaries of safe and ethical counselling and psychotherapy practice through 
acts of omission or commission. Through detailed description of and discussion about being 
in such situations these participants recounted and re-enacted their experiences of being 
challenged, shocked, angry, frustrated, incensed and judgemental by the faux pas committed 
by their supervisees. Their human responses to and lived experiences of being-with 
transgressing supervisees are considered and interpreted, taking into consideration the 
ordinary or traditional understanding of the voice of conscience and the Heideggerian, 
ontological construction of the call of conscience (Heidegger, 1927/1962:269) and the  
personal and professional meaning of being-responsible and existing-resolutely as a  
psychotherapeutic supervisor. 
8.2. A Challenging Experience 
The following story emerged during a first interview with Alice, (pseudonym) who provided 
individual, shared and group supervision in the not-for-profit, statutory and private sectors. 
She had gathered her experience over a period of 11 years and had specialisms in supervising 
practitioners who worked with individual clients, who provided couple counselling and 
psychosexual therapy.  This story evolved from a discourse in which Alice had been talking 
about what it was like to be a psychotherapeutic supervisor with individual supervisees and 
how different that was from being a group supervisor. Alice comported herself with an aura 
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of confidence when she described her way of being a psychotherapeutic supervisor.  She 
exuded a warm authority and demonstrated a passion for psychotherapeutic supervision. 
Alice launched into this story (Alice, 1:12-14)   about being a group supervisor with initial 
energy and enthusiasm, mapping out some of the challenges inherent in being in this position.   
Well I try not to be too involved (in group supervision) because sometimes 
you get hauled in.  I mean I think that might be a fault, a fault on my part. I 
sometimes don’t want to be hauled in. I prefer the group process and 
managing it. Well, I suppose it depends on whether it’s a very experienced 
group or not.  I don’t want to be just giving them my stuff because you know 
it’s more about how somebody can leave that room and go back in with the 
clients.  I suppose I’d prefer them to be getting the experience of the other 
people rather than mine. It is important because I just don’t want to be giving 
just my view on something.  I mean I do have a place to give a view, it’s very 
important that the facilitator has that remit as well, but I’d be conscious that 
it’s not just my view it is the group’s view as well. Well,  it is important that 
the supervisee feels that they have something  to take back into their work or 
that they’re feeling that they’ve been heard or that that experience has in 
some way helped them, even if it’s only to dump or you know, support or 
whatever.   
As this story unfolded, Alice appeared to be saying that being a group supervisor was very 
different to providing individual psychotherapeutic supervision. There seemed to be an on-
going tension for her between being over-involved and being under-involved in case 
supervision group discussion.  She clearly articulated that her preferred way of being was 
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being in the background,  being a facilitator while allowing and encouraging  group members  
to explore,  tease out, discuss and formulate perspectives and give supportive feedback on 
casework. However, she also seemed to be seduced by case content, by what was occurring 
within a group and wondered, did she allow herself to be ‘hauled’ into the midst of group 
discussion. Was she, at times, leaping-in especially with inexperienced supervisees giving 
her informed view, before her supervisees had had sufficient time to reflect, understand or 
respond to a case. Leaping-in appeared to be an uncomfortable experience for her, as she 
intellectually believed that it was more appropriate that group members’ perceptions inform 
case management.  
As Alice reflected on this she became hesitant and pensive as she mulled over her experience 
of being a group supervisor. On the one hand, she did not want to take over and impose her 
own perspectives while on the other hand she believed that it was important that the group 
supervisor offer views and opinions on cases. Getting this balance right seemed to be 
important as she was aware that she was holding the responsibility, for ensuring, that 
supervisees, who presented cases felt supported and got something from group supervision 
that would potentially enhance their practice. However, if this was not forthcoming from the 
group then it seemed that Alice felt compelled to get involved and articulate her perspectives. 
Having reflected on this and articulated both sides of the argument Alice’s hesitancy 
evaporated and she was once again comporting herself with ease and confidence as she began 
to reflect on a specific story related to being an over-involved group supervisor. 
I think early on in group supervision I did have, one time a situation where I 
got involved. It was a counselling case and somebody was talking about a 
client who had come in and really wanted psychosexual therapy and 
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somehow this counsellor was holding on to the client. I was a psychosexual 
therapist, so I was thinking more as a therapist rather than as a supervisor.  
The hook for Alice in being hauled into the middle of this case discussion seemed to be 
related to the fact that a vulnerable female client was presenting with a psychosexual concern. 
Alice seemed to be passionate about being a psychosexual therapist and sounded worried that 
the counsellor, presenting the case, did not fully understand the meaning of this young 
woman’s psychosexual issues. As the case unfolded, it became clear that Alice, as 
psychosexual therapist was uncomfortable that the counsellor was holding on to a client who, 
in her view, should have been referred on for psychosexual therapy. She was aware that for a 
period of time she lost herself in being the therapist, wanting to facilitate the client’s 
exploration of her sexual inadequacy and in doing so lost her sense of being a group 
supervisor.   
 That client wanted to be able to talk about that she can’t have sex, and there 
was one very psychoanalytic member of that group, a very experienced 
counsellor and therapist  who had done all sorts of other things and she was 
saying “Oh well of course that goes back into the past”. That’s fine but this is 
a young girl who just wants to be able to be sexual, and the tension of that 
and I was really feeling it and finally I kind of came in, when everybody had 
their say and I said “Well have you thought about what it might be like for a 
girl in modern Ireland going out with her friends, knowing she can’t be 
sexual.  What has she come in for? Why has she come here? And the 
psychoanalytic therapist said “Oh! That doesn’t matter. She has to battle 
with her past until she works all that through” and I said. “It may well be but 
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the girl feels at the moment that she is a freak or she’s different and she’s not 
very happy about it and she wants to do something about it NOW and she’s 
had a number of sessions, so it might be important just to think about that 
and maybe it might be important for her to talk to a psychosexual 
counsellor”.  So I left it at that. 
Alice’s state of mind was evident in her passionate delivery of this part of story. The tense 
mood that began to pervade the supervision group seemed to be heightening as Alice 
struggled to contain herself, while group members intellectually tossed around ideas about 
how to treat the client. As Alice heard her psychoanalytic colleague postulate about the root 
of this girl’s sexual difficulties and dominated the group discussion about how the client 
should be treated, it was clear that Alice was in disagreement with her and concerned about 
the way the group discussion was going.   
By this stage, Alice struggled to hold the tension she was experiencing. It was as if she felt 
compelled to intervene. When she re-enacted this part of her experience, she sounded upset 
and annoyed with the group. She was incredulous that group members could not empathise 
with this girl; could not understand her struggle with being sexually inadequate; could not 
hear her pressing need to overcome her sexual difficulty. Heidegger (1927/1962) suggests 
that Dasein experiences a call of conscience which is revealed in the ‘uncanny’ or anxious 
state of mind of the caller. In Heideggerian terms, Alice’s basic state of mind, seemed to be 
an anxious one, as she seemed to be increasingly concerned that the group members were 
‘listening way’ to the ‘they’, hearing only the theory and missing the meaning, for the client, 
of being a non- sexual being (Heidegger, 1927/1962:271).  
242 
 
So it was evident, through Alice’s impassioned telling of the story, that she judged that the 
dominant discourse in the group was lacking, that they had lost sight of the client’s needs, 
were distanced from the human to human connection of being-with the client, by being 
persuaded by psychoanalytic perspectives. She seemed to challenge them to hear the client’s 
distress, invited them to understand what it was like to be a young Irish woman with sexual 
problems and appealed for a more direct form of treatment to alleviate her difficulties. It was 
almost as if Alice wanted group supervisees to feel guilty about the intellectual way in which 
they were discussing the case. It seemed as if she was trying to prick their consciences, so 
that they would become more connected with the reality of the client’s world.  
Conscience as considered in this initial interpretation of Alice’s experience is aligned with 
the ordinary or tradition sense of conscience, which judges, moralises and reproves. 
However, from a Heideggerian perspective, the call of conscience, is not aligned with this 
ordinary every day meaning of conscience but is a call to understanding about being in a 
specific situation, when being-in-the-world. When Dasein hears the call of conscience it 
exists more authentically in that situation. It exists in resoluteness and as such makes 
decisions or takes action from the mode of solicitude, the mode of concernful caring 
(Heidegger, 1927/1962:298). From this perspective it could be interpreted that Alice’s mode 
of being-resolute in the group supervision was a manifestation of solicitude, her authentic 
expression of concernful caring for this young woman. 
I just felt well I had to come in because they were missing it. It was all on 
theory, they were missing the client, but yet I thought that the counsellor who 
was bringing the client was feeling worried because it was her client. So I 
remember eventually she came to me a few weeks later and said she wanted 
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to refer to a psychosexual counsellor.   So I had to challenge the dominant 
discussion in the group. I mean it became about the best interest of the client 
because I was feeling they were losing sight of the client in the discussion. So 
in those circumstances I could not sit back. I had to come in and give another 
view.  
It could be interpreted that for Alice to have remained uninvolved would have been an 
inauthentic experience for her, in the Heideggerian sense of being-authentic. She was an 
experienced psychosexual therapist and psychosexual therapy supervisor and her day to day 
lived experiences  informed her that the client’s presenting problem would be not be readily 
addressed by long-term psychoanalysis. It sounded as if she absolutely believed that it was 
her responsibility to ensure that this client received the most appropriate service.  In order to 
meet this responsibility, she seemed to be compelled to challenge the group’s idle talk about 
this case. It seemed as if the group members were allowing themselves to get caught up in 
psychoanalytic hypothesising and intellectually, idly interpreting this young woman 
predicament. As it was reported, it sounded as if the psychoanalytic idle talk was dismissing 
the client’s sexual needs. It was almost as if engaging in this ‘they’ talk was safer for group 
members than really engaging with the sensitive matter of a young, unattached woman 
wanting pain free casual sex. In the mode of concernful caring for the client’s desired 
outcomes and as existing-resolutely, it sounded as if Alice was determined to assist group 
members to put conceptual notions to the one-side in order that they would understand more 
clearly this client’s lived experience of being non-sexual.  I wondered had the counsellor who 
brought the case to the group, also heard and responded to the call of conscience, when she 
stepped away from the dominant discourse, when she choose not to be controlled by the idle 
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talk in the group. I wondered was the referral for psychosexual therapy as a result of a 
pricked conscience or in Heideggerian terms as a response to an inner call to be-solicitous. 
Even though, from Alice’s position, the client was referred for psychosexual therapy, this 
was a difficult, uncomfortable experience for her.   
I find it difficult, it’s not that easy because then you’re kind of challenging the 
group, it’s not just one person. It’s not that easy. I suppose, it’s about are you 
getting it right and how you’re perceived.  We’re all human. So I mean you 
do think about that.  So it matters in some way. How are you perceived by 
your supervisees? And I think the group situation is the one where it’s more 
difficult because you may not get the same space to actually look at that.  I 
mean if you have to challenge somebody in an individual supervision it may 
be uncomfortable but you know you’ll meet again and you’ll be able to work 
it through further.  
Existing authentically, hearing the call of conscience and being-resolute seemed to be a 
personally and professionally challenging experience for Alice. There was a sense of being-
alone, in her resoluteness, being-isolated in her responsibility to ensure best practice.  As 
Alice reflected on the meaning of being a group supervisor, she appeared to be vulnerable. 
There was a real sense, in the final telling of this story, that in being-resolute, Alice was set 
apart from the group. In her phronesis, she recognised that human beings prefer to be 
accepted and yet it sounded as if there had been a personal cost to hearing and responding to 
the call of conscience; a price to pay for being-responsible; some suffering in existing-
resolutely. 
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8.3. Carrying a Weight of Responsibility 
Dorothy had agreed to undertake a second interview in this research process and by this time 
had been providing psychotherapeutic supervision in Northern Ireland for about 12 years.  
Her working pattern had altered slightly, as she was doing more private practice, however she 
continued to meet the criteria for participation, as she was providing individual, shared and 
group supervision across sectors. In the first research interview Dorothy had comported 
herself as a wise woman and that impression remained in the subsequent interview as will 
become evident in the following narrative (Dorothy, 2: 10-13). This standout story transpired 
when she remembered a challenging supervisory experience with Sam (pseudonym). The 
story had stuck in her memory because it was a unique and extraordinary experience for her.   
Years ago there was one supervisee, a male. He disclosed something to me, 
something there was no way I could sit with, from his work with a client. 
Even when he was saying it, I was telling him that I will have to take it to 
supervision. I could feel that a line had been crossed… a line had been 
crossed and that’s why I was saying to him, I have an issue with this. I have 
to take this to supervision. 
The extraordinary nature of the experience of being-with Sam in this supervisory session 
permeated the manner in which Dorothy recounted this story. There was a sense of urgency 
about her which seemed to mirror her immediate experience of being-with Sam. She seemed 
to be compelled to urgently let him know that he had transgressed, that his transgression was 
intolerable and that she would not be persuaded to collude with it. It was almost as if Sam’s 
disclosure was so awful that she was catapulted into decisiveness, in as much as, she was 
certain that it was her responsibility to take Sam’s disclosure to another level and to  
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absolutely ensure that remedial action be taken. Then, Dorothy became very animated and 
moved into a rapid narrative about her experience of being-with Sam.  
Listening to him, there was a sense of panic. Am I really hearing this? Have I 
heard this? Is this what happened? And then because I think maybe I 
misheard, I needed to check it out. So can you just go back over that again 
for me? The first thought is like disbelief, is this a counsellor? It is like shock 
when I first heard that, thinking he has signed up to ethical guidelines, so he 
knows. So there was the shock, disbelief, putting him over it again, the 
realisation that oh dear, he has crossed a line here. I can’t let this go. Having 
come to the end of supervision I am telling him, there is an issue. I have an 
issue and I must discuss it in supervision and then letting him go. He was a 
bit shocked. He looked a bit oh what do you mean? As if, there is no way this 
has to be discussed and then he went out a bit pensive. 
It was a truly shocking experience, for Dorothy, as she began to learn about what Sam had 
done. She seemed to struggle to comprehend what he was telling her. The transgression was, 
initially, so far outside of her experience, as a psychotherapeutic supervisor, that for a period 
of time, it was difficult for her to grasp it. It seemed as if it was an existentially shocking 
experience, unbelievable, unfathomable. She tried to make the experience intelligible by 
questioning, querying and probing Sam. It sounded as if she did not want to believe that a 
member of the counselling profession could stray so far away from ethical practice by having 
sexual contact with a client. As the magnitude of the situation settled upon Dorothy, she 
reluctantly began to accept that Sam had transgressed the boundaries of acceptable practice 
and that he must have known that what he had done was wrong. A mood of shared confusion 
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settled on the supervisory space and for a time this seemed to paralyse both Dorothy and 
Sam. However, Dorothy was not seduced by Sam’s shock, denial or lack of insight about the 
seriousness of the transgression. Having rejected Sam’s minimisation, it seemed as if 
Dorothy’s shock and the paralysing experience dissipated. Indeed she appeared to become 
even more resolute, as she firmly held her responsibility to take action about Sam’s 
transgression. 
After he went away, it was Oh dear, some really heavy stuff, knowing that 
because he had crossed a boundary, a boundary that was quite serious in my 
eyes and in most supervisors’ eyes, there were going to be repercussions. 
That was very heavy stuff, very heavy stuff because a boundary is very clear. 
There is no denying, no seeing it differently, that’s the heaviness. Almost as 
though there is no other explanation other than this explanation and 
therefore I am left with no options. That is the bit that is the heaviness. I know 
I have to go down a certain road. It was the responsibility! Weighty! I would 
rather not have it, I can’t get rid of it. I can’t. You go around all these 
questions, how can I handle this? What is the best way? There is a bit of 
tossing stuff around in your head and trying to find a way that is the least 
destructive and yet fulfils the requirement of supervision. 
When Dorothy talked about the aftermath of this psychotherapeutic supervision session she 
sounded exhausted. What she had heard and eventually understood, seemed to be a heavy 
burden to carry. This weighty experience of being-responsible was unwanted. She seemed to 
want to escape from the magnitude of the responsibility, to distance herself from Sam’s 
wrong-doing, to circumnavigate the negative consequences of the transgression. However, 
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being-responsible as being a psychotherapeutic supervisor, Dorothy knew that she had to find 
a way to deal with this matter. She was clear that she was responsible for upholding standards 
of safe and ethical practice but was concerned to mitigate the potentially destructive 
repercussions for Sam. Holding these dual and competing demands was an exhausting 
experience.  
When he came back in again I didn’t let him go into any casework I went 
straight into addressing the previous supervision. I told him that I had been 
talking it over with my supervisor and he seemed a bit surprised. Nonetheless 
I went over the boundary that was broken and it was a very serious one and 
the options that were available to us. One of the options was that he goes into 
personal therapy immediately and he got a bit annoyed about that and he was 
going to argue with me about it. I said if you do not go into personal therapy 
I will have to withdraw my supervision and I will have to advise your 
manager that I am withdrawing my supervision. So he went into personal 
therapy. It was a challenging session, in that inside you are paddling 
furiously but outside you are maintaining the calm, saying this is how it is. 
But my inside was churning, a huge responsibility. I wouldn’t like to be doing 
those sorts of things every day of the week and because they are so rare you 
remember them. 
By the next psychotherapeutic supervision, Dorothy had taken support and formulated her 
response to Sam. She narrated this stage of the story in an authoritative manner. Her negative 
judgement of Sam’s breach of psychotherapeutic boundaries was evident. It seemed as if Sam 
still thought that he could mould Dorothy’s response and debate options to resolve his 
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mistake. The ensuing tussle seemed to be a disconcerting experience but Dorothy as existing-
resolutely did not waver. However, while she sounded confident when she gave Sam the 
ultimatum and threatened sanctions, it seems that discharging her responsibility was an 
extremely anxiety provoking experience, indeed it was an unforgettable experience.  
Well he did come back and he actually got a lot out of the personal therapy 
and was clear about where the guidelines lie and he did continue on. But he 
is no longer counselling now, it ended after a year or so. He was a better 
counsellor by then in my opinion. It was a sense of relief that he had gone 
and got personal therapy and got the insight and could acknowledge the 
boundaries in a responsible way. It was a great relief from my perspective. I 
can continue to work with you and he did say how helpful that had been but I 
don’t know how much of that was to appease me…. You always have a 
doubt… he was a charmer. 
Dorothy acted in a markedly different way, when she recounted the ending to this story. The 
exhaustion had dissipated. Her fears seemed to be allayed when Sam appeared to demonstrate 
insight into his transgression and she energetically described Sam’s transformation from 
transgressor to reformed practitioner. At one level there seemed to be a sense of relief that 
Sam had complied with Dorothy’s directives and that she had successfully discharged her 
responsibility as a psychotherapeutic supervisor, to ensure safe and ethical practice. 
However, it seems as if the psychotherapeutic supervisory relationship never really recovered 
from this shocking experience. As Dorothy reflected more deeply on her experience of being-
with Sam, I wondered was there another level of relief, relief that he was no longer practising 
as a counsellor, relief that he was no longer her supervisee. There seemed to be a lingering 
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mood of distrust, a sceptical attunement about Sam’s transformation. It was almost as if 
Dorothy’s innate phronesis was keeping her alert to the prospect that Sam was trying to 
charm his way out of a tricky situation but Dorothy as being the wise woman, remained 
resolute and did not succumb to his seduction. This shocking experience appeared to be 
existentially costly to Dorothy. In Heideggerian terms it could be ontologically interpreted 
that she wrestled with the inner call of conscience, as she found it to be a challenging 
experience to take, hold and implement her responsibilities as a psychotherapeutic supervisor. 
At times the shock of the experience seemed to undermine her resoluteness however, as she 
responded to the appeal to fulfil her potentiality-for-being (Heidegger, 1927/1962: 277) the 
responsible psychotherapy supervisor, her resoluteness became resolute. 
8.4. An Experience of Being-judgemental 
Lily had agreed to undertake one interview for this research project and had openly been 
talking about aspects of being a psychotherapeutic supervisor for around 10 years. She lived 
and worked in Northern Ireland where she thoroughly enjoyed providing individual and 
shared supervision in the not-for profit, statutory and education sectors. She was also 
developing a private counselling and supervision practice. Lily had come into the interview, 
in a very prepared and organised manner. She comported herself as a diligent and efficient 
psychotherapeutic supervisor. I think she was expecting to talk about the theory and practice 
of supervision and seemed somewhat surprised when she was asked to be talk about her day 
to day lived experience, even though she had reviewed and we had discussed the plain 
language statement. Prior to telling a specific transgression story related to an experienced 
counsellor, Ellen (pseudonym), Lily had been reflecting on what it was like being a 
psychotherapeutic supervisor.  
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 I suppose the bit I’m thinking about is the word responsible but I can’t think 
of another word that would adequately cover it. I think there is a degree 
where I do have responsibility. I’m not totally responsible because a 
counsellor needs to develop their own internal supervisor and I am 
dependent on what they’re going to bring to me or what they might not be 
bringing to me. But you know there is a bit where you do have to, at times 
say ‘HOLD ON’. I suppose if I say ‘HOLD-ON’, I think it’s a step up from 
challenging. It’s now a bit of right ‘STOP’, you need to look at this. The 
‘HOLD-ON’ bit is almost let’s put down tools here a minute and I’m moving 
into a different level which is around we do need to talk about this  ‘NOW’ 
and we do need to think about this.   Do you want me to give you an example 
that’s coming to my mind?  Would that be helpful or confusing? 
So being-responsible was a significant on-going experience for Lily. It seemed as if she 
encouraged her supervisees to share responsibility as she was mindful that she had only a 
partial view of what actually happened in the client /counsellor therapeutic space. However, 
there were occasions when she, alone, carried responsibility. This sense of responsibility 
seemed to be most evident to her when she experienced a ‘hold-on’ moment (Lily, 1:5-7, 26). 
In experiencing, these ‘stop’ or hold-on’ moments, it was almost as if Lily was trying to 
create a space in order to unconceal something, in order to help the supervisee to disclose, in 
order to understand that which was hidden, to make that which was unintelligible, intelligible 
to her.  ‘Hold-on’ moments seemed to be accompanied by a mood of urgency; a compulsion 
to move beyond the idle talk within the supervisory encounter and uncover the actuality of 
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what was happening in the therapeutic space.  Lily was, then, transported back into the 
actuality of a ‘hold-on’ moment which she had experienced with Ellen.  
I suppose what came to my mind there was working with a supervisee within 
an agency who had taken some time out for her regular work which was fine, 
came back in again and this bit is with hindsight, I think there wasn’t enough 
done to bring her back in because she’s been counselling for quite a few 
years, then had just over a year out and came back and I think there should 
have been more and I probably should have done more about thinking about 
how ready are you, but in more detail.  But anyway she went on into 
counselling and then my memory is that maybe 6 months down the line, in 
one week, we had something like, maybe it was over 2 weeks but we would 
have had 5 people in a very short period of time asking for a transfer, 
literally one after the other.  Clients can ask for a transfer for all sorts of 
reasons but I just thought ‘NO! NO! NO!’. This is very unusual, in my 
opinion.  So for me then it was a case of no more new clients, let’s HOLD-ON 
here.  
Lily started to recount this story in a deliberate and logical style. However as she started to 
unpack her experience of supervising Ellen, her delivery became animated and she sounded 
absolutely amazed that so many clients would simultaneously seek a change of counsellor. 
As she laid out the facts of the matter, there was a sense that Lily believed that a mistake had 
been made in allowing Ellen to return to work, without more attention being paid to her 
readiness to return to clinical practice. Lily alluded to having transgressed herself in not being 
diligent enough in the implementation of return to practice procedures. Yet, this logical 
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explanation did not appear to satisfy Lily as she existed in a curious state of mind, for some 
time, wondering what was happening in Ellen’s therapeutic and non-therapeutic spaces. 
However, the situation remained confusing and unintelligible to her. There was a sense that 
Lily believed that Ellen had transgressed, in some unknown way, as she was not engaging 
with clients and it appeared as if Lily believed that she was responsible for unconcealing the 
transgression and making it intelligible. So, the urgency to uncover Ellen’s mistake, to 
illuminate the ruptures in the therapeutic alliance, rapidly took over. The call of conscience as 
heard in Lily’s ‘No! No! No!’ experience could not be silenced and as existing-resolutely she 
stopped Ellen from practising as a counsellor, until the nature of the transgression could be 
uncovered.   
 Now she was very angry at that, that I had said no more new clients, but I 
just said ‘NO’, not until we figure out what is happening. I was concerned 
about her practice and there’s kind of a decision made, the processing has to 
stop, there’s a decision made and then we have to look at what is happening.   
Certainly I felt challenged, when she came back to me and said ‘Why did you 
do this? What are you saying? Am I doing something wrong?’  She was able 
to be quite rational about why these individual people had asked for a 
transfer but to me it’s unusual and I sort of had to bring her back to her 
practice.   
Once Lily had made a decision to stop Ellen from seeing clients, in Heideggerian terms, she 
appeared to exist-resolutely. Existing-resolutely requires some action to be taken which 
resolves that which has been uncovered by hearing the call of conscience (Heidegger, 
1927/1962:299). In her concernful caring for the clients she was called to help Ellen to cease 
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clinical practice until her transgressions could be made intelligible. Yet, existing-resolutely 
was a difficult experience as Ellen was angry and upset about being called out of practice. 
Privileging concernful care for clients over the demands of her supervisee, who wanted to be 
able to continue in practice, seemed to be a disconcerting experience. Notwithstanding this, 
Lily as existing-resolutely as a psychotherapeutic supervisor was not persuaded to change her 
decision; to undo the action she had taken.   
I found it quite difficult to hold my stance in that, because it did feel as if I 
was judging her and to some degree I was, in the interest of clients.  I felt I 
couldn’t stand over new clients being offered because I really didn’t know 
why this number of people had asked for a transfer.  I hadn’t good enough 
reasons, I had rationales but you know we need to be containing stuff. At that 
point, I felt I could not stand over saying look we’ll give you another client 
and see.  I thought ‘NO’, I can’t do that because I haven’t got a big enough 
handle on what the possibilities are and why these people felt they needed to 
have a transfer. But if I had a handle on that, we might have been able to 
work through it. Now thankfully that’s unusual but I have had to do it. 
There was a sense that it was a real struggle for Lily to take responsibility for being-
judgemental as being a psychotherapeutic supervisor. Yet, the call of conscience to exist- 
solicitously with respect to safe practice with clients could not be ignored and as such being-
judgemental with her supervisee, was something that Lily reluctantly accepted. As such she 
remained unconvinced by Ellen’s logical explanations for ruptures in client work. A blaming 
mood seemed to settle into the supervisory space as the angry supervisee blamed Lily for 
prematurely stopping her practice and Lily as being the judgemental supervisor, resolutely 
255 
 
held her position that Ellen had in some undetermined way transgressed. So, Lily as being-
resolute seemed to be focussed on uncovering the therapeutic transgressions that Ellen had in 
maintaining relationships with clients.  Unconcealing, illuminating and making Ellen’s 
transgression intelligible, seemed to be a manifestation of the call of conscience, a call that 
Lily was resolutely prepared to respond to in order to be able to exist authentically as a 
psychotherapeutic supervisor. 
8.5. An Incensed Experience     
The following story emerged during a second interview with Anne, who had been practising 
as a psychotherapeutic supervisor for around six years. Between the first and second research 
interviews she had developed her psychotherapeutic supervision practice and was involved in 
individual and group supervision with novice, pre-accredited and experienced counsellors. 
Anne comported herself with a sense of authority (but not as an authoritarian) but  as a being 
whose being was intensely committed to being-there for her supervisees, in order that they 
might be-there for the clients. During the interview Anne had been reflecting on 
circumstances in which she had felt concerned and responsible as a psychotherapeutic 
supervisor, mainly to do with practitioners’ competence levels.  Then she called to mind a 
supervisory encounter with a trainee counsellor, Andrea (pseudonym) who was on placement 
in a voluntary agency. She began through concernful description (Anne, 2: 20-24) to detail 
the circumstances of the trainee’s placement.   Her style of delivery was halting and 
punctuated with long silent pauses.  
I have supervised people who have not been able to do the job or do the job 
as well as I think it should be done. I can think of a supervisee where I felt 
very anxious and responsible. I supervised a trainee student and I became 
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concerned about the issue of boundaries. This person was working on 
placement as a counsellor, in an agency that did not have clear boundaries. 
So as part of the placement the student had to do some group facilitation and 
what I would call domestic duties.  So I was concerned.  
Anne slowing and deliberately set the context for her experience of being-concerned. In a 
tone that portrayed her sense of disbelief, Anne made it abundantly clear that it was 
unacceptable to her that a student on placement should be expected to be available to clients 
as a counsellor, as a group facilitator, as an educator and as a cleaner!  Anne went on to re-
enact a snapshot of a specific supervisory encounter with Andrea.  
In the supervision session, I said “I need to know exactly what you are 
doing” and she said, “We do the group thing and it is a teaching piece about 
alcohol”. So I said “when you are doing the teaching piece are you in the 
position then that the person you are counselling will be in the same group or 
in a different group?” She said, “So sometimes in mine and sometimes in the 
other group”. I said “So how do you think that affects the relationship with 
this client when you are in counselling”. The supervisee said “I don’t think it 
really matters when I do the piece about education, strategies and plans to 
help them stop (drinking) and when I am in the other place; I help them to 
talk about issues”. My feeling was that it would be very difficult to wear these 
two hats. The other bit was that she smoked and the client smoked and they 
were having a smoke together outside after the teaching group.  
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As this re-enactment unfolded, it seemed that Anne had started to comport herself as an 
interrogator. She seemed to be quietly teasing out the different hats that her supervisee was 
expected to wear and the different therapeutic and non-therapeutic spaces she was expected 
to exist in. Anne as being-judging seemed to be judging the common practices of this 
organisation, more that she was judging her supervisee. Andrea’s attempts to rationalise these 
practices and to help Anne understand the culture of this organisation were robustly rejected 
as Anne, through her warm authoritive stance, doggedly pursued her line of enquiry.  She 
spoke with a sense of disbelief that the organisation encouraged dual relationships with 
clients and it tolerated and encouraged the blurring of boundaries across professional and 
personal spaces.   
So I was concerned about all of it and I was appalled. I thought how can the 
relationship that exists between the counsellor and the client have any basis? 
How can it be functional in anyway? With all of these differences who does 
the client think he is talking to? What is she doing as the teacher? What is she 
doing as the counsellor? What is she doing as the smoking counsellor? How 
can that be when you think about some of the issues that the clients are 
bringing are very serious? So she can’t keep her boundaries and the client 
can’t know what is going on with her. So, I was very concerned, I was quite 
anxious at one level and at another level I was quite cross and angry that this 
situation is wholly inappropriate. This is damaging to the person in their 
training, damaging to the client. I was really a bit negative about the agency 
in general. I thought this is just not on! I was really quite cross, anxiety for 
the supervisee, anxiety for the client and cross with the agency. 
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As Anne mulled over the enmeshment is Andrea’s counselling placement, she moved into a 
whorl of circular reflection. Her sense of disbelief heightened as her awareness of the 
consequences of the breached therapeutic boundaries crystallised. Anne’s demeanour became 
increasingly animated and agitated as she portrayed her experience of being-appalled. She 
sounded as if she was outraged by what she firmly believed was an impossible, an intolerable 
and an utterly surprising breach of therapeutic boundaries. As a responsible 
psychotherapeutic supervisor, Anne grappled with the confused environment in which 
Andrea and the clients found themselves. For her, the best interests of vulnerable clients were 
not being attended to and she appeared to be incensed that Andrea, as a trainee counsellor, 
was being professional harmed by poor practices and boundary violations as were embodied 
in the image of the ‘smoking counsellor’.  The mood in the supervisory space was multi-
faceted. Anne seemed to be experiencing multiple layers of anxiety and anger.  As a 
psychotherapeutic supervisor whose existence was intensely committed to being-there for her 
supervisees and being-there for clients, it really sounded as if Anne was professionally 
offended by the unprofessional practices in this organisation. The heightened annoyance that 
she communicated to me seemed to suggest that she believed that the manner in which this 
organisation was providing services to clients and dealing with students on placement was 
morally wrong. Anne, as being-incensed was not prepared to allow this inappropriate 
situation to continue. In considering Anne’s experience through the traditional construction 
of conscience, it very much appeared as if Anne had taken on a reproving, chastising and 
judging voice.   
So I took her through a process of unpicking what was going on and because 
she was a student she listened and she was less defensive about it all.  I asked 
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“how does you client know who he is talking to? What hat would you have 
on? What would you like for your client?” She got a piece of it but what she 
was saying was “I really don’t know what to do as the agency has said my 
job is this and this and this”. I thought she would no longer be able to work 
at the agency under those circumstances. That’s how concerned I was. I felt 
the agency was not fulfilling the terms of a clinical placement and no 
counselling course would stand over it. There would have been a sense of 
responsibility because one of the other things is that I teach on a counselling 
course. So I had a huge amount of sympathy for the supervisee in that 
situation. But I can’t stand over someone and I can’t collude in a situation 
where someone is doing something that is not good for them in the process of 
becoming a counsellor, because what the person was learning was all bad for 
them.  
So Anne brought Andrea back into the research interview and re-enacted a further round of 
questioning about what was actually happening between her supervisee and the client group. 
Anne as being-judging had a quiet, persistent quality to her style of Socratic questioning. In 
her cross-examination of Andrea, it was almost as if she was determined to assist Andrea to 
catch hold of the inappropriateness of the expectations and practices in her placement setting. 
As being- critical, Anne’s questioning was laden with negative judgement of the 
organisation. Anne as existing-resolutely was seeking a resolution to this problematic 
situation. It almost seemed as if she wanted to make the boundary violations intelligible to 
Andrea so that she would realise that she could not continue in this setting, unless matters 
changed. As the re-enactment continued Anne, as being-sympathetic could understand the 
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dilemma that her supervisee found herself in. Yet, in all conscience she could not condone 
Andrea remaining in this detrimental set up as she was experiencing layer upon layer of 
responsibility. 
It felt like I had quite a responsibility to her and her training and a 
responsibility to something bigger. So we talked about how she could 
maintain at the moment and how she could look for an alternative placement. 
She said that would probably be the best way forward. She had felt 
uncomfortable, she was aware that it jarred with what she was doing but she 
needed the placement. So we had a conversation and I was supportive of her 
to talk to them. She said that’s what she hoped to do but subsequently that 
kind of didn’t work out particularly well and she had to move on from the 
agency. 
As Anne brought this anger-provoking story to a close, it was evident from her disposition 
that she was consumed with being-responsible as being a psychotherapeutic supervisor. She 
carried the weight of responsibility for being-there for Andrea, for being-supportive and 
being-protective of her supervisee. Furthermore, her sense of responsibility extended beyond 
this supervisee and this clinical placement as she was also comporting herself as a 
counselling educator and was taking responsibility for ensuring training standards. Alongside 
this she seemed to be grappling with taking responsibility for globally upholding standards 
within the world of psychotherapy.  
So, the weight of responsibility did not seem to be abated for Anne, when Andrea moved on 
from this clinical placement and I was left with the strong impression that Anne’s outrage 
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lingered on.  In considering Anne’s experience through a Heideggerian lens, it could be 
construed that she had heard and resolutely responded to the call of conscience in a 
concernful-caring manner with respect to her supervisee. In the mode of solicitude she had 
helped to protect and mitigate the harmful effects on Andrea of being exposed to blurred 
professional boundaries. Yet, removing Andrea from this detrimental set up did not seem to 
bring a sense of relief for Anne as the common practices in the voluntary agency had not 
changed, safe and ethical practice had not been achieved, existing-resolutely had not resulted 
in a global resolution. So the call of conscience, in the Heideggerian sense continued to 
appeal to Anne and appeared to manifest itself in the lingering experience of being-incensed. 
There was a sense that Anne as being-responsible would continue to be outraged until poor 
therapeutic practices and boundary transgressions could be eradicated. 
8.6. Responsibility as Existing-Resolutely   
Psychotherapeutic supervisors, by the very fact of being-in-the-world of supervision, find 
themselves in situations in which they hear about the positive aspects of clinical practice and 
in which they hear about the mistakes and faux pas made by other individuals and 
organisations. In these standout stories, there is an interpretation that each of these 
psychotherapeutic supervisors heard about transgressions that significantly concerned and 
affected them at the core of their existence. Their experiences of being-challenged, burdened, 
judgemental and incensed seemed to elicit a sense of responsibility within them. As a result 
of this they were determined and even seemed to be compelled to take some action in order to 
try to rectify transgressions; restore boundaries in psychotherapy practice; challenge and 
educate their supervisees and placement organisations, in a bid to promote safe and ethical 
practice with clients.  
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This interpretation of participants’ responses appears as a logical set of steps that responsible 
psychotherapeutic supervisors would and should take when confronted with violations of 
standards of good practice. However, Heidegger does not consider the process of taking 
action to be a linear one. He takes the view that Dasein does not simply find itself in specific 
situations. From his perspective, Dasein does not become aware of a situation and then 
respond to that situation but, Heidegger contends that it has already placed itself in that 
situation, in the  primordial sense of already being ‘there’ (Heidegger, 1927/1962: 300). So it 
could be construed that these participants, as existing-responsibly when being in the world of 
psychotherapeutic supervision are primordially already ‘there’, when their supervisees 
disclose transgressions. That is to say, that the Self of the participant is, already, existing as 
being-responsible.  
These descriptive stories and re-enactments clearly illuminate the meaning of being-
responsible which for these participants manifested in the common human experience of 
being-resolute. Resoluteness, in Heideggerian terms, is a phenomenon which occurs in a 
specific time and place (Heidegger, 1927/1962: 298).  
Resoluteness by its ontological essence is always the resoluteness of some 
factical Dasein at a particular time. The essence of Dasein as an entity is its 
existence. Resoluteness ‘exists’ only as a resolution which understandably 
projects itself…..Only in a resolution is resoluteness sure of itself (Heidegger, 
1927/1962: 298).  
From this perspective, it could be argued that the participants involved in these stories 
already existed-responsibly when they were existentially challenged by transgressions in 
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specific clinical settings. The meaning of existing-responsibly has shown itself in the 
phenomenon of resoluteness.  These participants’ stories are abundant with examples of the 
manner in which resoluteness projected itself. Indeed it seemed that Dorothy comported 
herself as being-resolute from the moment that Sam disclosed his transgression. Her 
resoluteness projected itself in her language and demeanour, ‘I will have to take this to 
supervision’… ‘I must discuss this in supervision. In Heideggerian terms, before Dorothy 
heard Sam’s disclosure, she was primordially existing-resolutely, in that she spontaneously 
made it plain to her supervisee that some action would absolutely ‘have’ to be taken to 
resolve his unacceptable transgression.   
In many of these stories, being-resolute as being a psychotherapeutic supervisor resulted in a 
satisfactory resolution of the transgression. However, in Anne’s experience, while her 
resoluteness projected itself within the world of psychotherapeutic supervision and assisted 
with protecting her supervisee, Andrea, from being exposed to poor therapeutic practices, it 
did not result in a global resolution, as the transgressions continued within the placement 
organisation.  In this circumstance wherein being-resolute did not lead to a resolution a 
heightened sense of being-responsible lingered on for Anne. In all conscience she could not 
resolve her sense of incensement because to do so would mean that she would be existing-
inauthentically, even irresponsibly as being a psychotherapeutic supervisor. 
Heidegger considers that Dasein has been summoned by the call of conscience into such 
specific situations and in order to hear and to respond to the appeal of conscience Dasein 
must exist-resolutely. When he refers to conscience, he takes a somewhat circular approach 
to defining it. Heidegger is, generally, at odds with the ordinary understanding of conscience. 
The ordinary or common understanding of conscience is influence by anthropology, 
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psychology and theology (Heidegger, 1927/1962). Traditionally conscience is experienced as 
an inner voice that guides us about what is ethically, morally and legally correct. It pricks us 
when we fall short of expected standards and calls us to act more responsibly. Personal 
conscience influences the collective or social conscience by informing the norms and rules 
associated with acceptable attitudes, thoughts and behaviours.  As such, as members of 
society we consider that we have the moral turpitude to call on others to listen to and respond 
to the voice of conscience. Conscience in the common understanding is associated with guilt. 
Human beings are expected to experience guilt for not having done something that should 
have been done or they are expected to feel guilty about unacceptable thoughts, feelings or 
actions. The guilty voice of conscience is often used as leverage to reform transgressions.  So 
for example, it could be construed that Alice was trying to prick her supervisees’ consciences 
when they seemed to be ignoring the female client’s need to be a fully functioning sexual 
being.  
For Heidegger the call of conscience is a phenomenological experience. The call, in the call 
of conscience is a mode of disclosure, a mode of uncovering.  
Conscience gives us something to understand; it discloses. By characterising 
this phenomenon formally in this way, we find ourselves enjoined to take it 
back into the disclosedness of Dasein. This disclosedness as a basic state of 
mind of that entity which we ourselves are is constituted by state-of-mind, 
understanding, falling and discourse. If we analyse conscience more 
penetratingly, it is revealed as a call. Calling is a mode of discourse. The call 
of conscience has the character of an appeal to Dasein by calling it to its own 
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most potentiality-for-being-its-Self; and this is done by way of summoning it 
to its ownmost being-guilty (Heidegger, 1927/1962:269). 
The call of conscience appeals to Dasein to understand something in the situation in which it 
already finds itself. It is an opportunity for Dasein to be more attuned to itself. It is an 
opportunity for Dasein to understand the meaning of its existence. In essence Dasein is being 
called to its own potentiality-for-being its Self.  In this context the Self is a way of existing. 
When being-in-a-situation, Dasein can exist inauthentically or authentically. Both of these 
modes of existence are everyday states of being for Dasein. In inauthentic existence, Dasein 
does not, however, hear the call of conscience as it is consumed by ‘idle talk’. It is lost in 
‘listening away’ to the Other to the ‘they’. 
Losing itself in the publicness and the idle talk of the ‘they’, it fails to hear its 
own Self in listening to the they-self (Heidegger, 1927/1962:271). 
There are many reports and descriptions of idle talk in participant’s stories including being 
absorbed in and privileging, as in Alice’s experience, psychotherapeutic theoretical notions 
over being-alongside the client in her distressing experience. Idle talk manifests itself in the 
deficit mode of solicitude (Cerbonne, 2006). According to Heidegger; 
This listening-away must be broken off: in other words, the possibility of 
another kind of hearing which will interrupt it must be given by Dasein itself 
(Heidegger, 1927/1962:271). 
When, this listening-away to the idle talk of the they is broken, Dasein has the potential to 
hear and respond to the appeal which comes through the call of conscience, it can exist 
authentically. This appeal is an occasion for Dasein to pay attention to itself, an opportunity 
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to discover itself (Heidegger, 1927/1962: 272).  Unlike the ordinary construction of the voice 
of conscience, Heidegger’s construction of the appeal of conscience is an existential call. It is 
a call to Dasein from within itself. This existential call is uncovered by Dasein’s state of mind 
as experienced as being-in-the-situation. A state of mind, in Heideggerian terms, is the mood 
that pervades a specific situation. He postulates that the call of conscience is signalled by a 
particular mood which he terms uncanniness. The mood of uncanniness is associated with an 
anxious state of mind in as much as Dasein experiences an anxious existence when being 
called by conscience.  
This resonates with respect to Anne’s experience of being ‘very concerned’ and being ‘quite 
anxious’ when she heard about the poor practices in Andrea’s placement setting. The more 
that she questioned her supervisee about what she was being encouraged to do with clients, 
the more Anne existed anxiously. The mood of uncanniness that pervaded Anne’s experience 
of being-with Andrea created a judgemental atmosphere in which Anne challenged the 
prevailing ethos of the organisation about therapeutic work with vulnerable clients. In this 
way, it could be construed, that Anne resolutely, responded to the call of conscience, which 
in Heideggerian terms is an appeal to reject the idle talk of the public world and the dominant 
discourse of the they (Heidegger, 1927/1962: 277).  
So Heidegger’s construction of conscience is a call to care. It does not have a disapproving, 
admonishing or cautioning voice. It is a call to exist authentically and a call to one’s own 
potentiality-for-being itself.  When the call is understood at an existential level, there is a 
more authentic understanding of the meaning of being (Heidegger, 1927/1962: 280). So when 
Dasein is confronted with its own uncanniness and when it chooses to hear the call of 
conscience, Heidegger suggests that Dasein is ready for anxiety and wants to have a 
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conscience (Heidegger, 1927/1962: 298).  In authentically hearing the appeal of conscience 
Dasein experiences the phenomenon of resoluteness. Resolute Dasein is aware of its own 
mortality, it fore-running towards death. In fore-running towards death resolute Dasein 
makes decisions and lives with a sense of resolve that enables it to address each particular 
situation that it faces when being-in-the-world, as authentically being-one-self. Choosing to 
be-resolute enables Dasein to exist authentically, in the world. It could be interpreted that 
Lily’s resoluteness projected itself in her experiences of  ‘HOLD-ON’ moments or ‘STOP’ 
moments or ‘NO’ moments. When she resolutely, halted Ellen’s practice, she was, however, 
challenged by her angry supervisee, who made it clear that she considered that Lily had made 
a wrong decision in preventing her from seeing clients. It seemed for a time, that, Lily 
grappled with existing-resolutely, when confronted by Ellen but there was a sense that if she 
had not struggled and chosen to continue to be- resolute that she would have been existing-
inauthentically. 
Resoluteness enables Dasein to be-alongside that which it encounters in the world and 
propels it into being-with-others solicitously. As such, resolute Dasein is not only concerned 
with its own potentiality-for-being but as being-solicitous has concernful care for others. In 
Lily’s story, it could be argued that she was concernfully caring for the clients and indirectly 
being-solicitous towards Ellen, who Lily believed needed help in uncovering her 
undetermined transgressions in order to become a more competent counsellor. 
Resoluteness then is associated with resolving something, of taking some action. In a 
primordial sense, Heidegger contents that authentic, resolute Dasein is already taking action. 
The action that Dasein is already taking is concernful caring, the manifestation of solicitude.  
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When Dasein is resolute, it can become the conscience of Others. Only by 
authentically being-their-selves in resoluteness can people authentically be 
with one another (Heidegger, 1927/1962:298). 
So according to Heidegger, Dasein as being-resolute can expand the call of conscience 
beyond the inner appeal, from within itself to itself and can, as stated, become the conscience 
of Others. However, this is not a moralistic, reproving or warning voice of conscience but a 
concernful caring call to authentic existence for all. 
8.7. Conclusion  
This chapter has gathered together stories from first and second interviews that dwell in 
participants’ experiences of being-with supervisees when transgressions in therapeutic 
practice have been unconcealed. In this chapter vivid accounts and re-enactments of 
psychotherapeutic supervisors day to day lived experiences have demonstrated how the mood 
of the supervisory encounter has elicited powerful experiences of being-responsible. The 
phenomenon of resoluteness has been uncovered through the interpretation of these common 
human experiences. From a Heideggerian perspective, it has been suggested that these 
participants have heard and responded to the call of conscience and that existing-resolutely is 
a way of coping with uncanniness and a way of dissipating the weight of responsibility they 
carry for ensuring safe and ethical psychotherapeutic practice. The central argument of this 
chapter is that while transgressions in therapeutic practice appear to elicit a series of 
responsible responses in psychotherapeutic supervisors, they are primordially, pre-
reflectively already there as existing-responsibly.   
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9.  MAKING RESPONSIBILITY INTELLIGIBLE IN 
PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC SUPERVISION 
9.1. Introduction 
This ontological research inquiry was interested in illuminating the meaning of being a 
psychotherapeutic supervisor. To date, there has been a paucity of studies which focus on the 
actual day to day lived experience of being a psychotherapeutic supervisor. In this study, I 
have addressed this under-researched area and begun to illuminate important aspects of what 
it is really like being a psychotherapeutic supervisor (Van Manen, 1990). In order to do this, I 
embraced a hermeneutic phenomenological methodological framework which created an 
opportunity for psychotherapeutic supervisors to become story-tellers. The descriptions and 
interpretations of their powerful stories have uncovered many unique meanings about the day 
to day, moment to moment lived experience of providing psychotherapeutic supervision.  
Unexpectedly, many evocative accounts unfolded, of experiences of being-with supervisees 
in worrying and concernful situations and they articulately talked about the personal and 
professional challenges of coping with transgressing supervisees. While there have been 
some previous studies which have addressed the management of conflict, challenges and 
ruptures in the supervisory relationship, (Nolan, 2007; Nelson et al., 2008: Grant et al., 2012), 
this research study has uniquely and strikingly unconcealed the depth of existential angst that 
psychotherapeutic supervisors actually experience.  
Participants’ experiences and the meanings that they attributed to these have been considered 
through a Heideggerian lens. From this philosophical position, the phenomena of truth, 
anxiety, care and resoluteness have emerged. A pervading common human experience of 
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being-responsible as a psychotherapeutic supervisor has been unconcealed. The notion of 
responsibility in supervision has been well documented (Carroll, 1996; Hewson, 2001; 
Hawkins and Shohet, 2006). However, critical discussion on philosophical postulations about 
primordial or pre-ontological responsibility with respect to the experience of being a 
psychotherapeutic supervisor is a distinctive feature of this study. 
Having dwelt and soaked up the participants’ stories and faithfully interpreted their 
experiences, the primary focus of this study has come to rest on, the meaning of being-
responsible as being a psychotherapeutic supervisor. The philosophical position underpinning 
this research inquiry respects the uniqueness of human experiencing. As such, I did not seek 
to identify the essence of human experience or assert that I have discovered a unified 
meaning of lived experience (Husserl, 1970a: Giorgi, 1992). Instead a taken-for-granted; 
hidden aspect of human experiencing, in terms of being-responsible as being a 
psychotherapeutic supervisor has been drawn out (Van Manen, 1990: Smythe, 2011: 
Vandermause, 2011).  
In this chapter, I reflect on the relevance and potential implications of the first-hand 
understandings about being-responsible as disclosed in this study. I seek to render 
responsibility more intelligible in the world of psychotherapeutic supervision through 
discussion, suggestion and recommendation.   I consider the contributions that this study 
could potentially make to the field of psychotherapeutic supervision, while also engaging in a 
critical discussion on the values and constraints of the chosen philosophical and 
methodological framework and outcomes of the study. 
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9.2. Uncovering Responsibility in the Here and Now  
In the Responsibility as Being-True and Being-Untrue chapter (6) standout stories emerged 
about participants’ experiences of being-with supervisees who appeared to be acting in a 
covert manner and who were considered to be concealing the actuality of their therapeutic 
practice. In such circumstances, a mood of mistrust pervaded the supervisory encounter 
which resulted in disturbing supervisory experiences. This seemed to be an unusual and 
uncomfortable experience for these participants.  In the literature, there is a dominant 
discourse about supervisors and supervisees establishing safe, empathic, trusting and 
understanding relationships (Hess, 1980: Page and Wosket, 1994: Creaner, 2014). However, 
this taken-for-grant trusting relationship was at times elusive and psychotherapeutic 
supervisors became critical and experienced powerlessness, concern and frustration when 
being-with covert supervisees. In order to cope with the experience of not knowing what was 
actually occurring in the therapeutic space, these particular participants comported 
themselves as truth-seekers.  
From the Heideggerian philosophical position, in order to cope, Dasein, draws upon fore-
structures of understanding which are influenced by expert knowledge and common practices 
(Schmidt, 2006; Dreyfus and Wrathall, 2007). The participants in this study were all 
experienced psychotherapeutic supervisors and as such have been exposed and influenced by 
theoretical paradigms about openness and transparency within the supervisory relationship. 
As has been made plain, psychotherapeutic supervisors are responsible for the protection of 
the public by overseeing and evaluating the quality of therapeutic practice (BACP, 2013: 
IACP 2013; Logan Bill et al., 1982; Fleming and Benedeck, 1983; Hewson, 2001). The 
common practices which inform psychotherapeutic supervisors on how to act responsibly 
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with respect to clients, supervisees, and employers are well defined (Proctor, 1988b; 
Holloway 1995; Carroll, 2001; Omand, 2009; Creaner 2014). It has been proposed that 
formal training in models and modes of supervision assist with the identification and 
management of the highly responsible components of this interpersonal endeavour 
(Holloway, 1995; Carroll, 2001). Psychotherapeutic supervisors are charged with the 
responsibility for dealing with any issues that thwart safe and ethical practice, such as 
‘boundary transgressions’ and ‘conflicts that affect both the therapy and the supervisory 
process’ (Whitman et al.,1998 ;170:174). At times competing responsibilities emerge, for 
instance, responsibility for protecting clients and responsibility for developing supervisees. In 
such circumstances psychotherapeutic supervisors are required to prioritise potentially 
opposing responsibilities and consider carefully their interventions with supervisees and on 
behalf of clients (Whitman et al., 1998; Creaner, 2014). 
Models of supervision which define the generic tasks of supervision reinforce a scientific 
stance by breaking down the process of supervision into measurable generic tasks. These 
models concretise the responsibility that manifests in overseeing the practice of others 
(Fleming and Benedeck, 1983; Stoltenberg and Delworth, 1987; Compton, 2005; Morgan and 
Sprenkle, 2007). The vertical mode of supervision (Hawkins and Shohet, 2006: 61) sets out 
overtly that the supervisor is responsible for ensuring that the supervisee is providing 
competent, safe and ethical practice. While, the alternative mode of horizontal or peer 
supervision rests on the premise that therapists are sufficiently experienced to practice in a 
more autonomous, unfettered fashion and are capable of being personally responsible for the 
quality of their own clinical practice (Hawkins and Shohet, 2006). However, peers are 
ethically bound to take responsibility for challenging or even reporting poor practices 
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(Feltham and Dryden, 1994). In such circumstances, individual or self- responsibility is 
negated in peer supervision.  
Collectively these models and modes of supervision are reflective of the common practices 
that psychotherapeutic supervisors utilise on an average everyday basis. Indeed, the evidence 
from the data in the being-true and being-untrue chapter demonstrates that participants in this 
study drew on such common practices when they were trying to cope with perceived untruth 
in supervisees. However, there is a paucity of references in the literature about the experience 
of being-responsible; how this influences meanings attributed to being a psychotherapeutic 
supervisor; how this impacts on the application of theories, models and modes; and how this 
impacts on human to human relationships in the supervisory space. It is my argument that 
conventional writings about responsibility and supervision do not adequately recognise or 
give sufficient weight to the depth of this common human experience, which has been 
evidenced in participants’ stories.  In other words, the literature places emphasis on the 
intellectual and practical components of this endeavour and neglects to discuss, what it 
actually is to exist as a psychotherapeutic supervisor, in concernful situations. 
I offer the view that Heidegger’s ontological project has something to offer the field of 
psychotherapeutic supervision in this regard. His philosophical stance maintains that 
ontology comes before epistemology (Heidegger, 1927/1962). When knowledge and 
common practices are privileged, he suggests that the meaning of human existence is 
concealed (Cerbonne, 2006). In considering the participant’s experiential stories from the 
Heideggerian hermeneutic phenomenological philosophical perspective, it is construed that 
their fore-structures of understanding were privileged and that these strongly influenced how 
they coped when they were thwarted in their attempts to uncover the actuality of supervisees’ 
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clinical practice. The descriptive accounts strongly suggest that when participants regularly 
experienced supervisees as being-untrue, their common response was to move, almost, 
exclusively into the monitoring or managerial supervisory function. In adhering to common 
practices and residing, primarily in a mistrusting monitoring mode, supervisors’ locus of 
attention was squarely placed on the then and there occurrences in the therapist-client 
encounter. The hermeneutic phenomenological analysis of the data suggests that there was a 
negative impact on the here and now relationship between supervisor and supervisee when 
the then and there occurrences were privileged. Participants had uncomfortable experiences 
of being-with supervisees in such circumstances. As a consequence ruptures and endings of 
supervisory alliances were a common occurrence.  
From the Heideggerian stance, it could be construed that the heightened sense of 
responsibility experienced by psychotherapeutic supervisors was fuelled by participants’ 
fore-structures of understanding. However close monitoring, as prescribed by these 
discourses, did not unconceal the actuality of supervisees practice but seemed to erode that 
human to human connection that is deemed to be such an essential aspect of 
psychotherapeutic supervision (Proctor, 1988b: Hewson, 2001; Creaner, 2014). As such it is 
argued that there is a danger that when psychotherapeutic supervisors are mistrustingly 
monitoring the then and there, that supervisees can potentially become even more covert 
about their practices and that, conversely, clients are less likely to be protected from risk or 
harm. I therefore draw the conclusion that there is a gap in the current training and 
supervision of psychotherapeutic supervisors with respect to understanding and coping with 
heightened responsibility.  
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In order to address this dichotomy, I consider that psychotherapeutic supervisors would 
benefit from exposure to Heidegger’s philosophy on the phenomenon of truth and being-true. 
He says that being-true means being-uncovering of human experience (Heidegger, 
1927/1962: 213; Schmidt, 2006). As such, I contend that being-true as being-uncovering is a 
concrete notion that has practical application to the supervisory endeavour, creating the 
possibility of fore-grounding the actual lived experiences of supervisors and supervisees in 
concernful situations. While Heidegger’s philosophical postulations on truth can be difficult 
to grasp, I think that his notion of idle talk will have ready resonance for psychotherapeutic 
supervisors, as witnessed in participants stories. By learning to notice idle talk 
psychotherapeutic supervisors, will have a reliable signpost that can alert them to the 
possibility of inauthentic existence or untruth in the supervisory space. In my view, an 
understanding of the notion of idle talk will add depth of vision to psychotherapeutic 
supervisors’ awareness that could enable psychotherapeutic supervisors to stay in the here 
and now of the supervisory relationship and be- true as being-uncovering of that which is 
hidden in the supervisor/supervisee relationship.  In being-true, in this way, 
psychotherapeutic supervisors will have the opportunity to uncover and understand the 
unique meaning of being-with covert supervisees and their interpersonal responses in such 
circumstances.      
Sharing the lived experience of being-responsible with supervisees may move 
psychotherapeutic supervisors away from a mistrustingly monitoring mode of being. Existing 
authentically in this way, is a challenging prospect as theoretical frameworks direct the 
supervisor to focus on therapists’ practices rather than addressing the distrusting mood which 
pervades the supervisory encounter. However, routinely shining an ontological lens into the 
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supervisory space could potentially lead to a shared authentic existence in which each party 
could safely uncover and understand the meaning of their actual experience of being-with 
each other. I believe that shared authentic existence has the potential to reduce ruptures in 
supervisory relationships.  
As an outcome of this research inquiry it is therefore proposed that psychotherapeutic 
supervisors are introduced to Heidegger’s philosophical position on ontology and the 
phenomenon of truth, as part of their training. Such philosophical training could be provided 
once supervisory techne has been grasped. Furthermore a new common practice of exploring 
the here and now occurrences in supervisory encounters should be integrated into the 
supervision consultation process. It is not proposed that modes and models of 
psychotherapeutic supervision should be disregarded. However, it is recommended that fore-
structures of understanding be illuminated in supervision consultation and that the 
employment of common practices is juxtaposed with seeking a depth of understanding about 
the lived experience of being a psychotherapeutic supervisor. It is suggested here that 
uncovering the meaning of lived experiences will lead to greater discernment in the 
application of theoretical frameworks and will develop phronesis in psychotherapeutic 
supervisors. This in turn, may result in more openness about the actuality of therapeutic 
practice and greater public protection. It is envisaged that these enhanced practices will 
encourage supervisors to unconceal their lived experiences and bring these into the here and 
now of the supervisory encounter. 
  
277 
 
Psychotherapeutic supervisors are invited to consider the proposition that illuminating the 
hidden phenomenon of responsibility in the here and now is as important as being-
responsible for wrestling the truth from supervisees about the then and there actuality of 
therapeutic practice. 
9.3.  Existential Angst and Inescapable Responsibility 
In the Responsibility as Leaping-in and Leaping-ahead chapter (7), the anxiety ridden nature 
of psychotherapeutic supervision strikingly and unequivocally emerged from participants’ 
concernful stories. In that chapter, I raised awareness of and explored the connection between 
the phenomenon of anxiety, the phenomenon of care and responsible existence from the 
Heideggerian perspective (Heidegger, 1927/1962). It is my contention that the findings from 
this research shed a new light on anxiety in psychotherapeutic supervision as they unconceal 
a level of existential angst that has previously been under reported in the literature. My 
argument is that the pervading nature of existential angst in psychotherapeutic supervision is 
inter-twined with experiences of heightened responsibility.  Due to the prevalence of 
existential angst emanating from participants’ stories, I take the position that responsibility is 
inescapable in the world of psychotherapeutic supervision. 
This argument is clearly influenced by Heideggerian philosophical thinking.  However, there 
are other philosophers, who offer alternative ways of thinking about responsibility. As such, 
in this section I seek to make responsibility more intelligible by considering Levinas’ 
phenomenological philosophical postulations about human to human responsibility and 
juxtaposing these with Heidegger’s contentions about the phenomenon of care and authentic 
solicitude (Levinas, 1961/1969; Heidegger, 1927/1962). Levinas’ writings about 
responsibility have been deliberately chosen to provide a counterpoint to the Heideggerian 
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influence in this study, for several reasons. Firstly, Levinas as a renowned European 
phenomenologist is known to be one of Heidegger’s prominent critics (Morgan, 2011). 
Secondly, when considering responsibility from a philosophical position, Emmanuel Levinas 
(1906-1995) is fore-most among contemporary philosophers in making claims about human 
to human responsibility (Todd, 2001).  
Levinas’ central treatise focusses on human social existence and ethical interpersonal 
interaction (Harrington, 1994). For Levinas, ethical human existence is experienced as a force 
in which the Self is obliged to care for and respond to other human beings in their neediness 
and suffering. Ethical responding in human relationships manifests in limitless, acts of 
‘senseless goodness’ and ‘senseless kindness’ (Levinas, 1961/1969). Responsibility is a 
matter of ethics for Levinas. He proffers the notion of ethical responsibility which he 
considers to be pre-ontological, making the claim that responsibility is already there 
(Levinas, 1974/2009). He asserts that ethical responsibility is an ingrained, inescapable 
aspect of being human and that it is a pervading and curative feature of human social 
existence (Levinas, 1961/1969; Todd, 2001).   
For Levinas, the starting point for ethical responsibility is the interpersonal relationship that 
occurs between two particular persons (Morgan, 2011.8). He places significant emphasis on 
the face-to-face encounter. In almost biblical language, he speaks in terms of the ‘epiphany of 
the face’ which manifests in the Self recognising unconcealed misery, in the face of the other 
(Levinas, 1961/1969:199). There is an appeal, a plea, from the face of the other which 
cannot be ignored. The Self is commanded to serve and meet the needs of the other through 
intrinsic human to human responsibility (Levinas, 1972/2006).  
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This is, however, an existential struggle, as the epiphany of the face splinters solitary 
existence and calls for the abandonment of self-absorbed pleasures (Morgan, 2011; Levinas 
in Peperzak et al., 1996; Todd, 2001). However, Levinas postulates that innate ethical 
responsibility resolves this dilemma as this primordial human condition precludes the Self 
from abandoning the utterly particular other who is suffering (Harrington, 1994; Levinas, 
1961/1969).  He, then, goes on to argue that unlimited ethical responsibility is universal and 
purports that there is an ethical foundation to all human relationships (Levinas, 
1974/2009:10).  
The evolution of Levinas’ philosophical thinking increasingly distanced him from his 
Heideggerian heritage (Morgan, 2011:2). Heidegger purported that there are many unique, 
contextual meanings of being human; multiple situated meanings of being, as espoused in the 
notion of Dasein (Heidegger, 1927/1962). However, Levinas’ philosophy totally rests on the 
premise that there is meaning in human existence primarily because the human condition is 
pre-ontologically, ethically responsible (Levinas, 1961/1969). 
Unlike Heideggerian philosophy which has been highly influential in the emergence of 
existential thinking and therapeutic practice, little has been published about the connection 
between Levinas’ philosophical perspectives and psychotherapy (Harrington, 1994). In some 
ways this is surprising because Levinas’ philosophy places significant emphasis on human 
social existence and ethical interpersonal interactions (Levinas, 1974/2009) while the 
cornerstone of the majority of psychotherapeutic theories is establishing a therapeutic 
relationship in order to assist clients to deal with emotional and psychological pain ( Van 
Deurzen-Smith; Mearns and Thorne, 2007).  
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There is also a distinct absence of the application of Levinasian notions with respect to 
psychotherapeutic supervision. On first consideration of Levinas’ assertions on universal 
ethical responsibly which ….can be seen as my responsibility for the other’s responsibility to 
others (Loewenthal et al., 1997:138) there seems to be a parallel with the process of 
psychotherapy supervision. Psychotherapeutic supervision occurs in the context of a 
relationship between two people, who are both concerned with caring for and reducing the 
pain and suffering of another; which could be construed as universal ethical responsibility, in 
action.   
In considering the findings from this research study through a Levinasian lens, it could be 
argued that the phenomenon of human to human responsibility manifests in the supervisory 
relationship. From participants’ standout stories, there is no doubt that responsibility is a 
pervading aspect of being a psychotherapeutic supervisor. In the manner in which 
experiences of responsibility were recounted, in many cases it sounded as if there was, 
indeed, an ethical force driving their human interactions (Morgan, 2011). The memories 
emerging in the research interviews commonly demonstrate that responsible existence is 
inescapable within the psychotherapeutic supervisory relationship (Levinas, 1961/1969). 
Evidence from the data strongly suggests that participants firmly adhered to the view that the 
foundation of psychotherapeutic supervision is rooted in ethical practice.  
Having reflected on, Levinas’ philosophy on ethical responsibility, I consider that it also has 
something significant to offer the field of psychotherapeutic supervision. In many of the 
stories recounted by participants, it really sounded as if they were compelled to be-
responsible and that this compulsion was not intellectually rooted but primordially driven.  
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Therefore, I suggest that opening up a broader philosophical discourse on pre-volitional 
responsibility would be highly beneficial to psychotherapeutic supervisors and supervisees. 
Drawing out the difference between acting responsibly and being-responsible, in my view, 
could expand the scope of understanding in the world of psychotherapeutic supervision. In 
line with the actual experiences of participants in this study, an expanded philosophical 
discussion could uncover and normalise the inescapability of responsibility in the human to 
human interaction that is psychotherapeutic supervision.  This is important because the 
seasoned participants in this research had unwanted and disturbing day to day, moment to 
moment, experiences related to being-responsible which were not fully addressed by current 
theoretical paradigms.  
If psychotherapeutic supervisors were given the opportunity during training and supervision 
consultation, to consider and embrace the notion that they primordially exist-responsibly, this 
could facilitate them to consider unique personal meanings of being-responsible when being-
with supervisees, in concernful situations. 
I would also offer the opinion, that acknowledging pre-volitional responsibility in human to 
human social existence creates an opportunity to reposition responsible existence in the 
psychotherapeutic supervisory endeavour. Currently, the management of responsibility is 
determined by theories and methods of supervision and is guided by ethical frameworks. 
Dealing with responsibility, as has been made plain, has been scientifically reduced into a 
series of generic tasks and functions (Carroll, 1988; Hewson, 2001). However, responsibility 
could be repositioned at the core of the supervisory relationship, by recognising the 
possibility of pre-ontological ethical responsibility.  
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So, I suggest that the force of this primordial position is not underestimated when 
psychotherapeutic supervisors are grappling with ethical dilemmas, in concernful supervisory 
situations. In other words, I am recommending that horizons of understanding are broadened 
in order to fore-ground the actuality of responsible social existence. This shift from acting 
responsibly to openly and transparently being-responsible has the potential to create more 
authentic, less covert interactions between the supervisory pair.  In Levinasian terms, both 
parties are deemed to be pre-ontologically responsible for responding to the needs of others. 
Raising and examining, this notion of personal ethical responsibility when establishing 
supervisory alliances may assist the supervisory pair to cope, more collaboratively, when 
problems arise in clinical practice, as a shared understanding about responding to the needs of 
others before fulfilling one’s own solitary needs, has already been established.  
However, while responsibility was a common human experience for participants, I consider 
that their actual day to day lived experiences diverge from Levinas’ postulations on universal 
ethical responsibility (Levinas 1961/1969) because this contention is not immediately evident 
in these participants’ stories. Several psychotherapeutic supervisors recalled specific 
circumstances in which they were unable to respond to both the needs of supervisees and 
clients. For instance, when some participants were convinced that a supervisee was not 
sufficiently competent, they responsibly responded, firstly, to alleviate the client’s pain. If 
possible they latterly responded to the plea from the supervisee for help and assistance to 
improve their practice.  On such occasions these participants wrestled with reconciling their 
responsibility towards both clients and supervisees. They experienced existential angst and 
self-doubt, when they felt compelled to respond to the epiphany of the face of the other, as 
client, when doing so meant ignoring the plea they witnessed in the face of supervisees. 
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While some participants grappled with interventions that negated the needs of supervisees or 
halted their existence as therapists, others appeared temporarily and in some cases 
permanently, to evade or disregard the face of the utterly particular other (Levinas, 
1974/2009).  
With respect to responding responsibility to competing needs, I consider that Heidegger’s 
philosophical positions on the phenomenon of care and authentic solicitude resonate more 
closely with participants’ accounts of their actual lived experiences. While Levinas’ 
philosophy is rooted in the idea of primordial human to human responsibility, Heideggerian 
phenomenological philosophy states that concern for others is a basic, pre-reflective mode of 
being for Dasein (Levinas, 1961/1969; Cerbonne, 2006:50). While the language and 
structures for responding to the needs of others are markedly different between these 
philosophers, in common they consider that human beings are already there, in terms of 
being responsible or caring entities (Levinas, 1974/2009; Heidegger 1927/1962).  
Heidegger defines care in terms of authentic and inauthentic solicitude toward the direct and 
indirect presence of others (Cerbonne, 2006; 50). As psychotherapeutic supervisors are 
charged with the direct care of supervisees and the indirect care of clients, I consider that 
Heidegger’s position on the care- structure is more relevant than Levinas’ postulations on 
universal ethical responsibility with respect to the findings from this research.   
Therefore, alongside my recommendation to reposition responsible existence at the core of 
psychotherapeutic supervision, I suggest that it would be beneficial to raise awareness of the 
level and prevalence of existential angst that has emerged in this research, with novice and 
experienced psychotherapeutic supervisors. I anticipate that this could give psychotherapeutic 
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supervisors an opportunity to more openly acknowledge the anxiety-provoking aspects of the 
work directly with their supervisees. It would allow the supervisory pair to jointly examine 
the positive and negative impact of the phenomenon of anxiety on the supervisory 
relationship. It may assist them to understand the mood of anxiety that can be all consuming 
in the supervisory space and which potentially contaminates and ruptures their human to 
human relationship. This would enable the supervisory pair to examine whether or not they 
are authentically bound together in the common affair of caring for clients (Heidegger, 
1927/1962:122).  
In order to do this, I am suggesting that Heideggerian style existential analysis is added to the 
repertoire of reflective activities that occur in supervision consultation and in 
psychotherapeutic supervision.  Existential analysis brings a focus to moment to moment 
experiences. It is not concerned with analysing practice through theoretical lens or in-depth 
reflection on emotive responses. Yet, it has the potential to unconceal lived experience 
descriptions; to uncover what is actually occurring in the supervisory space.  
So psychotherapeutic supervisors could be facilitated in supervision consultation, to 
existentially analyse their state-of-mind, the mood and atmosphere within specific 
supervisory encounters and the impact these are having on their interactions with supervisees. 
Existential analysis may also enable psychotherapeutic supervisors to consider and 
understand their level of tolerance of existential angst, providing a greater scope of 
understanding about propensities to leap-in and leap-ahead of supervisees.  Importantly, it 
could provide an opportunity to unconceal the interconnectedness of existential angst and 
heightened experiences of responsibility. 
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In recommending that practitioners have an opportunity to reflect on Levinas’ notions on pre-
ontological responsibility, I hope to normalise the inescapability of responsibility in the 
psychotherapeutic supervisory relationship. In advocating Heideggerian style existential 
analysis, I am encouraging educators and supervision consultants to assist psychotherapeutic 
supervisors to dwell in the experience of concernful care, to illuminate the phenomenon of 
anxiety and ultimately to deepen understanding of the meaning of being-responsible as 
opposed to simply acting responsibly.   
9.4. Coping with the Weight of Responsibility 
In the Responsibility as Existing-Responsibly chapter (8), participants related highly 
concerning stories which uncovered transgressions, boundary violations and incompetence 
involving individual supervisees and counselling organisations. Poor practice and ethical 
breaches are regularly reported in journals published by accrediting and regulating bodies 
(BACP, 2013; IACP, 2013; UKCP, 2013). However, the personal and professional cost for 
psychotherapeutic supervisors in having to cope with and respond to transgressions in the 
therapeutic workplace has been neglected in contemporary literature and research. In chapter 
8, through the interpretation of evocative stories, I have begun to address this deficit by 
unconcealing what it is like for psychotherapeutic supervisors to be exposed to poor practices 
that potentially place clients and supervisees, at risk. As such, in this study, heightened 
responsibility in psychotherapeutic supervisors has been unconcealed as a common human 
experience when being-in-this-situation. Multiple manifestations of being-responsible have 
been described and interpreted and the weight of responsibility has been particularly 
evidenced in the vivid stories in chapter 8.  In Heideggerian terms, the phenomenon of 
resoluteness has been uncovered and emphasis has been placed on the relevance of hearing 
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the call of conscience in anxiety provoking supervision sessions (Heidegger, 1927/1962; 
298:269).  
In a further bid to render responsibility more intelligible, this section focusses on the weight 
of responsibility inherent in the supervisory endeavour and critically discusses the manner in 
which influential ethical frameworks and psychotherapy bound theories of supervision 
consider and apportion responsibility to psychotherapeutic supervisors.  
The notion of responsibility is overtly conceptualised in codes of practice for counsellors, 
psychotherapists and supervisors. The Ethical Framework for Good Practice in Counselling 
and Psychotherapy (2013) as devised by the British Association for Counselling and 
Psychotherapy outlines that attendance at supervision is mandatory for therapists and 
supervisors. The framework charges independently-minded supervisors with the 
responsibility to protect clients, enhance practice and maintain standards in the profession 
(BACP, 2013:7). It sends a clear message that therapeutic practice must be overseen. The 
inference is that self-regulation and self-responsibility is insufficient and that clear 
mechanisms are required to ensure that the public is protected from risk or harm.  
In the Irish Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy’s Code of Ethics and Practice 
(IACP, 2013) responsibility is set out as one of four key principles that counsellors and 
psychotherapists must adhere to. The Code outlines three planks of professional 
responsibility which concentrate on General Responsibilities, Continuity of Care and 
Resolving Dilemmas. Again, attendance at supervision is obligatory if practitioners wish to be 
accredited members of this regulating body. From the IACP’s perspective supervisors are 
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charged with the responsibility for ensuring that the three planks of professional 
responsibility are adhered to (IACP, 2013).   
The direct influence of the position that ethical frameworks and codes of practice take with 
respect to the responsibilities apportioned to supervisors appears to be evident in many of the 
stories told by research participants.  As experienced psychotherapeutic supervisors they 
were clear about their obligations to protect clients and ensure that supervisees’ practice was 
safe and ethical. When a line had been crossed or breaches of safe and ethical practice were 
reported to them they appeared to make a series of moves consistent with the standards and 
guidance laid down in ethical frameworks.  
So while there is general agreement about the value and necessity of ethical frameworks and 
codes of practice, there is a concern that these can be blunt instruments that do not always 
serve clients, therapists and supervisors well (Levinas, 1974/2009). As they focus on the 
practical and knowledge based aspects of psychotherapeutic practice and are prescriptive in 
nature, I would suggest that care must be exercised in the application of codes and principles 
so that psychotherapeutic supervisors do not respond reactively when faced with scenarios 
that appear to violate good practice guidelines.  
From an ontological perspective there is a concern that by emphasising, the practical strands 
of this endeavour that the meaning of being a responsible psychotherapy supervisor gets 
concealed and that psychotherapeutic supervisors could  leap-in, unnecessarily fettering 
supervisees’ therapeutic practice. Even though the experienced psychotherapeutic supervisors 
who took part in this research study understood and sought to adhere to the guidance asserted 
in codes of ethics and practice, they were still burdened with a weight of responsibility when 
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being-with transgressing supervisees. The hermeneutic phenomenological analysis of data 
has illuminated unique meanings of being- incensed, disturbed and existentially shocked 
when participants were confronted with breaches of therapeutic boundaries. It is my 
contention that these experiences and the hidden meanings attributed to these can impact on 
interactions and responses between psychotherapeutic supervisors and supervisees.  
Supervisors are required to review their codes of ethics and practice on a regular basis in 
order to be up to date with their responsibilities (BACP, 2013: IACP, 2013). Undoubtedly, 
understanding of and adherence to the principle of responsibility in ethical frameworks has 
contributed to protection of the public and upholding standards in the profession. However, 
the actual reality and meaning of being-responsible is not overtly addressed within ethical 
frameworks. Therefore, it is argued, here, that unless the meaning of existing-responsibly, in 
the primordial sense is uncovered and existentially analysed there is a real danger that this 
hidden phenomenon will adversely impact on the application of codes of ethics and practice. 
In my view, there is greater potential for clients to be better protected from risk of harm and 
for supervisees to be enabled to provide safer and more effective therapy when ontological 
and conceptual ethical positions are simultaneously considered in training and on-going 
supervision consultation.  
Supervisors’ responsibilities are also discussed in highly variable ways in psychotherapy 
bound approaches to this endeavour. The philosophies, underpinning principles and practices 
of the main psychotherapeutic traditions with respect to supervision have been critically 
discussed in chapter 3. Here, I discuss how these approaches uniquely consider and apportion 
responsibility to psychotherapeutic supervisors, supervisees and clients, starting with the 
psychoanalytic school.  
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The overarching responsibility of the supervisor is to propagate the philosophical and 
theoretical principles of psychoanalysis and to bring supervisees back to these if they 
meander into foreign psychotherapeutic territories (Balint, 1948). 
The supervisor carries the primary responsibility for defining and 
maintaining boundaries, for sustaining the dyad’s focus on the task and for 
sustaining an analytic attitude (Frawley-O’Dea and Sarnat 2001: 83).  
Psychoanalytic supervisors, previously known as control analysts take responsibility for 
ensuring that they avoid engaging in the personal analysis of analysts and maintain a central 
focus on the supervisees’ analysis of patients (Mattoon 1995). Responsible supervisors pass 
on their psychoanalytic knowledge and experience, model patience and understanding of 
supervisees’ frustrations about the slow emergence of unconscious material and symptom 
reduction. They attend to their personal reactions in supervisory relationships, in a bid to 
identify and interpret parallel processes which may serve to unlock unconscious dynamics at 
play in the therapeutic space (Searles, 1955).   
There has, however, been some criticism levied at psychoanalytically orientated supervisors 
with respect to responsible, ethical practice (Alperin, 1997). Psychoanalytic theory purports 
that it is essential to work with patients’ fantasies and to talk about the impact of these on the 
self of the patient (Benvenuto and Kennedy, 1986). It advocates that supervisors assist 
analysts to sit with and interpret patients’ material thus enabling them to make meaning of 
their symptoms (Wharton, 2003). As this process cannot be forced, there may be a significant 
time period in which patients are engaging in inappropriate or damaging behaviour that puts 
others or indeed themselves at risk. There is a concern that in privileging this theoretical 
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position  that some psychoanalytic supervisors are failing to embrace responsibility for 
protecting the public and are failing in their ethical duty to recognise a genuine call for 
action (Weiner et al., 2003; 108). As psychoanalytic supervisors’ primary responsibility is to 
maintain a psychoanalytic attitude, it can be a real challenge to take any actions which could 
potentially, impact negatively on the analysis (Frawley-O’Dea and Sarnat, 2001). However, 
working with patients’ symptoms, especially inappropriate or abusive fantasies, exclusively 
through the psychoanalytic paradigm has been called into question, when more immediate, 
responsible ways to support patients and effectively protect the public are available (Alperin, 
1997; Weiner et al., 2003; Omand, 2009). So, psychoanalysis privileges the interpretation and 
processing of unconscious material over Levinasian style personal and social responsibility 
and pays scant attention to supervisors’ actual day to day lived experience of being-
responsible (Heidegger, 1927/1962/Levinas 1961/1969).  
Personal responsibility is however more openly addressed in cognitive-behavioural therapy 
and supervision. As has been discussed in an earlier chapter, from this perspective, there is a 
view that clients are mainly responsible for their own problems and that the creation of 
emotional and psychological distress is due to their irrational thinking, adherence to rigid or 
extreme beliefs and repetition of dysfunctional or harmful behaviours (Beck, 1995; Ellis, 
1994; O’Sullivan, 1996). As such, this approach squarely places responsibility on the client 
to actively draw from a variety of cognitive and behavioural strategies in order to overcome 
their problems (Corey, 2001: 297). 
This emphasis on responsibility carries over into the therapeutic and supervisory spaces. 
While the responsibility of the client is to actively collaborate with the therapist in their 
recovery, the responsibility of the supervisor is to ensure that the therapist is capable of 
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enabling clients to understand and utilise cognitive-behavioural techniques through a process 
of psycho-education (Liese and Beck, 1997). The central responsibility for cognitive-
behavioural supervisors is to ensure that the principles and practices of this therapeutic 
paradigm are consistently modelled with supervisees during individual and group supervision 
and to ensure that these are faithfully applied in therapeutic practice (Omand 2009). 
Supervisory responsibility is therefore focussed on teaching supervisees how to be 
competent, creative and effective cognitive-behavioural therapists (Woods and Ellis, 1997).   
While cognitive- behavioural supervisors place emphasis on developing and maintaining 
collaborative, psycho-educational alliances with supervisees, they are overtly accountable, 
through on-going supervision, for evaluating therapists’ fitness to practice and if 
circumstances dictate, to recommend a cessation of clinical practice (Watkins, 1997; 
Rosenbaum and Ronen, 1988).  As such, supervision in this therapeutic domain moves away 
from the core cognitive-behavioural principles which promote autonomy, self-reliance and 
personal responsibility (Liese and Beck, 1997). There is, however, a lack of discussion in the 
literature about how cognitive-behavioural supervisors reconcile the dichotomy of 
apportioning responsibility to clients, while simultaneously holding overall responsibility for 
the quality of supervisees’ day to day therapeutic practice. This is a taken for granted practice 
for cognitive-behavioural supervisors in which professional responsibility for safe and 
effective practice is privileged over the precepts at the heart of this therapeutic approach.  
From this brief analysis of responsibility in psychoanalytic and cognitive-behavioural theory, 
it could be argued that these psychotherapy schools place responsibility on supervisors to 
propagate their philosophies and practices, be that through modelling, psycho-education or 
reining in supervisees who stray away from prescribed principles. In doing so, psychoanalytic 
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and cognitive-behavioural schools do not pay attention to the here and now experience of 
being-responsible. Responsibility is interpreted and accounted for through their knowledge 
based structures. However, the weight of responsibility as experienced by participants in this 
study, demonstrates that the phenomenon of responsibility does not neatly fit into intellectual 
constructs.  
It is my view that these approaches to supervision have spoken about supervisor 
responsibilities in terms of how to undertake supervision but have not overtly spoken about 
human to human responsibility or about the weight of responsibility that supervisors 
inevitably experience in practice. Yet, the findings emerging in this study, demonstrate that 
supervisors who have been trained and who practice these psychotherapeutic modalities do 
grapple with being-responsible in the supervisory space. It is my view, that balancing 
theoretical interpretations with a genuine openness to attending to the experience of being-
responsible, could help psychoanalytically and cognitive-behaviourally orientated 
psychotherapeutic supervisors to avoid burnout and to be more emotionally, psychologically 
and intellectually available to supervisees and clients.   
In contrast to psychoanalytic and cognitive behavioural positions, responsible existence is a 
central feature of several shades of existential therapy as advocated by Frankl (1963), Yalom 
(1980), May (1983) and Van Deurzen (1997). This approach assists clients to live more 
purposeful and creative lives by helping them to gain insight into key aspects of being human 
such as freedom and responsibility as well as developing awareness of the importance of 
finding meaning and purpose in life, even in times of pain and suffering (Frankl, 1963).  
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Existential therapy assists people to realise that existential angst is an on-going condition of 
living which is perpetuated by having awareness of the impermanence of daily life and by 
acknowledging the inevitability of the finitude of life (May, 1983). Existential therapy calls 
and helps people to take personal responsibility for finding purpose and making meaning in 
their transitory and ever-changing lives.  Past experience, attitudes and responses to crises 
influence the manner in which people take responsibility or avoid responsibility for facing the 
voids in the physical, social, psychological and spiritual domains of their existence (Van 
Deurzen-Smith, 1996). 
According to Frankl psychotherapists have a responsibility to encourage clients to confront 
the meaninglessness that they experience in human existence by seeking a sense of purpose 
in their day to day relationships and working lives (Frankl, 1965). In facing the existential 
vacuum, existential therapists support people with the challenge of being personally 
responsible for making meaning in their changing and evolving human existence (Frankl, 
1965; Corey, 2001). The existential therapist helps clients to be aware of the challenges that 
they face in taking responsibility for the choices which they make and for the consequences 
of these (May, 1983).  As previously discussed, existential therapy is fundamentally 
interested in unconcealing and understanding the complexity and depth of human 
experiencing (Yalom, 1980).  
This position follows through into existential supervision which invites supervisees to stay 
close to the reality of clients lives and to gain insight into their human experiencing. So, 
existential supervision reflects the existential therapeutic position in as much as supervisors 
take responsibility for understanding how their biases and assumptions influence the 
supervisory encounter, their way of being with supervisees  and their appreciation of their 
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supervisees’ experiences when being-with clients (Van Deurzen and Young, 2009: 10). The 
existential supervisor takes responsibility for modelling the being-with traits that existential 
therapists bring to the interaction with clients (Van Deurzen and Young, 2009). They assume 
responsibility for being-in-relationship with supervisees as opposed to being-responsible for 
getting supervisees to do things in the right way (Mitchell, 2009: 167).  As such they do not 
set themselves up as gurus or superior beings but are responsible for being-real when being-
with supervisees in the world of supervision. This means that existential supervisors let their 
supervisees see that they are authentic human beings who grapple with challenging 
therapeutic and life situations. In being-true as being a supervisor, it is hoped that existential 
therapists come to realise that they don’t have to be perfect before they can trust themselves 
as practitioners (Van Deurzen, 1998; Mitchell, 2009).   
According to Mitchell (2009), the existential supervisor is continually mindful of her/his own 
and others’ professional and personal responsibilities. 
I believe that an existential supervisor will be acutely aware of his or her 
response-ability as a human being who is in the unique position of having 
confidence in the supervisee’s ability to take up his or her responsibility. This 
very same therapist/supervisee will already know that s/he can never take 
responsibility for his or her client’s way of being with others; that is the 
client’s responsibility. (Mitchell, 2009: 170).   
Existentially, responsibility is individually owned as opposed to being apportioned by 
professional bodies or ethical frameworks (Van Deurzen and Young, 2009).  The existential 
supervisor helps supervisees to cope with individual responsibility and is concerned to assist 
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them to achieve a balance between excessive-responsibility and deficiency of responsibility 
(Macaro, 2009: 28). In the first position the supervisee tends to take on too much 
responsibility for client well-being and the outcomes of therapy, which ultimately erodes the 
existential view of personal responsibility. In the latter position supervisees apportion too 
much responsibility to clients and do not question their own responsibilities in terms of doing 
their utmost for clients. In such circumstances, it is the supervisor’s responsibility to 
challenge supervisees by holding up a mirror to them so that they can unconceal that which 
is hidden in them or taken for granted in their therapeutic practices (Mitchell, 2009: 170).  
Alongside this mirroring process, supervisors have a responsibility to themselves and to 
others to communicate their thoughts about therapeutic practice in a respectful, adult manner 
which takes into account the assumptions and views of those who are actually in relationship 
with the client (Adams, 2002). However, the existential supervisor accepts that supervisees 
are ultimately responsible for what they take away from supervision (Mitchell, 2009).  
Having been influenced by Heidegger, existential supervision is a systematic and patient 
philosophical exploration that involves deep-thinking about what it means to be human in an 
interconnected world (Van Deurzen and Young, 2009:12). Until relatively recently, 
existentialism has overlooked supervision mainly due to its anti-theoretical stance and its 
adherence to its philosophy on personal responsibility (Du Plock 2009; Farber, 2011). 
Existential supervision is however in a process of development and is constantly evolving 
(Mitchell, 2009).  
In the future, I would hope that existentialism more actively extends its reach to the 
supervision of supervisors. This would enable a depth of thinking about individual 
supervisor’s experiences and could potentially create a space for on-going exploration of, 
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among other things, the meaning of being-responsible in this domain of practice. I consider 
this to be important because while existentialism forthrightly addresses responsibility as a 
central aspect of human existence, I have been unable to find any literature or research which 
pays attention to the weight of responsibility that existential supervisors experience when 
being indirectly exposed to human pain and suffering.   
Rogers’ person-centred philosophy places the notion of self-responsibility at the heart of the 
therapeutic endeavour and is a persistent theme in Rogers’ writing (Kirschenbaum and 
Henderson, 1990). The approach proposes that when there is a growth promoting climate in 
therapy clients will gain personal insight and learn to accept responsibility for themselves, 
their life choices and actions (Mearns and Thorne, 2007). The Rogerian position on self-
responsibility has permeated in to person-centred supervision as traditionalists advocate that 
person-centred supervisors replicate the core philosophy, principles and practices of this 
approach with their supervisees (Patterson, 1997; Scaife, 2009). The central responsibility of 
the supervisor is to establish and maintain a positive, affirming supervisory relationship as 
this is deemed to be directly correlated with therapeutic efficacy (Norcross, 2011; Creaner 
2014). Self-responsibility is encouraged in person-centred practitioners for the quality and 
management of their own casework (Bernard and Goodyear, 2009). Based on the principle of 
self-responsibility, the traditional person-centred supervisor is one step removed from the 
client in terms of responsibility, as they are required to focus their attention, empathy and 
unconditional positive regard on their person-centred supervisee. Here, the supervisor is not 
deemed to be an expert or overseer but a supportive, enabling, equitable facilitator (Patterson, 
1997; Kearns, 2005). In traditional person-centred supervision, responsibility for casework 
resides with the supervisee (Bernard and Goodyear, 2009).  
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However, with the increase in regulation in psychotherapy practice, contemporary person-
centred supervisors have moved away from a pure Rogerian stance with respect to self-
responsibility. They continue to espouse the notions of unconditional positive regard in the 
supervisory relationship and affirm self-responsibility in supervisees, up to the point, where 
they become concerned about client safety issues (Tudor and Worrall, 2004). Similar to 
traditionalists, they model the philosophy and principles of the person-centred approach in 
supervision. However, in contracting with supervisees, they are transparent about their moral 
and legal responsibilities, as apportioned by professional bodies, to ensure standards of safe 
and ethical practice (Lawton and Feltham, 2000; BACP, 2013; IACP, 2013). This is, 
however, an uncomfortable position for person-centred supervisors as it contradicts Rogers’ 
position on supervision and self-responsibility (Rogers, 1942). So, contemporary person-
centred supervisors are open to sharing their feelings about assuming responsibility and 
overriding supervisee’s self-responsibility as they strive to maintain a productive and 
enabling supervisory relationship, while being open and transparent about their professional 
and social responsibility to assess supervisees’ fitness to practice (Page and Wosket, 1994; 
Creaner, 2014). The acceptance of professional supervisory responsibility has gone some way 
towards allaying criticism of traditional person-centred supervision, which appeared to afford 
a limitless non-judgemental space, for supervisees to recognise their short-comings or gain 
insight into their professional and personal developmental needs (Scaife, 2009).  
Self-responsibility is closely linked with Roger’s optimistic and trustworthy image of the 
person (Kirschenbaum and Henderson, 1990). Unfortunately several of the stories in this 
research study, paint a less than positive picture of some supervisees, especially those who 
transgressed the bounds of safe or ethical practice. The person-centred way of coping with 
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such situations gravitates towards the supportive, enabling and educative functions of 
supervision, preferring to keep evaluation to a minimum in order to avoid the imposition of 
conditions of worth (Patterson, 1997; Rogers, 1980; Scaife, 2009). However, from a 
Heideggerian perspective, it could be argued that the person-centred pre-occupation with 
trust, support and supervisee self-responsibility conceals psychotherapeutic supervisors’ 
actual anxious experiences when therapists are not being-responsible. Even though many of 
the participants in this research study had been trained in the person-centred approach, they 
described how they experienced a heightened sense of responsibility when faced with 
incompetence and faux pas in therapeutic practice. In such circumstances, they were unable 
to sit and ponder notions of supervisee self-responsibility but existed-resolutely in order to 
protect clients from risk or harm.  
This raises the question of whether or not it is feasible to mirror person-centred 
psychotherapy principles of self-responsibility in supervision. Person-centred therapy is 
based on an equitable relationship between client and practitioner (Thorne, 1996). 
Supervision is a relationship between professionals who ideally can share responsibility for 
best practice (Creaner, 2014). Yet, it is not a horizontal, equal relationship as the supervisor 
can and does become the final arbiter of what constitutes safe and ethical practice (Kearns, 
2005). In my view, openly attending to the here and now, actual experience of being-
responsible could assist person-centred supervisors and their supervisees to come to terms 
with this dichotomy, as this approach is rooted in phenomenological/ experiential philosophy 
(Nelson-Jones, 1992).  
A central tenet of person-centred philosophy is authenticity, in the sense of being genuine or 
real in encounters with others (Kirschenbaum and Henderson, 1990). Heidegger constructs 
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authenticity in terms of existing resolutely in terms of taking some action to resolve 
something that is occurring in a specific situation (Dreyfus and Wrathall, 2007). I suggest 
that considering these two positions on authenticity, in tandem, could create an enhanced 
climate of openness regarding being-responsible as a person-centred supervisor and at times 
needing to be directive in order to resolve concerns about therapeutic practice. I believe that 
such an atmosphere is more reflective of the actual experiences emerging from participant’s 
day to day stories of being in challenging supervisory situations wherein the phenomenon of 
responsibility manifested and they resolutely responded. 
Having critically considered psychotherapy bound approaches to supervision, and their 
constructions of responsibility, it appears as if these make assertions about what supervision 
is and how to do it and they offer unequivocal positions on what constitutes responsible 
supervisory practice. In essence, these modalities assert that their underlying 
psychotherapeutic philosophies and principles are readily applicable to the supervisory 
endeavour. From an educative perspective, I can understand this rationale as supervisees gain 
professional development within their chosen modality of practice. However, I consider that 
psychotherapy bound approaches to supervision, with the possible exception of 
existentialism, do not sufficiently address the inescapable responsibility that has been 
unconcealed in psychotherapeutic supervisors’ actual human experiences.  Nor, I respectfully 
suggest, do they meaningfully assist psychotherapeutic supervisors to cope with the weight of 
responsibility. 
The findings from my research have clearly shown that responsibility is a burdensome issue 
for the psychotherapeutic supervisor. Therefore, I am suggesting that there is something 
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about responsibility that is more fundamental to human existence than is acknowledged in 
contemporary writings and theoretical postulations on psychotherapeutic supervision.   
In order to do justice to this human experience and to render responsibility more intelligible, I 
am recommending that it is necessary to move outside of the confines of the principles and 
practices of psychotherapeutic modalities and prescribed ethical guidelines. I am not 
suggesting that these should be disregarded but that they should be carefully considered with 
respect to the reality of psychotherapeutic supervisors’ existence.  
In order to achieve this I am proposing that an independent ontological approach to the 
supervision of psychotherapeutic supervisors is developed. In this new style of supervision 
consultation, I am suggesting that prominence would be given to uncovering actual 
supervisory experiences and to understanding the meaning that supervisors attribute to these. 
This is different to theoretically influenced supervision consultation which is concerned with 
unpicking what strategies were used; understanding the dynamics between supervisor and 
supervisee and understanding emotional responses in supervisory situations. The focus here 
would be on expanding horizons of understanding about human experiencing in the 
interconnected world of psychotherapy supervision, uninfluenced by the assertions inherent 
in knowledge based structures about how to provide a psychotherapeutic supervision 
(Gadamer, 1975). 
As psychotherapeutic supervisors are fundamentally held accountable for the quality of 
therapeutic practice, I am suggesting that this original supervision consultation stance would 
rest on the premise that responsibility is pre-ontological; that it is pre-volitional; that 
responsibility emanates from within the Self of the psychotherapeutic supervisor when she/he 
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responds to the call of conscience (Heidegger, 1927/1962). Ontological style supervision 
consultation would, therefore, acknowledge the inescapable nature of personal responsibility 
while taking account of the responsibilities attributed to psychotherapeutic supervisors by 
their preferred theoretical trainings and ethical frameworks. This I believe would help to 
normalise responsibility and enable psychotherapeutic supervisors to better cope with the 
weight of it.   
I am suggesting that the current gap in psychotherapy bound approaches to supervision about 
human to human responsibility could be addressed through engagement in ontological style 
supervision consultation. In this environment, I contend that psychotherapeutic supervisors 
will develop an awareness of their unique human experiences and the influence these have on 
their supervisory practice. From this, I consider that psychotherapeutic supervisors could 
learn to pay attention to them-selves in a different way; that they would be able to tap into 
and uncover their anxious and responsible modes of being, when being-in-specific- worrying- 
supervisory-relationships.  Through increased ontological awareness, I consider that 
psychotherapeutic supervisors could more immediately recognise and understand their 
interactions towards concerning or transgressing supervisees; determine if their responses are 
rooted in existential anxiety; discern whether or not their actions will protect clients and 
enable or disable their supervisees.   
 It is, therefore, my contention that psychotherapeutic supervisors could more readily resolve 
difficult supervisory experiences and cope better with the weight of responsibility by 
developing and maintaining ontological awareness in their day to day practice. It is my view 
that being aware of modes of being while in supervisory practice is an important adjunct to 
the repertoire of intellectual and conceptual approaches to psychotherapeutic supervision.  
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9.5. Conclusion 
This chapter sought to render responsibility more intelligible in the world of 
psychotherapeutic supervision. It has carefully considered how the notion of responsibility is 
treated in models and methods of supervision and how these influence participants’ fore-
structures of understanding. From a Heideggerian perspective, in this chapter, I invited the 
reader to consider how an appreciation of ontology could assist psychotherapeutic 
supervisors to dwell in the here and now of disconcerting supervisory situations as opposed 
to pursing elusive truths about the then and there happenings in supervisees’ therapeutic 
practice. It has suggested that truth-seeking, fuelled by fore-structures of understanding, 
heightened participants’ sense of responsibility and adversely affected human to human 
connections in the supervisory space.  
In this chapter, I also sought to develop understandings of responsibility by considering 
Emmanuel Levinas’ philosophical position on human to human responsibility as a counter-
point to Heidegger’s propositions regarding the phenomenon of care (Levinas, 1961/1969; 
Heidegger, 1927/1962). Levinas’ treatise rests on the notion of pre-ontological ethical 
responsibility. However, his philosophy has had limited influence on the principles and 
practices of psychotherapeutic supervision, yet responsibility to and for others is a central 
aspect of this endeavour. I have suggested that by acknowledging pre-volitional ethical 
responsibility, there is the potential to make responsibility more intelligible, by recognising 
and repositioning it as a core, enduring, inescapable aspect of the existence of the 
psychotherapeutic supervisor. I then parted company with Levinas as his postulations on 
universal ethical responsibility did not resonate with the findings that were uncovered in 
participants’ standout stories (Levinas, 1974/2009). Instead, I took a position which favours 
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Heidegger’s constructions on the phenomenon of care which manifests in authentic and 
inauthentic solicitude as these modes of being make sense with respect to participants lived 
experiences, the existential angst that pervaded supervisory encounters and how they coped 
with responsibility by leaping-in and leaping-ahead of supervisees (Cerbonne, 2006).  
Having reflected upon the importance of uncovering responsibility in the here and now and 
raised awareness of the interconnectedness of existential angst and the inescapable nature of 
responsibility, I then turned my attention to the weight of responsibility inherent in the 
supervisory endeavour. In doing so I directed my focus to the manner in which ethical 
frameworks and psychotherapy bound approaches to supervision address responsibility. 
Comments have been proffered that ethical frameworks focus on accountability and how to 
act responsibly but do not provide guidance on how to cope with the weight of responsibility 
that these apportion to psychotherapeutic supervisors.   
With respect to psychotherapy bound approaches to supervision this chapter states that the 
theoretical schools discussed, define supervisor responsibilities and make asserts about how 
to act responsibly. However, I draw the conclusion that with the exception of existential 
therapy, they are silent on how to deal with troubling experiences of being- responsible or 
how to manage the weight of responsibility that supervisors actually carry. 
In order to render responsibility more intelligible and manageable in psychotherapeutic 
supervision, I have recommended that an independent ontological approach to supervision 
consultation is developed. I have contended that this could enable psychotherapeutic 
supervisors to maintain ontological awareness in their day to day practice which I suggest 
would be an important adjunct to the theoretical and conceptual paradigms that they utilise.       
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9.6. Contributions, Critiques and Future Considerations 
There is a significant decision to be made about when is the right time is and where the right 
place is to finish a PhD thesis and indeed there is a question about whether or not a thesis is 
ever finished. In grappling with these dilemmas the hermeneutic phenomenological 
researcher considers if the research question and aspirations of the study have been 
addressed; if hidden or taken-for granted aspects of actual human experiencing have been 
uncovered; and if new understandings of the phenomena under investigation have emerged 
through accurate description  and cycles of thinking and interpretation (Schmidt, 2006; 
Smythe, 2011). This final section of the thesis examines these matters, discusses the 
contribution that this research study could make to the psychotherapeutic community, 
considers critiques that could potentially be levelled at this study and makes 
recommendations for further research.  
This research study has addressed an under researched yet crucial aspect of 
psychotherapeutic supervision. It has uncovered phenomenological patterns and common 
human experiences (Vandermause, 2011) of responsibility and has illuminated aspects of 
what it is really like being a psychotherapeutic supervisor in concernful situations (Van 
Manen, 1990). It has uncovered experiences of heightened anxiety in psychotherapeutic 
supervisors when they are faced with untruth, incompetence and transgression in the 
supervisory space. As such this study has begun to address the neglected question of what it 
means to be a psychotherapeutic supervisor. 
Responsibility is a taken-for-granted aspect of psychotherapeutic supervision. However, the 
findings from this research have unconcealed and articulated that responsibility is a 
burdensome experience which is intertwined with existential angst; that it is inescapable in 
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this life-world (Heidegger 1927/1962). It has been suggested that the phenomenon of 
responsibility can be rendered more intelligible by moving outside of the confines of 
psychotherapeutic bound approaches to supervision and prescribed ethical guidelines and by 
dwelling in the experience of being-responsible as being in human to human relationships. 
Uniquely, an appeal has been made for reflection on the notion of pre-ontological 
responsibility so that responsibility can be repositioned at the heart of the here and now 
supervisory endeavour.  
The development of an independent ontological approach to supervision consultation, 
unfettered by the influence of psychotherapeutic theories and ethical frameworks has been 
proposed. It has been suggested that this will go some way to filling the gap in current modes, 
models and approaches to the supervisory endeavour about coping with responsible 
existence. It is anticipated that engagement in independent ontological supervision 
consultation could enable supervisors and supervisees to move to a new level of shared 
authentic existence.  In this way, it is hoped that the influences of the phenomena of 
responsibility, on psychotherapeutic supervisory practice, will be more readily unconcealed 
and coped with. 
The Heideggerian philosophical position has been influential in guiding this study which has 
begun to address the paucity of hermeneutic phenomenological studies examining the 
experience and meaning of being a psychotherapeutic supervisor.  This philosophical and 
methodological framework has proved itself to be a very good fit for achieving the 
aspirations of the research. In choosing this approach to research inquiry, I have uncovered 
the phenomena of truth, anxiety and resoluteness in the life-world that is psychotherapeutic 
supervision (Heidegger, 1927/1962). Importantly, this Heideggerian ontological style project 
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produced a rich source of data leading to significant findings and recommendations, that I 
consider will be of direct benefit to psychotherapeutic supervisors, supervisees, supervision 
consultants and clients.  
This approach has however been subjected to criticism on several levels. Critics of Heidegger 
suggest that his philosophical writings are perplexing, convoluted and difficult to navigate 
and that by the end of Being and Time (1927/1962) his treatise was unfinished (Cerbonne, 
2006; Moran and Mooney, 2007).  While, I have found Heidegger’s work to be compelling 
and almost poetic, it has required significant time, attention and immersion to get to grips 
with his ontological project and the manner in which he discusses the specificity of human 
experiencing and the manifestation of phenomena.  This raises the question as to whether or 
not I have made a correct interpretation of the Heidegger’s philosophical postulations that I 
have articulated in this thesis. It is difficult to give a definitive answer to this question as 
Heidegger takes the reader down a long, winding philosophical path which twists and turns 
back on itself through myriad tributaries.  However, the findings from this study have 
received a phenomenological nod from Heideggerian phenomenological philosophers and my 
research supervisor. 
Transcendental or descriptive phenomenologists might criticise this approach to the study 
because it does not seek to find a common universal essence or unified meaning of lived 
experience (Giorgi, 1992). Furthermore, while there are checks and balances built into the 
hermeneutic phenomenological research process to monitor that pre-understandings and fore-
structures of understanding do not interfere with accurately describing and interpreting lived 
experience, Husserlian phenomenologists assert that assumptions and prior knowledge should 
be bracketed off in order to avoid subjective contamination of the data (Husserl, 1970).  In 
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this thesis, a decision was made to focus on the phenomenon of responsibility as this was a 
pervading and persistent common human experience emanating from the data. However, it 
could be construed that in focussing on this particular phenomena and its manifestations that 
my fore-structure of understanding influenced this choice; and in doing so other 
phenomenological experiences associated with the meaning of being a psychotherapeutic 
supervisor remain concealed. 
In terms of the techne of hermeneutic phenomenological research, I have been influenced and 
endeavoured to adhere to the guidance provided by Van Manen (1990), Smythe, (2008) and 
Vandermause (2011). In doing so, I have captured a wealth of evocative lived experience 
stories from which I identified and unconcealed a common human experience of being-
responsible in supervisory relationships. However, it has been asserted that hermeneutic 
phenomenological research lacks structure and linear direction, resulting in methodological 
confusion (Conroy, 2003). While, I dispute this contention, and have asserted the 
trustworthiness of my research method, I am mindful that approaches to undertaking 
hermeneutic phenomenological research are evolving and continue to be refined. Therefore, I 
recommend that hermeneutic phenomenological researchers publish and share with the 
research community their techne in order that more aspects of human existence can be 
brought to light. 
In terms of the research participants, I was most fortunate that female psychotherapeutic 
supervisors with a wide range of experience consented to take part and were extremely open 
in disclosing their day to day lived experiences. While I carried out 14 initial interviews and 8 
second interviews with participants, I was initially disappointed that all 14 participants were 
not available to take part in the second round of interviews. Yet, having soaked in the data 
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from all of the interviews, I realised that a rich vein of raw data was readily available. I have 
wondered what influence experiential stories from male participants would have had on the 
findings from this study. However, I am satisfied that the voices of a proper sample of 
psychotherapeutic supervisor in Ireland have been faithfully represented in this study. When 
Heidegger and Levinas were making their philosophical claims, they wrote as if their 
postulations were universally applicable to human beings. That is to say they took an un-
gendered, meta-view of human experiencing. Therefore, I anticipate that the findings from 
this research will have something significant to offer to psychotherapeutic supervisors of all 
genders and levels of experience. Furthermore I would hope that the findings from this 
research regarding existential angst and inescapable responsibility will have a broader 
resonance in human to human relationships that occur in specific concernful situations.  
While the aspirations of the study have been met and significant research findings have been 
presented, I wish to make a number of suggestions for future consideration. While 
Heideggerian philosophy was extremely helpful in interpreting and understanding 
phenomenological experiences and uncovering the pervading nature of existential angst and 
responsibility in participants’ stories, I think it would be beneficial to open up a discourse on 
alternative philosophical positions on responsibility. Taking the discussion initiated here on 
Levinasian human to human primordial ethical responsibility would be a good starting point 
but could also be expanded to consider the work of Jacques Derrida. Such discussions could 
ultimately inform the training and education of psychotherapeutic supervisors and 
supervision consultants. 
I would also suggest that research is carried out examining the provision of independent 
ontological supervision consultation; what type of influence this has on supervisors’ 
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ontological awareness; and if this impacts on the manner in which psychotherapeutic 
supervisors cope with existential angst and experiences of heightened responsibility.  
Finally, this study has focussed on the experience and meaning of being-responsible in 
psychotherapeutic supervision in concernful situations and in doing so has thrown a new light 
on a taken for granted aspect of existing in this life-world. However, I propose that there is a 
need for further hermeneutic phenomenological research studies designed to tell us more 
about what it is really like being a psychotherapeutic supervisor.  
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APPENDIX A -Interview Schedule 1 
Section 1- Introduction/Preamble 
 Welcome respondent 
 Collect Consent Form 
 Clarify if there are any questions arising 
Section 2- Inclusion Criteria 
1. Interview Date…………….Duration of Interview………………. 
2. Female supervisor ………….. Or Male supervisor………………. 
3. Age?..............Years 
4. How long have you been practicing as a supervisor?  
5. Were you trained as a psychotherapeutic supervisor in Ireland or the United Kingdom?   
Yes/No 
6. Are you currently providing individual, shared or group psychotherapeutic supervision to 
pre-accredited and accredited counsellors or psychotherapists?   Yes/No 
 
Section 3 – Interview Schedule 
1. How would you describe your experience of being a supervisor? 
2. What does it mean to you professionally to be a supervisor? 
3. What does it mean to you personally to be a supervisor? 
4. How would you describe your approach to supervision?  
5. What factors influence your approach to supervision? 
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6. In what way(s) does the process of supervision affect counselling and psychotherapy 
practice? 
7. Has your experience of supervision changed over the years?   
8. Is it a different experience when you are providing individual or shared or group 
supervision? 
9. What do you think you, personally, bring to the process of supervision? 
10. What would you say is the essence of supervision, for you? 
 
Many thanks for taking part in this research 
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APPENDIX B -Interview Schedule 2 
Second Interview Schedule 2012 
 Rationale for 2nd Interviews.  
With the research methodology that I am using it is recommended that second interviews 
are carried out with participants. The idea is that this helps the researcher to confirm or 
vary the findings from the first round of interviews.  
 Plain Language Statement/ Questions? 
 Consent Form/Sign/Questions? 
 I am interested in your actual experience of being a supervisor on a day to day basis. So I 
would like you to tell me the story of some of your specific supervision experiences. 
 Could you tell me about the last supervision session that you had with a counsellor or 
psychotherapist? 
 What was you experience? 
  Could you tell me about a positive supervision session? 
 What was you experience? 
 Could you tell me about a negative supervision session?  
 What was you experience? 
 Have you ever experienced a sense of responsibility in a supervision session? 
 Have you ever experienced a sense of anxiety in a supervision session? 
 
Many thanks for taking part in this research 
